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ARTICLE I COURTS

I. INTRODUCTION
In Crowell v. Benson, the Supreme Court recognized Congress's
power to create "legislative courts" under Article I of the Constitution.'
However, the Court held that, at most, the jurisdiction of "legislative
courts" or "Article I courts" extends to "examin[ing] and determin[ing]
various matters, arising between the government and others, which from
their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of
it."' 2 Although these courts are jurisdictionally limited to hearing suits

1. 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438,
451 (1929)); but cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 74
(1982) (To allow legislative courts to adjudicate disputes between private parties "would
require that we replace the principles delineated in our precedents, rooted in history and the
Constitution, with a rule of broad legislative discretion that could effectively eviscerate the
constitutional guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch of the Federal Government.").
2.
Bakelite, 458 U.S. at 74. The Supreme Court, in CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
847-59 (1986), later set forth a test to determine whether a tribunal created under Article I or
IIIimproperly encroached on the jurisdiction of Article III courts based on an analysis of
three non-exhaustive factors: 1) the degree to which the "essential attributes of power" are
reserved to Article III courts, and the extent that the agency exercises the jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts; 2) the importance of the right to be
adjudicated; and 3) the concerns that prompted Congress to depart from Article III norms.
In short, because an administrative agency did not exercise all the powers of an Article III
court (such as granting writs of habeas corpus) it did not infringe on the matters that were,
properly, exclusively in these courts' domain.
The Court of Federal Claims has, by statute, the power to hear "references"
from Congress. Under the statute, the court sits as a hearing officer over matters which
require fact-finding and legal analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 252-256, 260.
These courts probably need not follow Article III standing principles when hearing a case
that could not be appealed to an Article III court. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 362-63 (1911) (holding that the Supreme Court could not hear appeal of an advisory
opinion); Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447, 493 (1932)
("[T]he Supreme Court held [in Bakelite] that the Court of Customs Appeals, the Court of
Claims, and the courts of the District of Columbia are legislative and not constitutional
courts and hence could be invested by Congress with jurisdiction to render advisory
opinions, whereas a constitutional court could not be so required."); Am. Mar. Transp. v.
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 283, 290-91 (1989). However, adjudication of congressional
references is not subject to appeal and does not constitute a "case or controversy."
Therefore, the court may lack the power to compel testimony and issue self-executing writs.
Kanehl v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 89, 100 n.5 (1997) (Margolis, J.) ("[A] limited
exception to the Article Ill standing requirements are advisory rulings issued by this court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 .... Such advisory rulings are not considered actual
cases or controversies under Article Ill."); In re Dep't. of Def. Cable TV Franchise
Agreements, 35 Fed. Cl. 114, 116 (1996):
Thus, a dispute over compensation between the United States government and two private U.S. citizens, who were severely injured by machine gun fire.., would not be a case or controversy under Article III.
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against the government, it has been argued that they may also be circumscribed in the rules of decision that they may apply. In particular, it has
been argued that, unlike Article IH courts, 4 they lack the power to alter
their substantive determinations based on equitable principles5 and that
they lack the inherent power to punish noncompliance with their orders.6
Under Article I § 8 of the Constitution, Congress may "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Article 1I describes the characteristics of federal courts, namely that they are staffed by judges with life
tenure, whose salaries are insulated from diminution.7 Article 1I1 § 2
declares, in part, that "[t]he judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States."'
It is, therefore, uncontroversial that the lower courts described in Article
This case was appropriate for consideration by the U.S. Court of Claims
as a congressional reference case, however, because it was, in the practical sense, if not the legal sense, a real case and a real controversy.
Id. The rules of the Court of Federal Claims proceed from the proposition that the court can
compel testimony. R.CT. FED. CL. APP. D. 5. However, subpoenas issued under this
provision have never been enforced. As an aside, the internal rules of the Court of Federal
Claims provide that a panel of other "Article I" judges may serve as an appellate body. Id.
3.
See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
4.
See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding fight
of contribution in actions under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
because "[t]o apportion damages without regard to fault reduces, to an extent, the equity
which the doctrine was intended to provide. In this case, the potential inequity outweighs
the slight administrative benefits to be gained from using the pro rata measure."); United
States v. Iron Mountain Mines Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1452-54 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding
that in a suit brought by the government arising from statutory cause of action, the
"defendant... may assert any counterclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence
as the government's action, even though the counterclaim otherwise would be barred by
sovereign immunity or the statute of limitations were it brought as a separate action.").
5.
See, e.g., Drobny v. Comm'r, 113 F.3d 670, 678 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
unless fraudulent conduct by attorneys materially altered the outcome of the case, the Tax
Court was without power to vacate judgment).
6.
See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
7.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts,
shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall . . . receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished.").
8.
At the time of the drafting of Article III, it seems that the fields of law and
"equity" involved rigorous construction of statutes and doctrines. 3 WILIMm BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, § 27 ("Thus in the first place it is said that it is the business of a court of
equity in England to abate the rigour of the common law.") (footnote omitted). The major
differences between law and equity were the availability of discovery in the Chancery, and
jurisdiction over estates and debts, as well as "most matters of fraud." OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATr'y GEN.: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW: A
RECONSIDERATION OF THE "BROAD EQUITABLE POWER" OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 21 (1998)

[hereinafter OLP]. The courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over secured transactions
(including mortgages and trusts) as well. Id.
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111, and created by Congress pursuant to Article I, § 8, exercise the judicial
power of the United States described in Article Hm, § 2.
A literal interpretation of Article Il, demanding that all judicial decisions be made by judges with life tenure, has been soundly rejected by the
Supreme Court's decisions following Crowell.9 Article I courts may be
staffed with judges who lack life tenure because they do not exercise
"core" judicial functions for which the federal Constitution requires that
judges be insulated from politics. Put another way, decisions of tenuredfor-years judges are invalid only if these decisions extend beyond the
adjudication of "public rights."' 10
Because Article I courts are staffed by judges who lack life tenure,"
they are limited to hearing matters that "do not require judicial resolution,
even though they are capable of it.' 2 On the other hand, this jurisdictional
limitation prevents litigants from being hailed into court and forced to try
cases before judges without life tenure;' 3 or without a jury. 14 Nevertheless,

See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
9.
Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. 643 (1994) ("But while scholars continue to
hold up a literal interpretation of Article III as a goal to which the law might aspire, most
everyone agrees that it suffers from serious problems of institutional fit.") [hereinafter
Power]. Pfander also suggests that the use of the phrase inferior tribunal in Article I may
suggest that the drafters of the Constitution intended Congress to have the power to create
tribunals that did not exercise all of the powers of the lower courts, and that such a reference
may be a vestige of the idea of congressionally appointed state judges. Id. at 676-77.
10. N. Pipeline,458 U.S. at 70 (1982) ("iO]nly controversies in the [public rights]
category may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or
administrative agencies for their determination."); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America
v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) ("At the outset, and leaving aside all
consideration of criminal cases, we recognize the principle that parties to a case or
controversy in a federal forum are entitled to have the cause determined by Article III
judges, with some significant exceptions yet to be fully delineated by the Supreme Court.").
Historically, Supreme Court case law confined Congress's power to create
11.
Article I courts to certain areas. Professor Chemerinsky describes the permissible areas for
Article I courts as 1) courts with jurisdiction over United States possessions and territories,
2) military matters (though these may exist within Article II), 3) civil disputes between the
United States and private citizens, and 4) criminal matters or disputes between private
citizens where the legislative court serves as an adjunct to an Article III court that can
review the legislative court's decisions. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 18182 (1989); see also Amell v. Unites States, 384 U.S. 158, 166 (1966) ("The Court of Claims
possesses the expertise necessary to adjudicate government wage claims. It also serves as a
centralized forum for developing the law, particularly in large wage claim suits. These tasks
have been its responsibility since 1887."). Although the matter is beyond the scope of this
paper, in the past other "centralized" courts have existed.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
12.
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919 (1988) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 4950 (1932)); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449-60 (1929)).
Two cases appear to be exceptions to this rule. In United States v. La Abra
13.
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the question remains: Do Article I courts exercise fewer powers than
Article I courts? In particular, are they limited to simply using their
powers to make factual findings specified in statutes, or can they use their
powers to fashion remedies for government conduct that is "illegal" or
deviates from acceptable norms? In some cases, it has been argued that
these courts lack the power to fashion remedies that would regulate the
behavior of agencies by punishing the agencies for the behavior of the
representatives that appear before them.' 5 This paper argues, however, that
the requirement that Article I courts only hear matters that are "capable of
judicial resolution yet do not require it" does not act as a limitation on their
powers once a matter comes within their jurisdiction. Once an Article I
court is vested with jurisdiction, it exercises all of the powers associated
with the "Judicial Power of the United States" pursuant to Article Ii of the
Constitution.
Section II of this article describes two competing models for Article I
courts: the "redeterminist" model, which holds that Article I courts do not
exercise the judicial power of the United States, and the "institutional

Silver Mining Co., 32 Ct. Cl. 462 (1897), Congress enacted a statute that allowed the
Attorney General to sue La Abra in the Court of Claims with specially-conferred equity
jurisdiction. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 262, § 5, 20 Stat. 144, 145 (1878) (Based on claims
of fraud before the claims tribunal established by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the
President is requested to investigate "claims of fraud."); Act of December 28, 1892, ch. 15,
§ 1, 27 Stat. 410 (1892). In this case, pursuant to a treaty with Mexico that included an
arbitration agreement that was intended to settle the claims of various individuals it was
alleged that La Abra had provided false testimony that had resulted in the Mexican
government having to pay the U.S. government to compensate La Abra. WILSON COWEN ET.
AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY 74-7 (1978). After the court
determined that La Abra lied, the U.S. government repaid Mexico, and took the loss for
itself. Also, pursuant to 27 Stat. 410, the U.S. brought suit against Mr. Weil who was also
accused of defrauding the arbitration panel. Eventually, in United States v. Weil, 35 Cl. Ct.
42 (1900), the court determined that the claims against the Mexican government were false.
14.
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880) (holding that Seventh
Amendment does not apply to actions before the court, because the court does not
adjudicate matters arising from the common law); Leandra Lederman, Equity and the
Article I Court: Is The Tax Court's Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?,5 FLA.
TAx REV. 357, 364 (2001) ("Article I courts are an odd creation. Their very existence
appears to be prima facie evidence of an infringement by the legislature on the judicial
power expressly granted to Article III courts. Nonetheless, despite the language of Article
III, Article I courts are so accepted today that commentators consider 'a return to "Article III
literalism" virtually unthinkable."' (quoting M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review- A Nice
Thing? Article III, Separationof Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1550 (1997) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Fallon, supra note 12, at 938))).
15.
See the discussion of M.A. Mortenson Co. v. United States, infra notes 301-306
and accompanying text.
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discipline" model, which holds that Article I courts do exercise such
judicial power.16 The remainder of the paper argues that the "institutional
discipline" model is correct, and that Article I courts possess the power to
remedy more than just incorrect factual determinations by government
agencies. Sections 1I and IV of this article show that although Article I
courts purport to operate within a waiver of sovereign immunity, the very
concept of sovereign immunity is a doctrine so rife with legal fictions' 7 that
it does not operate to constrain the power of Article I courts, as is so often
asserted by adherents of the redeterminist model.' 8 Section V provides a
history of extant Article I courts, tracing the evolution into their modem
forms' 9 and illustrating how Article I courts exercise "the judicial power of
the United States." Although they owe their existence to congressional
enactments, their power to provide petitioners with complete remedies
derives from the necessity that Article I courts vindicate the "right of the
people to petition the government for a redress" '20 (provided, at least, an
underlying judicially-cognizable grievance), and the Constitutional dictate
that courts exercise jurisdiction over "controversies" and not merely
isolated questions. 21 However, the power of Article I courts has been, to
varying degrees, constrained by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
22
may have been codified, at least in part, by the appropriations clause
which limits monetary relief to that which is "in [clonsequence of
[a]ppropriations made by [f]aw. ' 23 These Constitutional concerns have
varied in importance over the years, and history demonstrates how courts
have balanced these concerns, often not without inconsistencies. The
purpose of section VI is to show that tensions between these three
constitutional provisions can be resolved, even if specific remedies are
foreclosed by Congress, since the very nature of rights and remedies, as
expressed in Professors Hart and Sacks' primary and remedial rights

16.
See infra part II(A).
James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a
17.
First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 899, 977 (1997) (describing sovereign immunity as a "complex interplay of statutes,
judicial decisions, and common law assumptions.") [hereinafter, Pfander, Petition].
18.
See infra Section III.
19.
See infra Section V(A)(1).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
21.
Controversies.").
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
22.
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
23.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 7. The Eleventh Amendment protects only the
states-not the federal government-from suit.
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dichotomy, allows injured petitioners
to use the government's conduct as a
24
theory to reduce their liability.
1I.THEORIES OF ARTICLE I COURTS

This section describes two theories of Article I courts, in an attempt to
identify their powers, and, more particularly, to determine whether Article I
courts exercise the "judicial power of the United States." The "redeterminist theory" posits that the powers of Article I courts are restricted to
answering narrow questions of fact and questions of law that clearly fall
within the jurisdiction of the agency that the court reviews. Under the
broader "institutional discipline theory," Article I courts have the power to
provide petitioners with relief from incorrect interpretations of law and
from systemic agency problems.
A. THE REDETERMINIST THEORY OF ARTICLE I COURTS

Article I courts have jurisdiction only over actions against the federal
government and can only review certain statutorily-defined decisions made
by agencies within the executive branch. Under the redeterminist theory,
Congress ostensibly has the power to create courts that exercise judicial
power only insofar as those courts will serve as neutral fact-finders
reviewing certain statutorily-defined executive agency decisions. To
support this view, redeterminists point to the narrow waivers of sovereign
immunity within which Article I courts operate.26 They argue that these

24.
See infra Section VI(B).
25.
Unfortunately, because Article I Courts are not given the same scholarly
attention that Article III Courts receive, these terms are my notations for these schools of
thought, and, to my knowledge, no judge or commentator describes him or herself as a
"redeterminist" or an "institutional disciplinarian." The term "redeterminist" reflects the
formal name of most petitions before the Tax Court, which are styled "Petitions for
Redetermination," viewed by many as a simple request for review of the Internal Revenue
Service's preliminary determination of the amount of tax due. The "institutional discipline
model" is so called because it regards Article I Courts as capable of disciplining agencies
for their behavior by, at the very least, reducing the amount of money that they are able to
exact. See infra notes 29 and 49. For a view of judicial discipline of agencies, see Jill E.
Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An EquilibriumApproach, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1055,
1118-19 (1997) ("Retroactivity doctrine limits both the nature of legal change and the
manner in which it occurs ....[R]etroactivity rules can be viewed as a way of disciplining
institutions for improper rulemaking.").
26.
A common mantra in these cases is that "the sovereign cannot be sued without
its consent, and that consent must be strictly construed, it can decide all the times and
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waivers implicitly limit an Article I court's ability to articulate substantive
norms of behavior.2 7 Specific statutes also explicitly limit the ability of
Article I courts to provide injunctive relief beyond mere orders to pay
petitioners or to refrain from collecting-or attempting to collect-from a
petitioner appearing before the court.28 In the redeterminist view, Article I
courts exist to weigh conflicting evidence and render a conclusion as to the
merits of various statutorily-defined matters,29 such as "adjusted gross
conditions and name the court to entertain the suit." See United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 583 (1941); United States v. Testan, 205 Ct. Cl. 330 (1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 392
(1976). The notion that the sovereign may restrict the available remedies upon consent to be
sued likely came from a compilation of British Law. See Harold J. Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 42 HARv. L. REv. 447, 449 (1918-1919) ("[The crown] chooses
its own court; it may, save where, of its own grace, it has otherwise determined, avoid the
payment of costs." "Laches and prescription lose their meaning when the Crown has
become desirous of action.").
27.
For example, in the government's brief in Dixon v. Comm'r, the government
argued that, at best, an Article I court can provide a remedy only if the behavior of
government attorneys created a "structural defect"' in the trial proceedings that, if the same
had happened in a criminal trial, would have constituted more than harmless error.
Appellee's Brief at 21-22, Dixon v. Comm'r, 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 00-70858),
2002 WL 32096491. Since Article I courts do not hear criminal cases, their powers to
regulate norms of behavior are limited to those articulated by Federal Courts of Appeal that
hear criminal matters, and their ability to prospectively adopt rules. However, the
government conceded that there has never been a case of a structural defect in a civil case.
Id. at 22 n.4. In other words, the government argued that Legislative Courts have structures
that can never be structurally breached, and there is no need for their judges to worry about
such breaches.
All Article I courts have, by statute, and perhaps by virtue of their inherent
28.
power, the power to issue injunctions in aid of their jurisdiction. 38 U.S.C. § 5711 (2000).
However, such injunctions only exist to preserve their jurisdiction, and a request for such a
writ would not provide the basis for a complaint. See United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1
(1889) (holding that where a District Court's jurisdiction was the same as the Court of
Claims, the district court, acting under the jurisdiction of the Tucker Act, could not order an
agency to undertake administrative action).
29.
Two tax court judges who argued in favor of this view were Judges Meade
Witaker and Theodore Tannenwald. Judge Witaker wrote:
the court does not simply determine which party wins the lawsuit, but
instead determines the taxpayer's correct tax liability. This is a different
responsibility, for example, from that of the United States district court
in a controversy between two parties. To carry out this responsibility,
the court must play a different role in the trial process than would normally be expected of a trial court.
Meade Witaker, Some Thoughts on Current Tax Practice,7 VA. TAX REv. 421, 437 (1988).
Judge Tannenwald wrote, "the public equally is entitled to assurance that the taxpayer will
not be permitted to 'eat, drink, and be merry' at the expense of the federal fisc." Theodore
Tannenwald Jr., Tax Court Trials: A View from the Bench, 59 A.B.A. J.295 (1973); see also
Kuehn v. HHS, 2003 WL 22416683, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. 2003) ("[T]he Vaccine Act
does not provide any textual authority to the special masters to determine the Constitutional-
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income." The only remedies available are court-imposed reductions in the
amount the agency can collect, or, when the court determines that an
agency owes money to a petitioner, issuance of a judgment for money
damages against the agency, payable only out of a specific fund that
Congress sets aside for payment of such judgments. 30

ity of its provisions. With no textual authority, the undersigned refuses to create any extra
textual authority.") appeal dismissed by stipulation 85 Fed.Appx. 198 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(cited in Cheskiewicz v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 2004 WL 326693 at 5, n.5 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(opining that constitutional issues regarding the Vaccine Act must be raised before the
Federal Circuit and apparently can be raised nowhere else); Akins v. Comm'r, 1993 T.C.
Memo. 1993-256, 1993 WL 195425 (1993) (stating that the court does not have jurisdiction
to set off proposed deficiency against negligence claim by D.C. employee who was
seriously injured as a result of claimed negligence by federal government); Appeal of
Kunkel & Co., 3 B.T.A. 133 (1925) (refusing to order Board of Internal Revenue to accept
amended returns).
While challenges to the constitutionality of statutes or procedures are properly
before a court, it is undisputed that merely asserting a constitutional claim that exists
independently of the subject matter that Congress put before the Article I court need not be
heard by the Court. See, e.g., HHS, 23 CI.Ct. 348 (1991) (Lydon, J.). Unlike English courts
of equity, no showing will vitiate the jurisdictional requirements, and likewise no overall
apparent injustice will deprive a court of jurisdiction. See also, Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is
JurisdictionJurisdictional?,95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1207, 1248 (2001) ("[Glood equity cannot
establish good subject matter jurisdiction, and bad equity cannot destroy it.").
However, setting aside Kuehn, amongst courts of appeal there is no dispute as
to whether courts created under Article I can decide constitutional issues. While an
individual court may not have the specific power to enjoin certain state or federal actions or
issue declaratory judgments, all judges are required to refuse to follow a statute they
consider unconstitutional, no matter what court they sit in and regardless of whether or not
Congress specifically empowers the court to undue its work. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI;
Jaggard v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 222, 224 n.6 (1981) ("In its holding, the Fifth Circuit relied on
Simon v. E.K. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), a case dealing with standing in
Article III courts, not Article I courts such as the Tax Court. Nothing in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion, however, indicates to us that any meaningful distinction should be drawn based on
the constitutional derivation of the particular court involved."); United States v. Matthews,
16 M.J. 354, 366 (C.M.A. 1983) ("Likewise, we are sure that Congress intended for this
Court to have unfettered power to decide constitutional issues- even those concerning the
validity of the Uniform Code. To impute a contrary intent would itself raise the constitutional question whether a judge-even one appointed under Article I, rather than under
Article Ill-could be required by oath to support the Constitution of the United States, see
U.S. CONST. art. VI, but at the same time be forced to make decisions and render judgments
based on statutes which he concluded were contrary to that Constitution."); United States v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1982) (discussing the constitutionality of pretrial detention
provisions of the District of Columbia Code without judicial intimation that Article I status
precluded consideration of the constitutional issue), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (en
banc).
30.
Indeed, if no such fund was available, a prevailing counterclaimant was, at
certain points, entitled to no relief. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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To redeterminists, an individual wronged by the government, or even
hoodwinked in litigation before an Article I court, is entitled to no relief.
The court is simply in the business of weighing the evidence put before it
and perhaps punching a few numbers into a calculator. It may not address
broader legal or moral questions 31 or determine the proper interpretation of
factual findings.3 2
Under this view, if Congress, in its grace, creates a claim against the
government and delegates adjudication of the claim to an executive agency,
an Article I court has no more power than that delegated to the agency
under its review.33 The delegation restricts the court's function to inquiring
into, at most, the correctness, validity, and perhaps arbitrariness of a final
agency decision. The court may not correct the underlying behavior of
personnel in the agency, and it certainly may not compensate a petitioner
for mischievous
behavior by attorneys representing the agency before the
34
court.

Indeed, in extreme cases, it has been argued that even the amount of
damages available to the victim of the government's breach of contract
should be resolved not by reference to the common law of contracts, but

31.
Examples include a conflict between two statutes or a constitutional issue. See
Greider v. Sec'y of Dept. of Health and Human Services, 23 Cl. Ct. 348 (1991), which
explains how a constitutional claim for money damages might be outside an Article I court's
jurisdiction, but analyzing the constitutionality of a statute is not. This view may also find
its roots in Story's understanding that "There are many cases against natural justice which
are left wholly to the conscience of the party, and are without any redress, equitable or

legal." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 14 (1988 reprint).

32.
It should be noted that Article I courts have, on the other hand, held somewhat
rigorously that once they properly have jurisdiction, it is not destroyed by the conduct of a
party. Connick v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 495 (1993) (holding that the Tax Court may still
determine tax liability even if the parties are fugitives and no longer in the country).
33.
Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172 (1936) (providing that the court's
power is "curtailed only so far as authority to decide is given to the administrative officer").
34.
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949)
("The Government, as representative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract right.").
Since the Tax Court and Bankruptcy Court have somewhat overlapping jurisdiction, the
Eleventh Circuit has concluded that the Tax Court might discretionarily opt not to exercise
jurisdiction over a matter which was primarily bankruptcy in nature, because even though it
might be able to review an appeal of a "Collection Due Process" hearing under 26 U.S.C. §
6330, the Tax Court "had reasonable concerns as to whether addressing such issues would
constitute the exercise of equitable powers exceeding the Tax Court's statutorily prescribed
jurisdiction to handle its particularized area of law by intruding into the particularized area
of law delegated by Congress to a different Article I court, the bankruptcy court." Meadows
v. Comm'r, No. 04-11089, at *12 (5th Cir. April 6, 2005).
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rather by a "redetermination" of the government's own calculations.35
According to the redeterminists, courts in such a position are not acting to
shape broad concepts of justice with the finality of an enforceable
judgment. Instead, these courts act as one part of a larger decision-making
process.36 For example, the Tax Court acts as a safety-valve for tax
assessments, preventing the Internal Revenue Service from collecting
money from a taxpayer once the taxpayer has filed a valid petition with the
court, but lacks the3 7inherent power to "to revisit a final judgment to
achieve a just result.
Even though redeterminists insist that the court's actions are so constrained, it can be argued that the practical effects of its decisions have
substantial influence over the behavior of the agency whose determinations
the court reviews. Even if the agency is not bound by a specific mandate or
injunction, the agency will acknowledge the precedential effect of the
court's decision and resign itself to the likelihood that similar matters will
be decided the same way.
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE MODEL

In contrast to the redeterminist model, the institutional discipline
model posits that the parties before an Article I court have a right to air
their dispute before a tribunal endowed with all the powers of an Article Ill
court, at least with respect to matters addressed in the petition.38 These
powers, originally recognized by courts of equity, include the power to
hold parties in contempt of court; the power to issue and enforce subpoenas;39 the power to impose sanctions for bad-faith actions; n4 and even the

35. Hemphill Sch., Inc. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 462 (1955) (entitling schools
to petition the court for additional monies where the Administration had no "general
regulatory power" over the school and where Veterans Administration had contracted with
school to provide training for returning veterans and the "G.I. Bill of Rights" required that
government fix a reasonable rate to pay such schools); but c.f. Patterson v. United States,
115 Ct. Cl. 348 (1950) (holding that where claims against the government for valuation of
takings of land were handled administratively, Court of Claims could not review decisions,
as it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the administrative process).
36.
See Stephen C. Gara, Challenging the Finality of Tax Court Judgments: When
is Final Not Really Final?, 20 AKRON TAX J. 35, 44 (2005) ("Another reason for judgment
finality unique to the Tax Court is found in section [26 U.S.C. §] 6213 ....If ajudgment is
subsequently reviewed or modified, it delays the government's ability to initiate collection
activities.").
37. Id. at 56.
38.
See, e.g., infra note 414, and accompanying text.
39.

William A. Richardson, History, Jurisdiction, and Practice of the Court of

Claims of the United States, 7 S.L. REv. 781, 804 (1882) (describing historic powers of
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power to alter the court's own substantive determinations in order to
redress interests injured by the conduct of the government and not
otherwise provided for by a remedial statute. To institutional disciplinarians, an Article I court can do much more than merely stand in for an
agency decision-maker or accountant. Once Congress has waived the
government's sovereign immunity, a petitioner seeking relief before an
Article I court is entitled to the full panoply of substantive rights as
described by Congress or the Constitution, so long as the jurisdiction of the
court is properly invoked.4' While a petitioner may not have the choice of

court); COWEN, supra note 13, at 106. Initially the Court operated with a "Call Statute", 28
U.S.C. § 2507, which allowed the court to call upon any part or agency of the Federal
Government for documents. However, the agency could avoid heeding the call by simply
asserting that it would be "injurious to the public interest." Such a limitation on discovery
powers finds its roots in the common law of evidence, and not necessarily any need to
construe the powers of a court of limited jurisdiction narrowly. NORMAN FETrER,
HANDBOOK OF EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 197 (1895). However since 1954, the parties have,
by statute, the same procedures available that a U.S. District Court would. 28 U.S.C. § 2507.
Of course, should a government agency refuse to provide information, unlike a third party
who refuses to comply with a subpoena, the court could simply find the refusals to be
deemed an admission. See also HARRY N. STULL, A CASE INTHE UNITED STATES COURT OF

55 (1924) ("The Court of Claims may issues subpoenas to require the attendance of
witnesses in order to be examined before any person commissioned to take testimony
therein. Such subpoenas shall have the same force as if issued from a district court, and
compliance shall be compelled under such rules and orders as the court shall establish.")
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 168).
40.
Some commentators note that non-monetary sanctions may always be available,
even in administrative actions. See Thomas C. Wheeler, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 569, 571-580
(2000). These sanctions can be quite forceful, since they include striking responses and
eliminating evidence.
41.
In one of the darker days for the country, and, unfortunately, for the Court, the
Court of Claims held that certain soldiers in the Korean War who had willingly cooperated
with the enemy (they had conceded that they were not brainwashed) were not entitled to
back pay despite the statute. 37 U.S.C. § 242 (1952). In Bell v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl.
248 (1960), rev'd, 366 U.S. 393 (1961), the court held that the argument that the soldiers
were entitled to back pay was technical and "sheer legalism." Therefore, presumably, the
government was entitled to ignore the statute because the plaintiffs were guilty of immoral
acts in time of war. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that based on the language of the
statute, 37 U.S.C. § 242, the turncoats were entitled to their pay.
In Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (Field, J.), the Court noted that
all lower Federal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, but, once in existence, "[tihe power to
punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of
the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of
the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject,
they became possessed of this power." See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REv. 593, 606 (1992) (arguing that the Court presumes that "once Congress has
CLAIMS
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whatever remedy she wants, 42 she is entitled to a forum complete with the
inherent power to provide her with the same procedural tools to obtain the
quantum of relief that she would obtain in another court vested with
jurisdiction over the matter.4 3
Professor Lederman has argued meticulously against the institutional
discipline model. According to Professor Lederman, Article I courts
adjudicate different questions than Article II courts, and therefore appeals
for parallel treatment are unwarranted. 44 However, Professor Lederman's
argument does not hold water if both Article I and Article I courts are
"courts" in the constitutional sense of the word. 5 Even if some subject
matters are outside the jurisdiction of an Article nH court, the court's ability
to determine substantive rights and provide remedies 46 may merely be
"organized" but not constrained by Congress. 4 7 No matter how narrowly

vested federal courts with jurisdiction, it is presumed to vest them with all the traditional
facets of the 'judicial power').
42.
See, e.g., OLP, supra note 8, at ii (1988) (providing that "the right/remedy
principle is a general statement about the role of the judiciary, that it has no peculiar
application to equity, and that it is true only if its contra-positive ('where there is no remedy,
there is no right') is also true").
43.
While Congress seems to have gone out of its way to provide for various forms
of due process, it also has gone out of its way to attempt to limit injunctive relief,
presumably to channel as much litigation as possible to these forums. Even so, Article III
courts have found that they could issue injunctions when the government failed to provide
individuals with an opportunity to litigate in Article I courts. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents of
Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1938); United States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97 (7th Cir.
1956); Moore v. Welch, 166 F. Supp 36 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
44.
Lederman, supra note 14, at 396-98. Professor Lederman explains that
arguments regarding whether the Tax Court has equitable powers refer to the fact that the
Tax Court has similar jurisdiction to other courts that also have jurisdiction to rule on tax
matters and to order refund of money. However, Professor Lederman points out that there
are significant differences: 1) the pre-requisite for Tax Court jurisdiction is the IRS's
assertion of additional monies owed, while in the U.S. District Court and Court of Federal
Claims full payment and exhaustion of administrative remedies is required (unless there is a
claim made under the Constitution and the Tucker act), so the Tax Court might decide
overpayments, whereas the other courts order refunds; 2) in a deficiency case, the taxpayer
need not prove an exact dollar amount, but in refund cases the burden as to the exact amount
due is still usually on the taxpayer; 3) the District Courts do not accord any burden-shifting
effect to matters that the IRS did not include on a statutory notice of deficiency, whereas in
the Tax Court the IRS bears the burden of proving things that it did not include on its initial
notice. Finally, Professor Lederman notes that the Tax Court, as a pre-payment forum, is
not mandated by Fifth Amendment of the Constitution as there is no constitutional right to a
pre-assessment forum.
45.
See Pfander, Power, supra note 9.
46.
As will be explained later, it is quite possible to have a right without a
correlative remedy. See infra section IV(B).
47.
When faced with a challenge to an administrative decision, the Supreme Court
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the subject matter jurisdiction of an Article HI court is described, it still
exercises the judicial power of the United States by virtue of being a
"court" in the constitutional sense of the word. Likewise, if an Article I

court is a "court" in the constitutional sense; its subject matter jurisdiction
may be narrowly circumscribed without simultaneously eviscerating its
exercise of the "Judicial Power of the United States."
At the heart of the debate between redeterminists and institutional
disciplinarians is the following question: Are Article I courts analogous to
the British courts of common pleas, which could issue relief only by means
of certain writs enumerated by the King or Parliament, 48 or do Article I
courts function as courts in both "law" and "equity" as described in Article
III of the Constitution? Redeterminists subscribe to the view that Article I
courts are analogous to courts of common pleas.49 Institutional discipli-

held that the Administrative Procedures Act gave parties other than the party granted or
denied a license the ability to challenge the matter in court. It concluded that rather than
simply organizing a right to seek judicial review of administrative decisions, the Act
actually provided parties rights that they did not have before. Data Processing Serv. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question
of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
Thus the Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person "aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Id.; Thomas Wm.Mayor, The Local
Government Antitrust Act: A Comment on the Constitutional Questions, 50 J. AIR L. &
COM. 805 (1985) ("The procedures and remedies that define the 'remedial capacity to
invoke a sanction' are generally subject to the control of the legislature."); see also
Miravalle v. Comm'r; 105 T.C. No. 5 (1995) (holding that Tax Court held no power to stay
the sale of property seized pursuant to a jeopardy assessment because there was no specific
grant of jurisdiction that would enable the court to issue such an order after the IRS actually
had title to the property), but cf. Murray v. United States, 817 F.2d 1580 (Fed Cir. 1987)
(holding that Court of Claims had jurisdiction under the takings clause to adjudicate claim
that IRS's levy on property constitute a taking of the second-mortgagee's interest in the
property). As will be discussed later, jurisdiction of the Tax Court to consider equitable
claims has caused considerable anxiety in tax circles.
48.
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 915-16 (1987) ("The
obligation to choose only one writ at a time limited the scope of law suits, as did rules
severely restricting the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants.").
49.
However, redeterminists concede that Article I courts have been specifically
vested with the power to compel testimony via depositions and subpoenas.
JoHN
INDERMAUR, A MANUAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 452 (1902). Arguably the foremost
redeterminist, Judge Tannenwald, minimized the importance of these powers by saying that
they were usually unnecessary to proper determinations by the court. Judge Tannenwald
stated:
I view resolution of a tax dispute as involving more of an investigatory
than an adversary process. The concept that a tax case is not a jousting
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narians, however, contend that Article I courts exercise the judicial power
of the United States, which includes powers originally consigned to both
courts of common pleas and to the Chancery.
ItI. ORIGINS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Redeterminists, as illustrated above, believe that the doctrine of sovereign immunity limits the operation of Article I courts. The powers of
Article I courts must, therefore, be limited to deciding issues within the
narrow statutory waivers of sovereign immunity. However, a historical
overview of the adjudication of claims against the government (contrary to
the redeterminist view) supports the institutional disciplinarian's view that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity imposes no substantive limitations
upon the powers of Article I courts.
A. BACKGROUND OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

The modem 50 history of claims against the government probably begins about 1300 A.D. when Edward I returned from the crusades and began
to hear complaints against the Crown from any who wished to petition
him. 5' The actual payment of sums was at first delegated to the Exchequer,
which was initially little more than an administrative agency charged with
keeping the King's books.5 2 Later, the evaluation of the writs was
delegated to "special commissions . . . the Privy Council, or . .. the
Chancellor," 53 which began formulating a jurisprudence to determine the
match between gladiators on the field of battle finds particular relevance in the area of discovery .... All too often, the Court has found
that one party, usually the Government, uses the discovery process to

ask for the kitchen sink, a process which can impose an undue burden
on taxpayers.

Theodore Tannenwald, Jr. & Mary Ann Cohen, A Dialogue Between Tax Court Judges, 46
TAX. LAW. 672, 674 (1993).
50.
I refer to this as the "modern" period because our current understanding of the
doctrine can be traced to this time. The "medieval" English concept of the king was
somewhat more benevolent, and kings were obligated to right wrongs. Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1999).
51.

LUDWIK EHRUCH, PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE CROWN 95 (1921);

Charles

Chancey Binney, Origin and Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government in the
United States, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 372, 376 (1908-9); CHARLES H. McILWAIN, THE GROWTH

OF POLmCAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 198 (1932).
52.
THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000).
53.
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1963) [hereinafter, Jaffe, Officers] (noting that at the time of the
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proper grounds upon which claims should be paid.54 In theory, the King
could, in his sole discretion, refuse one of these "petitions of right." Yet,
according to Professor Jaffe, this never actually happened. Initially, these
petitions were based on claims against property or chattels.5 6 Thus, while
the King could not be sued in his own courts, a party could submit a
"petition of right" to the King, 57 and the King would either handle the
58
matter himself or delegate the matter to a judge or the Chancellor.
Eventually, petitions to sue the King were granted on a routine basis, 59 even
though a decision not to follow the court's recommendations could not be
enforced via judgment. 60

drafting of the American Constitution, parties could attain some remedy from government
wrongs by either suits against officers, or via petitioners of right in which consent to sue
was given as a matter of course).
54.
These writs were included within the common law. Matthew Hale, The History
of the Common Law of England § 11 (1713), available at
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/3113/hale/common (last visited Oct. 19,
2005). However, Binney describes these petitions as of right as "really a petition for a right
to sue." Binney, supra note 51 at 376; see also McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440
(1880) ("They are not suits at common law within its true meaning. The government cannot
be sued, except with its own consent.").
55.
Jaffe, Officers, supra note 53, at 5 ("In theory at least, and there is no positive
evidence as far as I know that practice did not accord with theory, consent was given not on
the basis of expediency, but of law."); George M. Davie, Suing the State, 18 AM. L. REV.
814, 817 (1884) ("[Tlhe law of England seemed to be that the courts should be open to all,
and that remedial writs might issue against any other person.").
56.
Cockburn, C.J. described this limitation in the oft-quoted passage of Featherv.
Regina, 6 B & S 257, 293 (1865):
The only cases in which the Petition of Right is open to the subject are,
where the land or goods or money of a subject have found their way
into the possession of the Crown, and the purpose of the petition is to
obtain restitution, or, if restitution cannot be given, compensation in
money, or where the claim arises out of a contract, as for goods supplied to the Crown or to the public service.
Remedies under tort theories against the government were left to either specific acquiescence by the government, or suits against the officers. The American experience, as
detailed later, was somewhat tortured, as the courts wrestled with the question of whether
officers or states could even be sued.
57.
COWEN, supra note 13, at 1-2. Laski sees petitions of right not as the admission
of a legal claim, but rather as "an ungracious effort to do justice without the admission of a
legal claim." Laski, Responsibility, supra note 26, at 455.
58.
F.W. Maitland, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, Two
COURSES OF LECTURES 4 (1920) ("Now the king can not be sued by action- no writ will go
against him; the heir if he wants justice must petition for it humbly. Such matters as these
are referred to the Chancellor."). Failure to heed such petitions was included by Jefferson in
the Declaration of Independence. COWEN, supra note 13, at 1-2.
59.
Davie, supra note 55, at 830.
60.
See, e.g., Queen v. Comm'rs Treasury, L. R. 7 Q. B. 387, 394 ("When a duty
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After the Glorious Revolution and the Bill of Rights in 1688 resulted
in Parliamentary control of the "purse" via the Exchequer, the Exchequer
began to enjoy surpluses, which could not be turned over to the Crown.6'
Parliament began to approve payments to individuals from the Exchequer
to satisfy various claims. 62 Along with the practice of appealing to the
63
Crown, petitioners could also attempt a suit against individual ministers
or against the King in those areas to which he was presumed to have
consented. 64 After Edward I, the Exchequer's role expanded to include
disciplining various bailiffs and sheriffs. However, before judgments were
enforced against specific officers, the Exchequer would determine whether
the action was properly undertaken in his name, and therefore the officer
was entitled to immunity from judgment.65
After the Glorious Revolution, the jurisdiction of the Exchequer
gradually expanded. Its power reached an apex when it was hearing
"common pleas" involving individuals, though such actions were later
prohibited by statute.66 Nevertheless, the Exchequer acquired both "legal"
has to be performed... by the crown... this court can not claim ...to have any power to
command the Crown.") quoted in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
61.
K. BRADSHAW & D. PING, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS 307, 310 (1972).
Initially, after the "Glorious Revolution" the Exchequer found itself with a surplus of money
that it could not return to the King. Parliament began hearing many requests for relief.
Some authors characterize the gradual development of the Exchequer from an accounting
office to a court-entity as taking hundreds of years, perhaps dating back to the time of King
John. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 160 (5th
ed. 1956).
In Pawlett v. Attorney Gendera, 145 Eng. Rep. 550 (1668), the Court of the
Exchequer found that the King was required to "do equity" and that even though the Court
of the Exchequer was a "court of revenue" it could allow a mortgager whose property had
been foreclosed to redeem it. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 202 (1965) [hereinafter Jaffe, Control].
62.
Floyd Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The
Evolutionfrom a Legislative Toward a JudicialModel of Payment, 45 LA. L. Rev. 625, 628
(1985).
63.
Laski points out that by even after the Glorious Revolution, "[tihe law knows
no such thing as the government." Therefore, if a minister actually makes a decision on his
own, absent a statutory protection or indemnification, he is subject to suit. Laski,
Responsibility, supra note 26, at 450. Likewise, as a practical matter, allowing an individual
to sue for the reckless actions taken in the name of the state is "no more than a plea that
realism be substituted in place of fiction," as such reckless actions are not undertaken on
behalf of the sovereign, but, in fact, are no different than they would be if a someone acting
on his own behalf had committed them. Laski, Responsibility, supra note 26, at 452.
64.
See Jaffe, Officers, supra note 53.
65.
Id. at 9. ("Thus, if a servant of the King disseised an individual in the King's
name, an action against the servant lay but judgment would not be given before the King's
will was done, i.e., would not be given unless he disclaimed the act.").
66.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 61, at 160.
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and "equitable" jurisdiction 67 over 1) suits brought on behalf of or against
royal officers and accountants and by anyone regarding any debt to the
Crown; 68 2) persons that the King deemed "favoured persons" such as
friars and some merchants, who the king decided could be sued only in the
Exchequer; and 3) matters in which the parties had voluntarily deposited
their contracts with the Exchequer.69
By the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the Laws of England in 1769, relief from government mistakes or inadvertence had been
granted with some frequency for over four hundred years. Nevertheless,
Blackstone declared in his treatise that the proposition "[tihat the King can
do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle of the English
Constitution. 7 °
Today, Blackstone's pronouncement is frequently
interpreted as a cynical declaration of government's infallibility. Yet,
given the history of claims against the government and the state of law that
existed in Blackstone's time, his pronouncement is better interpreted as
expressing the view that remedies for government misdeeds are available,
but only because of the King's routine benevolence, and not as an absolute
right.
To invoke the King's benevolence, a party petitioned the King for a
referral to the Chancery. Blackstone described the process of seeking
extraordinary relief via a "prerogative writ."
Whenever therefore it happens, that, by misinformation or
inadvertence, the crown has been induced to invade the
private rights of any of its subject, though no action will lie
against the sovereign, . . .yet the law has furnished the
subject with a decent and respectful mode of removing that

67.

W. H.

BRYSON,

THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER:

ADMINISTRATION, AND RECORDS

ITS JURISDICTION,

11, 17 (1986) (relating how in many instances the suits

could be sought at common law, but the parties often sought injunctive relief).
68.
This appears to have included all matters regarding the King's revenues, and
taxation matters. Id. at 12. ("The exchequer court had jurisdiction over whatever was
cognizable in the revenue departments of the exchequer and over anything which touched
the profits of the crown."). Indeed, in the Court of the Exchequer, one who owed money to
the King could also sue his own debtors, so that the King could in turn assert the
Excheuqer's jurisdiction over the Crown's debtor's debtors to further the collection of royal
revenue. Id. at 18. Indeed, at one point it became a strategic decision for parties to vest or
divest the Court of Exchequer of jurisdiction by paying a debt to a party to the Crown, or by
satisfying the obligation to the Crown. Id. at 27.
69.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 61, at 160-61. Plunkett also notes that the Crown could
sue individuals in the Court of the Exchequer, and many individuals died in debt to the
Crown, and their estates came before the Court of the Exchequer for adjudication. Id. at 161.
70. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 254.
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invasion, by informing the king of the true state of the
matter in dispute: and, as it presumes that to know of an
injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it
then issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders
to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.1 '
Blackstone's declaration that the "King could do no wrong" marks an
important shift in the rhetoric surrounding claims against the government.
The default position, following Blackstone, would be cast as a presumptive
immunity of the government from paying up on claims of wrongdoing,
rather than as the presumptive right of citizens to receive redress from
harms suffered at the hands of government actors. 72 It was in this context
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity evolved, and the doctrine began to
take on a life of its own as courts extrapolated a theory for when claims
should be allowed from instances in which relief had been denied to
petitioners.
At the time of the American Revolution, sovereign immunity was not
conceived as a simple bar against non-consensual claims against the state.
Instead, it was a complex doctrine with intricate contours and exceptions,
under which claimants had to navigate among prerogative writs, suits in the
Exchequer, and petitions to Parliament in order to obtain relief. Therefore,
by the time the British colonies obtained some measure of autonomy,
lawyers, legislatures, and colonial governors were faced with a doctrine
that was the product of a desire to articulate a formula for when relief
should be denied to a petitioner, rather than a long-standing historical
assumption that the government was immune from suit.
Colonial America understood that, from time to time, legislatures
would have to provide compensation for injuries, breached contracts, or
other damages that the government inflicted upon a citizen.73 In Virginia,
for example, the practice of legislative payment of claims became
institutionalized.74 In 1705, judges were tasked with traveling from town to

71.
Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
72.
Or, as Pfander puts it, Blackstone's articulation of the individual's right to relief
from an infallible king was "[n]ot a bad piece of work for a good king's man like
Blackstone." Pfander, Petition,supra note 17, at 926.
73.
Davie notes that state constitutions often seemed to allow the legislature to set
forth the way that the state could be sued, and that no independent rights existed to bring
suit in a court. Davie, supra note 55, at 820.
74.
The first standing colonial committee on claims was found in Virginia's House
of Burgess sometime before 1680. At the time, like in England, a legislative committee
served as the highest court in Virginia. Shimomura, supra note 62, at 630.
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town and "certifying" various claims against the Commonwealth. 75 While
the judges did not pass on the credibility or legal merit of the claims, they
presented a record to the House of Burgesses, who decided whether to pay,
and if so, how much.76 Indeed, while there might not have been binding
review of the decisions of the legislature by an independent judiciary,
individuals had a right to have their claims heard, and in one instance,
judges were reprimanded for not collecting and certifying the grievances
against the commonwealth.77 Moreover, as will be discussed later, even if
a decision was wholly within the province of the legislature, and not
subject to independent judicial review, it still provided what Professors
Hart and Sacks would term a "directive arrangement" 78 to future executive
actors.79
Likewise, in pre-revolutionary Connecticut, it became common practice for individuals to petition the legislature for relief from the actions of
the executive or even judges. 80 This practice of "legislative equity" became
so cumbersome that the legislature eventually suggested that citizens
attempt to find relief in the courts before going to the legislature. 8 '
B. POST-REVOLUTIONARY HOLES IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Those searching for a source of state sovereign immunity can easily
find it in the Eleventh Amendment, and can look to state law (and the
jurisprudence surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment) for its waivers.82

75.

JAMES MILLER LEAKE, THE VIRGINIA COMMITTEE SYSTEM AND THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION

27-28 (1917).

76.
By 1705, the process became somewhat decentralized, and by statute, courts
were convened throughout the state to "certify" (but not evaluate) documents that would be
presented at the next session of the legislature. Id. By the time of the articles of confederation, most state legislators had established standing committees on claims against the state.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 633.
77.
LEAKE, supra note 75, at 27.
78.
See infra note 491 and accompanying text.
79.
Professor Jaffe noted that a king could see the use of the courts in supervising
his own officials. Jaffe, Officers, supra note 53, at 3.
80.
It is worth noting that Connecticut did not have an independent judiciary until
1818. Until that time decisions of the courts were appealed to the legislature. CONN. CONST.
art. V, § 1 (1818).
81.
Pfander, Petition, supra note 17, at 931. For an analysis of the way states
handled their sovereign immunity issues, see, Binney, supra note 51, at 392.
82.
Davie, supra note 55, at 827-8 (describing the Missouri, Alabama, and
Delaware Constitutions, as well as statutes of New York City and Philadelphia, which
provided the means to sue the state); Charles Martindale, The State and its Creditors,7 S.L.
REv. 544, 545-48 (1882) (describing other states' statutory approaches to suits).
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However, American courts have given short shrift to the origins of the
federal government's sovereign immunity.8 3 In most cases, the result is not
harsh, as many plaintiffs avail themselves of legal fictions or statutorily
created forms of review and sue individuals for violation of their constitutional rights or erroneous statutory interpretations.84 In other cases,
Congress carved out specific exceptions to sovereign immunity, thereby
allowing the government to be sued.
Today, the sayings "the King can do no wrong" and "the government
always wins" are aphorisms for the view that an individual has no way to
complain about harms that befall him at the hands of the state. However,
as illustrated above,8 5 when these platitudes were first uttered, they were
not meant to signify that there was no recourse for governmental wrongs.
Instead, closer examination reveals that these sayings meant that the
"King" or "sovereign" (which might include any branch of the American
86
government) "must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong.,
Therefore, while policy decisions that had the overall effect of hurting
someone did not give rise to a remedy, improper implementation of such
policies did.

83.
Some say that it emerged from the concept that a feudal lord could never be
judged in his own court. CHARLES H. McILwAIN, THE GROWTH OF PoLxrrcAL THOUGHT IN
THE WEST 198 (1932) (relating that by the 13th century it was well settled that lords could
not be sued in their own courts); Laski, Responsibility, supra note 26, at 448 ("It is difficult
to say at what precise period this non-suability of the King passed into infallibility."). The
first acknowledgement that the U.S. government could not be sued came in Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 US 264, 411-12 (6 Wheat.) (1821) ("The universally received opinion is, that
no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act
does not authorize such suits."); but cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall) 419 (1793)
(states could be subject to suit, but later abrogated by eleventh amendment); Developments
in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and its Officers, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827, 829
(1957) ("There was a widespread belief, albeit unfounded in fact, that the King had once
been subject to suit in his own court."); ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY
LITGANT 197 (2003 reprint) (1927) (noting that explanations are usually ex post facto
justifications of what is viewed as an assumption, and questioning why a state would want
to completely immunize itself from suit).
84.
In comparing the Anglo-American view with that of the French, who set up a
system of courts specifically to review acts of an agency, Justice Jackson commented that
"[w]e have treated the controversy with the official as a matter of ultra vires-if he was
outside of his authority he was unofficial and just another citizen." ROBERT JACKSON, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, 47 (1955), quoted in Clark
Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" JudicialReview: Sovereign Immunity,
IndispensableParties,Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1479, 1483 (1962).
85.
See supra text accompanying note 70.
86.
EHRLICH, supra note 51, at 42; Jaffe, Officers, supra note 53, at 3-4 ("Indeed, it
is argued by scholars on what seems adequate evidence that the expression 'the King can do
no wrong' originally meant precisely the contrary to what it later came to mean.").
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However, the American concept of popular sovereignty 87 had no role
for an infallible king, capable of fixing any inadvertent mistakes made by
his ministers by a benevolent consent to suit-or even for any king.88
Initially, it was supposed that the legislature and the executive (having been
elected by the people) would always act in their best interests.89 Even
though the sovereign would certainly not intend any harm to its people and
would act legally given the chance, the question of the mechanisms
available to obtain a remedy remained open. 90 Today, while numerous
legislative exceptions exist to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
ability of courts to provide relief for actions of the executive's agents in
court remains in flux.
IV. OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL VECTORS

91

If a petitioner finds himself in, or is forced into, an Article I court, it is
argued that the substance of the petitioner's rights differs depending on the
forum in which they are asserted. This view proceeds from the notion that
the government must consent to suit, and that consent must be construed
narrowly in order to avoid violating the doctrine of sovereign immunity or
to avoid ordering the government to pay money that would normally be
specifically appropriated by Congress.92 However, others (most notably
Lord Coke) saw that when the legislature allocated decision-making to the
courts, the extent and nature of monetary damages should be construed

87.
Obviously there is some debate as to whether "people" can really govern
themselves, or whether there must be some device which places some above others. See
Harold J. Laski, The Theory of PopularSovereignty, 17 MICH. L. REv. 201, 204 (1919)
("Once we turn to the modem state, with its absence of numerical limits within which the
Greek cities were confided, it is obvious that, for the general purposes of daily life, popular
sovereignty is non-existent.").
88.
Jaffe, Officers, supra note 53, at 2, 19 ("With the expulsion of the Crown, the
citizens of the new Republic lost half of the rights against government which as Englishmen
they had previously enjoyed."); Martindale, supra note 82 ("Long ago, the old fallacy that
'the king can do no wrong' was exploded in England, but now seems to reviving in a
republic, with slight changes.").
89.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821); see also United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
90.
This is not to say that statutes that provided for consent to sue the government
could not be repealed without violating due process. See Beers v. State, 61 U.S. 527 (1857).
91.
I probably owe this term to Scott Dodson, who defined "vectoral federalism" as
"the federal government's power to regulate the states and the concomitant power of the
states to resist this regulation." Scott Dodson, Vectoral Federalism,20 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
393, 401-2 (2003).
92.
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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broadly, as long as there was no danger of interfering with proper executive
functions and discipline of the lower courts could be accomplished by writs
of prohibition or mandamus. Under these circumstances, it was thought
that the sovereign had irrevocably placed control over determining the
merits of such claims in the hands of the courts. 93
In the face of American popular sovereignty's conundrum that sovereignty did not come with the waivers of immunity to which subjects of a
monarchy had become accustomed, the development of Article I courts that
hear claims against the government can be viewed as a struggle between
three legal principles. All of these principles have roots in the common law
and appear in the text of the Constitution. But because these principles
appear to be unable to coexist peacefully, the courts, over the years, have
equivocated over which principle is most important.
A. THE APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE

Article I § 9, cl. 7, which prevents funds from being "drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" is the
closest the text of the Constitution comes to acknowledging the principle of
sovereign immunity of the federal government.
Since the signing of the Magna Carta, parliaments have guarded their
power to tax.94 Eventually, Parliament assumed most, if not all, of the
powers of taxation in England. 95 Colonial legislatures, in an effort to
control the royal governor, sought to retain control over not only how
money was collected, but also how it was spent.96 Legislatures were
primarily concerned with executive incursions into the public purse, a
concern addressed in most state constitutions by provisions declaring that
the collection and appropriation of funds was legislative in character. 97 By

93.

94.

See infra text accompanying note 150.

Col. Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The

Alluring Myth of a PresidentialPower of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REv. 1, 30-44 (1998)
(describing shifting powers to tax between Parliament and the Crown).
95.
Col. Rosen concludes that:
Control over the public purse was the cornerstone of British representative democracy. It served as the instrument for parliamentary supremacy, compelling monarchs to surrender their royal prerogatives in exchange for the revenue required to sustain their administrations .... It
was also an end in itself, ensuring that taxes would not be raised except
with the consent of the taxpayers.
Id. at 44.
96.
Id. at 47.
97.
Id. at 70 n.323.
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the time of the Constitutional Convention, the Framers were of the mindset
that the words "according to law" meant that it was for the legislature to
make specific appropriations. Of course, this does not mean that discretion
cannot be vested with the executive to pay its debts. However, the
Appropriations Clause does raise the question of whether the judicial
branch must comply precisely with legislative dictates regarding the form
of judgment
or order it must issue in order to draw funds from the
98
Treasury.
Arguably the most radical interpretation of the Appropriations Clause
occurred in Reeside v. Walker.99 In Reeside, the government had sued the
estate of one of its contractors which then obtained a large setoff. Despite a
jury verdict and a judgment from the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Treasury did not pay. The
victorious defendant unsuccessfully petitioned the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that "[h]owever much money may be in the Treasury at any one
time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus
previously sanctioned. Any other course would give to the fiscal officers a
''°
most dangerous discretion.
Today, as Congress has provided numerous funds to pay requests, and
has, by statute, allowed for setoffs to claims made by it against defendants,
the appropriations clause is usually invoked by the government to avoid
disgorging funds that it may have incorrectly taken,10' or to protect the
government from liability under an estoppel theory when government
02
employees give erroneous advice. 1

98. See supra note 13 (examples of court orders to pay money that were arguably
enforceable against the government due to non-compliance with the terms of the
appropriation from Congress).
99. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850).
100. Id. at 289.
101.
See, e.g., Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 90
(1992); United States v. Ten Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 860 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("If, for example, an agent of the United States had scooped up the cash in
dispute and, without waiting for a judicial order, had run to the nearest outpost of the
Treasury and deposited the money ...it would be absurd to say that only an act of Congress
could restore the purloined cash to the court.").
102. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26

B. THE PETITION CLAUSE

Most associate the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the free
speech clause10 3 of the First Amendment.1°4 The usual interpretation of the
Petition Clause is that every American has the right to petition the
legislature for redress of "political" grievances, 10 5 but there are few, if any,
remedies for the doomed petition beyond the election of more amenable
politicians. Some argue, however, that the Petition Clause effectively
abrogates sovereign immunity. Most notably, Professor Pfander argues
that the history and structure of the Petition Clause is an "antidote to the...
doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 0 6 According to Pfander, the fact that the
framers included the word "government" in the Petition Clause (and not
"legislature" or "courts"), indicates that there was a right to petition any of
the three branches of government, not just the legislature or the executive. 10 7 The British did not conceive of as strict a separation of powers as
the framers did,' 0 8 and hence the Petition Clause is simply a recognition of

103.
The text of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the governmentfor a redress of grievances." (emphasis added).
Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Implications
104.
for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1993).
Robert Tsai offers a theory of the Petition Clause which concludes that a right
105.
to litigate constitutional issues is protected by the Petition Clause, as any critique of the
government inevitably requires some reference to the question of which branch of
government has the final say on the matter. Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional
Litigation As Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51
Am. U. L. REV. 835 (2002). Tsai and others noted that in colonial America, government
officials "felt a socio-political obligation to hear those grievances, to provide a response,
and often to act upon the complaints." Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The
History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2159 (1998),
cited in Tsai, supra at 848.
106.
Pfander, Petition, supra note 17, at 899, 953-63. Although Pfander argues that
the Petition Clause almost completely vitiates sovereign immunity, he also argues that
dismissals of petitions on the grounds that they are barred by a doctrine of sovereign
immunity are really dismissals for substantive reasons (such as failing to show that all the
elements of the claim could be proved, or because the right has been "organized" by
Congress, necessitating that the petition begin in a certain form, or that equitable relief is
unavailable because a legal remedy is available).
Pfander, Petition,supra note 17, at 954-56.
107.
This arrangement prompted the acknowledgement that while an individual had
108.
a constitutional right to petition for redress, this was, in fact, a "naked right." After
presentation of a claim, there was no right to investigation, or even action. See, e.g.,
Richardson, supra note 39.
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the right to bring a petition to either the courts or legislature.'°9 Of course,
the legislature was welcome to direct the petitions to the courts, though,
such delegation was irrevocable. 0
Unlike other claims against the government, receiving just compensation under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause""' does not require an
explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. 12 When it is combined with the
Petition Clause, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment gives courts
the power to look behind executive claims of immunity, even when
couched in legislation, such as statutes of limitations. The Petition Clause
gives courts, as well as agencies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the
ability, and even the duty, to adjudicate both the underlying issue and any
3
collateral "takings" issues that occurred in the course of its procedures."
For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to adopt Pfander's
view in whole. Instead, the Petition Clause can simply be read as
demanding that all courts, properly vested with jurisdiction over a claim,
address any grievances that arise during the course of the litigation that the
legislature has declared cannot be heard elsewhere. This relief cannot be
limited by executive action, as the Petition Clause acts to guarantee that a
party can make a claim already provided for by the Constitution or by
statute and will not by blocked by executive claims of immunity. This
view has support not only in the text of the Constitution but also in English

109.
See also Louis Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401
(1957).
110.
See infra text accompanying note 150.
111.
The Takings Clause reads: "No person shall be... deprived of... property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
112.
See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951) (noting
that no express waiver of sovereign immunity is necessary to obtain an award of interest, if
the claim for interest arises under the Fifth Amendment); Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United
States, 205 F.3d 1369, 1374-5 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (a selfexecuting clause of the constitution, such as the compensation clause or the export clause
triggers the application of the Tucker Act's jurisdiction relating to claims founded under the
constitution without the need to comply with other statutes). It is worth noting, however,
that in actions against states arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a plaintiff must show that the
defendant was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights,
since the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions." Zamakshari v.
Dvoskin, 899 F. Supp. 1097, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
113.
Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Emplmt. Practices Comm'n., 411 N.E.2d 277
(Ill. 1980), rev'd sub nom, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982); see also
Lott v. Governors State Univ., 436 N.E.2d 569, 572 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Logan, the
Court of Appeals held that the trial court must allow a plaintiff to amend complaint to
include administrative agencies and order the agencies to adjudicate complaint).
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history, suggesting that the Framers conceived of petitioners in this way." 14
Moreover, it has even carried the day with the Supreme Court."'
To be sure, unlike some others,' 16 I do not contend that courthouses
are open fora for the airing of any and all grievances against the state. Nor
does the Petition Clause remove the need to comply with procedural
requirements.11 7 Instead, at least in the context of my overall theory, I view
the Petition Clause as expanding the power of any forum designated as the
exclusive forum 18 for the airing of an otherwise recognized legal theory to
encompass the power to adjudicate all individual rights protected by the
"takings" and "due process" clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
The Takings Clause and the Petition Clause guarantee that a party
aggrieved by government action can go to court, and be provided with just
compensation in the case of a taking, according to whatever standards the

114.
It is argued that these rights that are mentioned in the Constitution are "selfexecuting" and directly traceable to the earlier "petitions of right," and that these narrow
categories of suit were exceptions to the general bar against suits against the sovereign. In
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 205, the Court noted that:
It is believed that this petition of right, as it has been practiced and observed in the administration of justice in England, has been as efficient
in securing the rights of suitors against the crown in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as that which the law affords in legal controversies between the subjects of the king among themselves.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 205. The Court observed that at the time of Lee, the Court of Claims
existed, but it was not given jurisdiction over such "takings" issues, and therefore the right
could be heard in any court. Id.; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) ("We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to
bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of 'the self-executing character of the
constitutional provision with respect to compensation."') quoting United States v. Clarke,
445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
See infra note 113.
115.
116.
See, e.g., John E. Wolfgram, How the Judiciary Stole the Right to Petition, 31
UWLA L. REV. 257 (2000). Attorney Wolfgram, by his own proud admission, has been
"blacklisted" under California's vexatious litigant statutes. Id. at n.55.
Logan, 455 U.S. at 437 ("Obviously, nothing we have said entitles every civil
117.
litigant to a hearing on the merits in every case. The State may erect reasonable procedural
requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, be ,they statutes of limitations, or, in
an appropriate case, filing fees." (internal citations omitted)). In the state context, it has
been held that there is no per se taking if a state procedure is not followed. Instead there
must be an inquiry into the nature of the right deprived. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091,
1101 (7th Cir. 1982). However, the existence of a procedure may be probative of
underlying substantive rights. Id.
To be precise, the sovereign can designate certain other forums for the
118.
adjudication of associated rights, and petitioner may have to go to multiple tribunals, but the
Supreme Court has said that if relief in another tribunal is merely "speculative" then a forum
with slightly less than exclusive jurisdiction over the matter will be subject to this grant of
power. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Fifth Amendment mandates, even if no statute specifically provides for
such a forum. Any limitation on a party's ability to be compensated for the
deprivation of a right is unconstitutional, and if a court (or agency) is the
only avenue that a petitioner has to air his grievance, then any limitation
upon that court is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court appeared to adopt this view when it faced the
issue of whether a petitioner, before a state administrative agency, had been
denied a chance to argue their case under Illinois' Fair Employment
Practices Act when that agency's jurisdiction had evaporated due to the
agency's mishandling of her petition. The Court held that the jurisdiction of
the agency, as a constitutional matter, must expand. The court ruled that:
A claimant has more than an abstract desire or interest in
redressing his grievance: his right to redress is guaranteed
by the State, with the adequacy of his claim assessed under
what is, in essence, a "for cause" standard, based upon the
substantiality of the evidence. 1 9
In so ruling, the Court conceived of a claim under Illinois' Fair Employment Practices Act 20 as a property right, protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, which, "presumably can be surrendered for
value." 12' Likewise, in the case of statutorily created rights, the Petition
Clause provides that all parties will have access to a forum to air their
grievances, and that that forum will not be hampered in its fact-finding by
legislative or executive constraints, because such constraints would allow
the executive to "take" whatever property a petitioner might have. 122 The
Court concluded that "any other conclusion would allow the State to
destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest.'' 2 3
Moreover, in Logan, the Supreme Court went even further, and rejected the state's argument that other remedies that might provide the
petitioner with compensation for her lost rights were theoretically

Logan, 455 U.S. at 431. In earlier cases, the Court has held that an opportunity
119.
must be provided to submit a constitutional issue "to a judicial tribunal for determination
upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void
because in conflict with the due process clause." Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Borough Of Ben
Avon, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
120.
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 48, 851 et. seq. (1979).
Logan, 455 U.S. at 429, 431.
121.
Id. at 433 ("As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the Due Process
122.
Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its merits
fairly judged.").
Id.al 432.
123.
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available, since the possibility of obtaining relief was unavailable,
speculative or overly cumbersome.124 Therefore, the body with jurisdiction
must adjudicate the issues and provide a remedy regardless of whether
there was a theoretical remedy somewhere else. The Court explicitly held
that even statutorily-created rights to redress are protected by the Constitution.
This line of reasoning prevailed even in the face of arguments regarding the ability of the courts to second-guess the executives' detention of
individuals captured during an armed conflict. Specifically, in the face of
the executive's abject refusal to adjudicate an issue, the Supreme Court
even went so far as to order a lower court, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, to provide
a habeas125 petitioner with whatever process the executive refused to
provide.
Therefore, action by the government that effectively deprives an individual of her ability to be heard in a forum violates the Petition Clause.
Indeed, when the Court applied this doctrine to taxation issues, it found in
McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages 26 that a state must provide
an adequate forum for adjudicating tax disputes. Therefore, at a minimum,
a forum for providing retrospective relief for taxes already illegally27
collected, regardless of the good faith of the tax collectors, is required.1
Injunctive relief or promises of future constitutional or statutory compliance are not acceptable. 28 Whether the taking resulted from executive
misinterpretation of the law, executive incompetence or malfeasance
(whether in a quasi-judicial or a purely executive act or as a litigant before
a court) the executive must fix whatever mistakes resulted in such a taking.

124.
Id. at 436-37 ("Seeking redress through a tort suit is apt to be a lengthy and
speculative process, which in a situation such as this one will never make the complainant
entirely whole: the Illinois Court of Claims Act does not provide for reinstatement ... and
even a successful suit will not vindicate entirely [the petitioner's] right to be free from
discriminatory treatment.") (citations omitted).
125.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) ("In the absence of such process,
however, a court that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy
combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved.")
(citing Army Regulation 190-8, § 1-6 (1997)).
126.
496 U.S. 18 (1990).
127.
Id. at 39. After taxpayers had prevailed in their effort to invalidate a taxation
scheme under the dormant commerce clause, only to have the court issue an injunction but
fail to order a refund because of vaguely articulated "equitable" reasons, the Court held that
"the state must provide taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy
and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also a "clear and certain remedy." Id.
128.
Id.
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When the courts fashion such ad hoc remedies for takings of property,
relief can generally be had in courts of general jurisdiction. 29 However, if
a party is forced (or "channeled") into a court of specialized or limited
jurisdiction, or chooses one without the realistic option 30 of pursuing an
action in another court, then that forum (even in the face of statutory
prohibition) must also adjudicate any collateral taking matters,' 3' as failing
to do so would result in yet another taking! Therefore, even if statutes do
not explicitly provide a court with the ability to afford an individual due
process or reach a correct decision as to both the underlying substantive
law and any takings issues, the court is obligated to fashion a remedy
which would vitiate such impairment. 132 For example, in Dixon v.
Commissioner,133 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
Tax Court was obligated to provide a remedy (in this case, a reduction of
tax liability based on equitable principles and what appears to be the
equitable remedy known as "quasi contract") for the IRS's unfair play
before the Tax Court that effectively deprived many taxpayers of a fair

129.
See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977) (collecting cases in which
lower state courts were required to provide a remedy under the common law of money
damages for uncompensated takings).
130.
See supra note 124, and accompanying text.
131. Historically, state chancellors were even more protective of their jurisdiction. In
states with bifurcated equity and law jurisdictions, chancellors held that, since the lack of a
legal remedy would usually be the basis for their jurisdiction, the legislature must explicitly
divest them of jurisdiction in order for the law courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over the
adjudication of certain rights. See, e.g., Sweeny v. Williams, 36 N.J. Eq. 627, 1883 WL
468, at *2 (N.J. Eq. 1883) ("When, by statute, a right to administer relief previously
administered only by courts of equity is extended to courts of law, the jurisdiction of the
courts of equity is undisturbed, unless prohibitory or restrictive words are used in the
statute.").
132.
The Supreme Court in Logan eventually concluded that the Illinois Supreme
Court was wrong in granting a writ of prohibition to the respondent, who argued that
because the administrative agency had missed a statutory deadline, no relief could be
granted. Logan, 455 U.S. at 426. The court also noted that the alternative remedy of relief
via a tort suit was not adequate as different remedies were available, and at best the chances
of actually getting them were speculative. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436-37. At least one
commentator has noted that in the absence of legislation, issues that arise in unique cases are
probably best suited to be remedied by the courts. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs
and Federal Common Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1413, 1446
(2002) ("Realistically, the courts may be the only entity willing to address these more
nettlesome issues of implementation.").
133.
Dixon, 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003); See infra note 180, and accompanying
text. Briefly stated, in Dixon, parties to the same tax shelter had agreed to follow the Tax
Court's resolution of test cases of taxpayers. Counsel for the government secretly settled
with some designated taxpayers in exchange for their cooperation at trial and reduction of
assessed tax liability by the taxpayer's expended attorney fees.
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chance to litigate.' 34 This was essential because litigation in the Tax Court
forecloses a right to seek a refund of taxes later in the District Court or the
Court of Federal Claims, 135 and suits against 136
government attorneys for their
official misdeeds are doomed from the start.
Finally, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold not only that
these waivers of sovereign immunity exist regardless of a statute, but that
their judgments must be paid, and under the U.S. Constitution a statutory
regime that allows the executive or the legislature to elect not to pay the
judgment runs afoul of its controversy requirement, and the federal courts
must not become involved at all.' 37 Such an announcement is of considerable moment, as even English and colonial petitions as of right had to be
submitted to Parliament to be paid as the controversy requirement
prevented them from being heard. 138 Nevertheless, however strong the pull
of the Petition Clause, its power to define the role of legislative courts is
curtailed by other parts of the Constitution which protect the government.
C. THE CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT

The "case and controversy" requirement of Article H simultaneously
constricts and expands the powers of legislative courts.
1.

A Court's Ultra Vires Activities

Because of the structure of the Constitution, when a court renders
decision where there is no real controversy, it risks operating outside of its
judicial power. Once outside this power, it is beyond the Constitutional
protections of the courts, such as Supreme Court review, self-executing
judgment, and the inherent power to punish contempt. Outside this power,

134.
Id.
135.
26 U.S.C. § 7422(c) ("A suit against any officer... for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected...
shall be treated as if the United States had been a party to such suit in applying
proceedings in the Tax Court and on review of decisions of the Tax Court.").
136.
See, e.g., Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
absolute immunity protects attorneys for the government for their actions in the course of
litigation before the Tax Court).
137.
See infra notes 240-243 and accompanying text.
138.
Pfander, Petition, supra note 17, at 985. ("[P]etitions of right did not result in
self-executing judgments payable by the Parliament in England or the assembly in Virginia.
Rather, legislative control of the fisc entailed legislative control of the decision whether to
appropriate funds to pay money judgments rendered against the government.").
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which extends to "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States. .. ,,139 a court's decisions are subject to
second-guessing by other branches of government. This "case and
controversy clause" has been interpreted as prohibiting the issuance of
advisory opinions by federal courts.1 40 Yet the Court of Federal Claims is
explicitly empowered, and semi-routinely asked, to provide advisory
opinions in the form of reports to Congress.'14 Historically the Court of
Federal Claims has obliged, and it continues to oblige. However, in writing
these reports it can be argued that this "court" is not really a "court" and
therefore does not exercise the judicial power of the United States, but
instead exercises a legislative power.
2.

The Controversy Clause as a Grant of Power

Although the controversy clause acts to limit the federal courts to only
acts to expand the power of the courts to the
"live" controversies, it also 42
1
it.
before
controversy
entire

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1. Justice Frankfurter further defined "cases" and
139.
"controversies" by describing Art. III as indicating that:
the limited area within which judicial action was to move-however farreaching the consequences of action within that area-by extending "judicial Power" only to "Cases" and "Controversies". Both by what they
said and by what they implied, the framers of the Judiciary Article gave
merely the outlines of what were to them the familiar operations of the
English judicial system and its manifestations on this side of the ocean
before the Union. Judicial power could come into play only in matters
that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if
they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted "Cases"
or "Controversies."
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
140.
State courts, even when adjudicating causes of action in which a federal statute
or the U.S. Constitution provides the rule of decision, need not abide by Article III's "case
or controversy" requirement. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (stating
that the U.S. Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to review a facial challenge to state
law brought in state court when state law had not yet been applied, and the individual
taxpayer did not have standing).
141.
See supra note 2.
The concept that "U]urisdiction, once taken, extends to the whole controversy,"
142.
also has its roots in the common law. Oliver S. Rundell, Law of Estoppel, in 7 MOD. AM. L.
225-26 (1914).
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The JudicialPower to Adjudicate Cases or Controversies

Article I courts do more than simply decide issues that the legislature
or executive could properly determine. These courts, with their neutral
decision-makers, often143provide petitioners with the constitutionallyrequired "due process."'
Whether one subscribes to a functionalist or formalist model of separation of powers, when these courts entertain a case, they exercise the
"judicial power of the United States." Once an issue is packaged into a
"case" and that case is within the judicial power, it is not for other branches
to interfere with that exercise of power. 144 This judicial power includes the
power to adjudicate whatever substantive rights fall within the court's
jurisdiction, and to provide the parties with whatever remedies are
available. 145 Though Congress may limit the scope of remedies, it may not
completely eliminate a court's power to provide certain remedies without
infringing on the court's jurisdiction. Henry Hart pointed out that a
limitation on remedies is "[o]nly a limitation on what a court can do once it
has jurisdiction, not a denial of jurisdiction that can hurt a defendant. And
if the court thinks that the limitation is invalid, it's always in a position to
say so, and ... to ignore it."146

143.
Gordon Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's
Lessee Through Crowell To Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 835 (1986) citing Phillips v.
Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1939) in which Justice Brandeis held that in adjudicating
"public rights" the executive had an interest in determining the amount of liability, and
review by the judicial branch will be limited to questions of law and to assure that "some
evidence" supports the Commissioner's ascertainment of facts.
144.
Under the "formalist" model, "judicial power is preserved simply because it has
not been delegated to the other branches." Burkeley N. Riggs and Tamera D. Westerberg,
Judicial Independence: An Historical Perspective, 74 DEN. U. L. REv. 337, 339 (1997).
Functionalism, on the other hand, questions whether the "one branch interferes with one of
the core functions of another." Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1527 (1991). However, even the most famous adherents to
functionalism concentrate on whether the language of a Congressional delegation, rather
than the strength of executive will, has been infringed upon. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the role of this Court should be limited
to determining whether the Act so alters the balance of authority among the branches of
government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic division between the lawmaking power
and the power to execute the law").
145.
Hoffstadt, supra note 124. at 1446 (concluding that since the "case or
controversy" clause forces courts to apply generally phrased laws to factual cases, and
federal courts are generally not empowered to articulate new rights, creation of "rights of
action and forms of relief are ostensibly less troublesome than the concerns related to
federal common law that creates new enforceable rights").
146.
Henry Hart Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
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Therefore, once the federal judicial power is triggered by a valid complaint or petition, the Constitution provides that that power extends "to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under [the] Constitution... the laws of the
United States." 147 In practice, this means that where an Article III court
reviews the determinations of administrative agencies, even if events
transpired after the administrative agency's actions but before the Court of
Appeals issued a mandate, it is not bound by the agency's determination of
whether a controversy still exists. While the agency's power to regulate the
petitioner may have been diminished or mooted, the court's jurisdiction
does not commensurately constrict. 148 Therefore, the scope of judicial
power to render decisions is not limited by the executive's position on the
scope of the controversy. 149 This view has deep historical roots, as even
Lord Coke wrote that:
The King hath committed all his power judiciall, some in
one Court, and some in another, so as if any would render

Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1372 (1953) (emphasis in
original).
147.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; cf. Brian A. Stem, Note, An Argument Against
Imposing the Federal "Case or Controversy" Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 77, 90 (1994):
A judge, of course, is not free to ignore the article III constraints on the
"judicial power" any more than Congress is free to disregard article I
limits on "legislative powers," or the President is free to ignore the
definition of "executive power" contained in article II. Nor may Congress ignore the limitations placed on it by article III, section 1 with respect to its influence over the judiciary.
Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 647 n.260 (1983) (arguing
that the Article III extension of the "judicial Power" to "cases" and "controversies "can be
viewed as an obligation to adjudicate "cases" and "controversies" within the court's
jurisdiction). For the opposing view, see Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 188 (1943)
(Stone, J.) ("The Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the
power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of
withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress
may seem proper for the public good."').
Humphreys v. DEA, 105 F.3d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1996) (exercising its discretion
148.
not to vacate decision after doctor successfully appealed revocation of his certificate of
registration to dispense controlled substances, and Third Circuit reversed, but the doctor
died before mandate could issue). Further, the exercise about whether to vacate, is equitable
in nature, even if the underlying determinations of the administrative agency are statutorily
limited to being based on legal grounds. Avellino v. Herron, 181 F.R.D. 294, 295 (E.D. Pa.
1998) (citing Humphreys); see also Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946)
("An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial
function.").
Id.
149.
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himselfe to the judgment of the King in such case where
the King hath committed all his power judiciall to others,
such a render should be to no effect. And the King doth
judge by his Judges (the King having distributed his power
judiciall to severall Courts) And the King hath wholly left
matters 150of judicature according to his lawes to his
Judges.
By the same token, at least two courts have acknowledged that legislative courts have the inherent power to vacate their own judgments or
decisions, 51 though the exercise of their inherent power to give effect to
1 52
their review of agency actions may be limited by their statutory role.
Unfortunately, in the case of Article I courts, when the judicial power
of the United States acts as a safety valve and performs a function that does
not require exercise of the "judicial power," rather than providing
retrospective relief, there is a plausible argument that it is unable to ever
exercise any inherent power that could retroactively amend one of its
decisions. Under this view, such an act would be unenforceable at best,
and could have no real effect upon the agency supposedly under its review.
Therefore, in order to actually decide a "controversy" there must be some
inherent power to vacate decisions improperly procured.
Whether the controversy requirement is applicable in Article I courts
is unsettled. It has also been held that in matters that can be appealed to an

150.
EDWARD CoKE, 4 INST. 73 (2002 reprint) (1817); see also Edgar H. Brenner,
Judicial Review by Money Judgment in the Court of Claims, 21 FED. B.J. 179, 204-05
(1961).
151.
See Dixon v. Comm'r, 316 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Courts possess
the inherent power to vacate or amend a judgment obtained by fraud on the court.");
Toscano v. Comm'r, 441 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (once the Tax Court became a court
as opposed to an administrative agency, a decision obtained by fraud on the court could be
set aside at any time); Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 135 (2004)
(Allegra, J.) ("[the government] argues that because this court is an Article I tribunal, it
lacks the inherent powers afforded Article III courts to order the preservation of relevant
evidence. This court disagrees."); see also Freytag, 501 U.S. at 889; Dismuke v. United
States, 297 U.S. 167, 172 (1936). Cf. Webbe v. Comm'r, 902 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1990) (26
U.S.C. § 7481 prohibits revisitation of Tax Court judgments). Gara, supra note 36, at 53
collects instances where courts have hinted that vacation was possible, but concludes that it
wasn't warranted. See also, Cinema '84 v. Comm'r, 412 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2005) (collecting
cases, but finding no grounds in the instant case to warrant vacation of a final judgment).
152.
Cf. Fierro, 197 F.3d 147 at n.9 ("It is true that the exercise of the inherent
power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for [t]hese courts were
created by act of Congress. Nevertheless, we do not lightly assume that Congress has
intended to depart from established principles such as the scope of a court's inherent
power.").
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Article 111 court, the Article I court should, at least as a courtesy to the
reviewing court, 153 scrutinize each case to make sure that it is not adjudicating a moot, unripe or hypothetical case. 154 The Tax Court goes through
similar soul-searching when it is told that it must cease adjudications
because a controversy no longer exists.155
The issue is further muddied when a court first decides the merits of
the underlying case, and later the executive takes some action based on the
court's decision (such as collecting from a petitioner or assessing taxes).
Then, after the executive action, the court later concludes that a petitioner
is entitled to some relief based on the behavior of the government while the
matter was pending. 56 While the government may have complied with the
law by waiting for the statutorily-defined judicial process to end, it is
tempting to argue that once the executive takes action, the court is
forbidden from exercising the "judicial power" of the United States. Under
normal circumstances, this judicial power might include the inherent power
to vacate decisions procured by fraud or mistake. 157 However, where the

153.
In Vaccine Act cases, it is possible for a petitioner to "withdraw" from the
program or elect to "reject" a judgment, which is a necessary precondition to filing a tort
suit against a vaccine manufacturer or administrator. However, if a petitioner does not do
this, a judgment will still bind the government. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21.
Kanehl v. Unites States, 38 Fed. Cl. 89 (1997); cf. First Hartford Corporate
154.
Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 298, 304 n.10 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (Yock, J.)
("Although this Court is not an Article III court, the 'case or controversy' requirement of
Article III is still applicable."); see also Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 12, 15 (1990)
("We recognize the unsettled nature of the law indthis area and do not attempt to resolve the
controversy for purposes of this case.").
Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why
155.
Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 249 (1999)
(citing the transcript in Smith v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 350 (1982)). In Smith the taxpayers had
engaged in a tax strategy that was promoted by Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch had later
agreed to compensate the taxpayers for any monies due as the result of the Tax Court case.
The petitioners then conceded, but such a concession, it appears, was not enough to divest
the court of jurisdiction. Compare United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116
(1920) ("Where by an act of the parties, or a subsequent law, the existing controversy has
come to an end, the case becomes moot and should be treated accordingly.").
26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) ("no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax...
156.
and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted
until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day...
if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has
become final.").
157.
Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) ("the inherent power also allows
a federal court to vacate its own judgment .... This 'historic power of equity to set aside
fraudulently begotten judgments,' . . . is necessary to the integrity of the courts.") (citations
omitted); Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The power to grant
'[e]quitable relief against fraudulent judgments is not of statutory creation.' This equitable
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matter may be irretrievably out of the judiciary's hands, it is not too much
of a stretch to conclude that such a legislative court is powerless to provide
a remedy, 158 and is therefore bound to concede that it can not reverse the
harm that was done, perhaps leaving the remedy to another court. In such
cases, courts faced a paradox: the initial exercise of jurisdiction is a
controversy, but their ability to make decisions is not.
4.

The Power of the Controversy Clause

Even a court with limited jurisdiction might have some authority to
fashion remedies for contempt based on its status as a "court" once the
judicial power has been conjured up. Professors Frankfurter and Landis
first argued that courts had inherent power because of: 1) "the formulated
experience of the past . . ."; 2) the need to "deny these powers and yet to
conceive of courts;" and 3) the fact that "courts would otherwise obviously
fail in the work with which they are entrusted."'' 59 In Michaelson v. United
States the Supreme Court held:
[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all
courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded
as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over... at once become
possessed of the power. So far as the inferior federal courts
are concerned, however, it is not beyond the authority of
Congress... but the attributes which inhere in that power
power was 'firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our
Republic,' and the power is vested in courts by their very creation.") (citations omitted);
United States v. Twitty, 44 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Courts inherently possess this
equitable power in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.").
158.
Inherent powers are to be distinguished from implied powers. Chambers, 501
U.S. at 43 ("[T]he Court has held that a federal court has the power to control admission to
its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it."). There is no dispute that all
federal courts have the power to regulate their bar, and disbar individuals who misbehave,
after providing them with due process. However, to conclude that an Article I court has the
power to hear evidence based on an allegation that a lawyer for the government misbehaved,
so that the petitioner can have his tax liability reduced (or another the monetary amount of
another "public right" increased) is to conclude that the "case or controversy" - or rather
just the "controversy" part requires a court to hear matters which involve a dispute between
two parties that the court is capable of hearing disputes between.
159.
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts - A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1010-22 (1924).
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and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor
rendered practically inoperative. 160
However, provided that there are at least some types of sanctions for
not following rules, the Supreme Court directed that any use of inherent
powers should be construed against16the
1 party seeking relief, provided that
he is afforded relief via some power.
Although American courts generally do not shift attorney fees without
legislative prodding, many statutes provide for shifting fees from party to
party, 162 thereby allowing the courts to grant relief to parties who may be
injured just by the cost of appearing in court. 163 However, equitable
shifting of attorney fees (absent a statute) based on a theory of the court's
inherent authority has proved somewhat controversial. 164

266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (citations omitted); see also Leslie M. Kelleher,
160.
Taking "Substantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 47, 66 n.81 (1998) (collecting cases).
Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entm't, 493 U.S. 120, 122 (1989) (Fed. R. Civ. P.
161.
11 provided that sanctions could be imposed against a party or its lawyer. It could not be
construed to sanction his law firm.); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (stating that neither statutes
nor the Fed. R. Civ. P. display the inherent authority of courts to sanction bad-faith
litigants). For example, some courts have seen their inherent powers to fashion remedies in
the face of conduct that looks and smells like contempt, but the court has not specifically
found it to be contempt, which would trigger the court's inherent powers. For example, in
Johnson v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), Judge Pollack held that where
the IRS had violated a court order, Plaintiffs damages were limited to a statutory cap, and
the court was "loath" to inquire as to whether the violation of the court order was willful.
For examples of fee-shifting statutes, see West Virginia Univ. Hospitals v.
162.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1991); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975).
For example, while the First Amendment guarantees individuals at least some
163.
freedom from government-sponsored religious indoctrination, in many cases, it is not "selfapplying." See infra note 502 and accompanying text. It is also difficult to quantify the
value of such an injury. Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows courts that have jurisdiction
over such First Amendment claims to award attorney fees to a party whose first amendment
rights were violated, thereby resolving at least most of the controversy without making the
party ask the very party that injured them to compensate them for the cost of the lawsuit.
For example, in Chambers, a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale
164.
of a TV station, Mr. Chambers did numerous things to defraud the court, especially filing
frivolous pleadings, and did not cooperate in discovery. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 38 n.2 (e.g.
motion for recusal of judge). Nevertheless, before trial the parties stipulated that the
underlying contract was enforceable, and that it had been breached by failing to file the
required paperwork with the FCC. Id. at 38-39. After that agreement, Chambers again
tried to frustrate the litigation by moving the physical station to another location, not
covered by the agreement. Almost at every turn, Chambers or its lawyers were sanctioned
by either the district court, or, when they appealed his decisions they were again sanctioned
by the Fifth Circuit (by remanding in order to determine the amount of sanctions). NASCO
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In general, however, the contempt power has not been used to regulate
the conduct of government agencies, despite their considerable power, at
least pending judicial disposition,
to impound property or determine
65
substantive amounts owed. 1
Outside the contempt context, even if a court properly has jurisdiction
over a matter, "fee-shifting" of legal fees to the loser is not found in the
"common law," and it is the exception to the general "American Rule" for
a prevailing party to receive attorney fees. Moreover, to enforce such a
judgment against the government, absent a specific statute, risks offending
Congress's ability to preserve the public fisc and make specific appropriations.
From the "American Rule" against fee shifting, courts have carved out
four exceptions in the federal system: 166 1) the "common fund" exception

v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 797 F.2d 975, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 28456 (5th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (unpublished order). Eventually the district court ordered Chambers to
pay almost $1,000,000 in attorney fees and ordered the disbarment of one attorney. NASCO
v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120 (W.D. La. 1989). Over time, the
court fashioned a sanction for this bad faith in the form of a shifting of attorney fees not
based on the statutory mechanisms, but on its inherent power which the Supreme Court
accepted. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (There is . . . nothing in the other sanctioning
mechanisms or prior cases interpreting them that warrants a conclusion that a federal court
may not, as a matter of law, resort to its inherent power to impose attorney fees as a sanction
for bad-faith conduct.) The dissent (Kennedy, J.) castigated the majority by saying that such
an ad hoc approach did not adequately put the parties on notice of the penalties they faced,
and did not allow for a meaningful review of the use of the court's discretion. Chambers,
501 U.S. 32 at 60-61.
165.
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761 (D.D.C.
1993), affd in part, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In Armstrong, the Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's finding of contempt for failing to promulgate new regulations,
as the agency had not been directly ordered to promulgate those regulations, but was,
instead informed in a declaratory judgment that its regulations were not in compliance with
relevant statutes. Id. at 1289. On the other hand, various commentators have taken the more
narrow view that the only inherent powers which a court should exercise are those which
discipline people in a physical courtroom. For example, Professor Goldfarb argued that
courts should only rely on their inherent powers to push people as necessary for its selfpreservation. For anything else, a court can rely on imposition of statutorily mandated
sanctions to punish contempt. RONALD GOLDFARB, CONTEMPT POWER 181-82, 290-91, 29798, 304-06 (1963). See, e.g., Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 536 (2005)
(Miller, J.) (holding government attorneys in contempt and issuing a "contempt citation"
for, inter alia, violating a protective order, mentions disbarment proceedings, and prohibit
use of improperly obtained material).
166.
S. D. Shuler, Recent Development: Chambers v. NACSO, Inc.: Moving Beyond
Rule 11 Into the Uncharted Territory of Courts' Inherent Power to Sanction, 66 TUL. L.
REv. 591, 593 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651 (1982).
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where, under equitable principles, a party's efforts benefit others' 67 who
also stand to benefit by a suit to vindicate the rights of identifiable
beneficiaries of a trust; 168 2) where no fee shifting statute exists, but many
parties benefited from the litigation; 169 3) sanctioning the willful disobedience of a specific court order, as is derived from the court's contempt
power; 170 and 4) the bad-faith exception, also derived from the court's
inherent powers.' 71 In addition, in some states, an individual can obtain
attorney fees by suing under a "private attorney general" statute which
allows a suit in the name of the government in order to obtain a result that
would benefit the entire state. 172 However, for the most part, each of these
theories proceeds from the premise that a party other than the plaintiff has
benefited from the litigation, and the proceedings are in the nature of a
request for equitable relief.
Unfortunately, even if Article I courts can exercise jurisdiction over
an entire controversy, it is doubtful that the "common fund" exception to
the American rule would be available in an Article I court as they have
generally lacked jurisdiction to impose equitable decrees on the government. Absent a specific statute, a grant of attorney fees for the purpose of
benefiting a set of people who had not properly petitioned the court and
over whom the court did not properly have jurisdiction would not only
interfere with Congress's ability to manage the public fisc and set aside
funds for various uses, 17 3 but might not make sense because the court could

167.
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-58.
168.
Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 535-36 (1947).
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
169.
170.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-6 ("Third, and most relevant here, a court may assess
attorney's fees when a party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.' In this regard, if a court finds 'that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the
very temple of justice has been defiled,' it may assess attorney's fees against the responsible
party, as it may when a party 'shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by
hampering enforcement of a court order."' (citations omitted)).
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980). This "bad faith"
171.
exception was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but the Supreme Court interpreted "costs" not
to mean "attorney's fees" but rather simply filing, service fees, and expert witness fees. Id.
at 757-58.
172.

Karla Alderman, Comment, Making Sense of Oregon's Equitable Exception to

the American Rule of Attorney Fees After Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 35 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
407,409 (1999).
See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 264 n.39. The Court also stated that if state law
173.
provided for a shifting of fees on to a victorious private attorney general, then, a federal
court would likely have to follow state law on this issue. Id. at 259 n.31. However, it is
doubtful that an Article I court may actually find itself in the position of having to enforce a
policy interest of an individual state.
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probably not issue
an injunction that would directly benefit similarly
74
situated people. 1
5.

Actions of Government CounselMay Not Be a Partof a Controversy

While the above powers may seem grand, there remains yet another
obstacle to disciplining the government. Although they sit on opposite
sides of the court, a government lawyer may not be truly adverse 175 to the
interests of the petitioner (as he might not be personally liable for any
reduction in revenue that the public fisc would sustain), and it could be
argued that there is no real controversy when the citizen seeks money from
the government based on a government attorney's behavior. Therefore, a
reduction in the petitioner's tax liability does not directly impact the
government attorney's personal pocketbook. Moreover, his client, the
government, does not require him to maximize its revenues at all costs.
The closest that the Supreme Court came to deciding this issue was its
holding that even a court without subject matter jurisdiction may sanction a
party for its behavior before that court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.176 In most
sanctions cases, however, the Court has held that it, and lower courts,
undoubtedly have jurisdiction over the lawyers, and could issue a selfexecuting judgment against them. However, since Article I courts likely
cannot issue judgments against individuals who did not petition the court in
the first place, they probably do not have personal jurisdiction over the
lawyers who appear on behalf of the government (at least to issue
judgments against them in their personal capacity), and therefore, the court
may lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that the lawyers' behavior
warrants an imposition of sanctions that, inure to the benefit of a petitioner. 177 Therefore, in the face of misbehavior by the government, the
argument goes, if there is no jurisdiction to issue a judgment, there is no
"'controversy."

174.

But see supra Section II(A).

175.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 ("The term implies the existence of
present or possible adverse parties, whose contentions are submitted to the court for
adjudication.").
176.
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992) (holding that a collateral
order of sanctions was still within the District Court's determination, despite the fact that the
underlying dispute had been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
177.
See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 n.10 (1989) (stating that
Congress may not "assign at least the initial fact-finding in all cases involving controversies
entirely between private parties to administrative agencies or other tribunals not involving
juries, so long as they are established as adjuncts to Article III courts. If that were so,
Congress could render the Seventh Amendment a nullity.")
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The Government Lawyer as an Agent of the Government

Under a purely redeterminist mdel, the actions of the government's
lawyers mean little. In this view, the court is charged only with finding
facts that relate to the petition or complaint. On review it is deemed to
have seen through any chicanery. Yet under the institutional discipline
model, courts could attribute the actions of the government's agents to the
government under a principal-agent theory, just as the Exchequer was able
to determine either that the actions of a sheriff were properly undertaken in
the name of the King, or that they merited punishment. 7 8 This approach is
probably the only available approach as there is no chance that the
government lawyers could be held liable under a tort theory in a subsequent
action.
In other words, since the lawyers for the government are not actually
satisfying any grant of attorney fees, any inherent power that courts have to
award attorney fees against litigants as a way to punish bad behavior is
almost ineffective unless they can issue and enforce a judgment against the
individual attorneys. However, not only may this be impossible, but in
most cases it would be inadequate to compensate large classes of litigants
that have been harmed by their actions.
Even if a lawyer for the government commits the most horrendous
violations of court orders and violates whatever ethical duties he is bound
by, it is only speculative that such behavior may result in an "injury in fact"
to the petitioner. 79 Simply because a lawyer engages in unethical litigation
techniques does not automatically mean that the tribunal came to an
incorrect result. Therefore, in practice, although the Tax Court was
eventually overruled by the Ninth Circuit, in Dixon,' it initially held even
if there is a "fraud on the court" it does not automatically mean that a
taxpayer was prejudiced or even had his rights to due process violated.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Drobny, relied on precedent from when the Tax Court was not an Article I
court, but rather an "independent agency within the executive branch," and
concluded that the Tax Court's powers were limited, and therefore, where
there is no prejudice, there was no "fraud on the court."' 81 Furthermore,

178.

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
179.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) ("[I]t must be
'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
decision."').
180.
T.C. Memo. 1999-101, 1999 WL 171398 (1999).
181.
Drobny v. Comm'r, 113 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kenner v.
Comm'r, 387 F.2d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1968)) ("We think, however, that it can be reasoned
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according to Drobny, the only reason that fraud upon the court (by the
government) was subject to revisitation is because of the legal fiction that
any decision tainted by fraud "is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final."'' 82 Amazingly, because Drobny and Dixon create a
remarkable circuit split, 183 and the Tax Court is bound to follow each one
depending
on where the taxpayer lives, this issue has remained unre84
solved. 1
Courts, however, have been reluctant to conclude that lawyers for the
government are really agents capable of binding it under anything other
than specific procedures set out in statutes or regulations. 85 If the
government lawyer was consistently treated as an agent of the government
for determining tax liability, then there would be no question as to whether
his misbehavior in court was a "controversy" that the court had jurisdiction
over, and substantive determinations of liability could be based on his
actions. However, due to the federal government's size, a government
lawyer is but a cog in a great machine, and courts are reluctant to characterize the lawyer's actions as the actions of an18 6agent of the government,
analogous to those of a cashier or a bank teller.
To be sure, courts have tried to use their power to conduct proceedings to hold that government statements during court proceedings can be
87
considered "adoptive admissions" for Fed. R. Evid. 801 purposes.
that a decision produced by fraud on the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final.").
182.
Id.
183.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to finding that courts possess a power
to look beyond statutes precluding judicial review in the case of aberrant government
conduct is in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Heckler v. Chaney in which he opined that
"[iut is possible to imagine other nonenforcement decisions made for entirely illegitimate
reasons, for example, nonenforcement in return for a bribe, judicial review of which would
not be foreclosed by the nonreviewability presumption." 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985).
184.
Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.
1971) (stating that the Tax Court will "follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely
in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals")
185.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 187, 192 (2002) (Gibson, J.)
(analyzing regulatory scheme to determine that "associate chief appeals officer" lacked
settlement authority and could not create an implied-in-fact contract with government);
Gardner v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 475 (1980) ("Appeals officers ... do not appear to have been
delegated settlement authority, and petitioners thus cannot rely [on their] preliminary
approval of the settlement stipulation as being binding on the Commissioner.").
186.
See, e.g., LaMirage, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 192, 200 (1999) (Horn,
J.) ("It is well settled that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain claims arising from a
contract, based on the theory of promissory estoppel, or based on contracts implied-inlaw.").
187.
United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to address
whether the government's admissions are those of "agents" under Fed. R. Evid.
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However, this does not necessarily mean that the lawyer is acting as an
agent of the government, and thereby mandating the satisfaction of
monetary obligations. In practice, courts have only gone so far as to hold
that U.S. Attorneys' duties to disclose information include a duty to make
a
88
reasonable inquiry into what exculpatory information the FBI knows.
It follows that, absent a statutory basis to change the government's
liability based on an attorney's actions, a court cannot view a government
attorney's actions as part of the live controversy unless it is willing to find
that the attorneys for the government are capable of subjecting the
government to reduced revenue based on their actions, or to conclude that
equity demands a reduction in tax liability. However, to conclude that such
equitable interests are in play before an Article I court would shatter the
myth that Article I courts are vested with no "general equitable powers.' 8 9
In Dixon, by ordering the Tax Court to "enter judgment in favor of
Appellants and all other taxpayers properly before this Court on terms
equivalent to those provided in the [corruptly obtained] settlement
agreement with Thompson and the IRS," the Ninth Circuit did just that.' 90
V. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING ARTICLE I COURTS

To see how the Ninth Circuit's solution in Dixon accurately reflects
the nature of the current equilibrium between the above constitutional
interests, and therefore should be adopted by all circuits, some history of

801(d)(2)(D), and instead holding statement admissible under "Rule 801(d)(2)(B) as
statements of which the party-opponent 'has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth"');
United States v. Powers, 467 F.2d 1089, 1097 n.1 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The United States, like other inanimate persons, must, of course, act through its agents.
However, just as formal action by a board of directors may clearly evidence the position of a
corporation, so does the formal prosecution of a criminal trial establish the position of the
United States and not merely the views of its agents who participate therein."); United
States v. Harris, 834 A.2d 106, 118 n.3 (D.C. 2003) ("We have held that, in certain
circumstances, statements of Assistant United States Attorneys are party admissions that are
admissible against the government in subsequent criminal cases ...[but the] admissions of
a party opponent. The Freeland [v. United States, 631 A.2d 1186 (D.C.1993)] court did not
mean to suggest that the United States was bound conclusively by its prior statements, as if
they were judicial admissions.").
188.
United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that in a
criminal trial, where the government did not provide timely discovery that the "prosecutor
charged with discovery obligations cannot avoid finding out what 'the government' knows,
simply by declining to make reasonable inquiry of those in a position to have relevant
knowledge.") (internal citations omitted).
189.
See infra note 396 to 405.
190.
Dixon v. Comm'r, 316 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2003).
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extant Article I courts is needed. At present, Article I courts include: the
Court of Veterans Appeals, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Tax
Court. 191 Unfortunately, a complete history of these courts is beyond the
scope of this article. However, a brief glimpse at the way these courts
developed beyond non-reviewable discretionary functions of agencies to
their current state will put them in perspective and show that they are
intended to protect petitioners from improper actions of the government.
A. HISTORY OF THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

Professor Jaffe and others note that in the United States, where there
1 92
was no king to grant nominal consent, there could be no petition of right.
Legislatures, mindful of the public fisc and the pressures of the taxpaying
public, were not willing to consent to be sued as a benevolent king would
be, 93 and courts were somewhat reluctant to push the issue. In a sense, the
greatest obstacles to claims against the government were the concept of
popular sovereignty, the need for courts to observe strict separation of

191.
Because bankruptcy courts generally adjudicate claims involving individuals
and, by statute, matters requiring Article HI adjudication can be readily transferred to a
district judge, they are not included in this article. However, statutes provide that
bankruptcy courts can adjudicate claims between the IRS and taxpayers in bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. § 505 (a) ("the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or
penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether
or not paid, and whether or not contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction."); James I. Shepard, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
to Hear Innocent Spouse Defenses in Tax Cases: The Tax Court Leads the Way, Norton
Bankr. L. Adviser, 2001 at I (discussing interaction between Bankruptcy Code and Judicial
Code). Likewise, military courts are not included because they have criminal jurisdiction,
and the lower military courts are creatures of Article II. Moreover, they may exercise
supervisory power to dismiss charges where the government is deemed to have behaved
badly.
192.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
193.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 238-39 ("The English remedies of petition of right, monstrans
de droit, and traverse of office, were never introduced into this country as a part of our
common law; but in the American colonies and states claims upon the government were
commonly made by petition to the legislature.") Shimomura also notes that in the colonies,
judges were appointed by the King, and the legislatures were not too eager to have their
purses depleted by jurists who were beholden to the King, and whose rulings were appealed
to courts in England. Shimomura, supra note 62, at 633; Davie, supra note 55, at 822
(explaining how American courts asserted a broader doctrine of almost absolute sovereign
immunity from judicial intervention on the grounds that 1) it was inconsistent with the
dignity of the state; 2) taking money from the fisc might impair the prosecution of war);
Martindale, supra note 82, at 545 (noting that it is not the desire of the people to pay debts,
but rather to save money).
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194
powers, and the "wisdom" of exempting government from suit.
Congress has been reluctant to cede unfettered discretion to pay claimants
to any branch, or to engage in any searching inquiry of the government's
behavior. Instead, Congress's approach has been schizophrenic and
piecemeal. Indeed, to date, all three branches of the government have
played the role of "final arbiter" of the validity of a claim against the
government. There is no general waiver of sovereign immunity, or even a
theory under which a court can determine whether sovereign immunity
should be waived, but rather, a hodgepodge of statutes and some constitutional provisions, which the courts have attempted to coalesce into a
coherent doctrine that provides claimants with recourse to courts.
Consequently, the history of the court's power has been a tug-of-war
between sovereign immunity (or Art. I, § 8) and the court's need to
exercise jurisdiction over the entire controversy put before them.

1. Background
After the Articles of Confederation were adopted, 195 a three-member
"Board of the Treasury" heard cases relating to war debt, as well as cases
sounding in tort, usually adhering to some unstated evidentiary requirements and burdens of proof. 196 The Board reported back to Congress, who,
in turn, authorized the Treasury to pay the claims. 197 Unlike the arrangement in England, where matters were referred by the King to the courts
98 or
Chancery, there was no formal trial procedure or independent review. 1
Five months after the signing of the Constitution, Congress continued
the general pattern of executive fact-finding, followed by Congressional
approval of claims, and established a Board of Auditors within the
Treasury, 199 which mirrored the system under the Articles of Confedera-

194.
See WATKINS, supra note 83, at 195 (collecting views of the "wisdom" of
sovereign immunity, its "expedience" and a need to allow the executive to go about its
business).
195.
The terms of the articles placed plenary power to evaluate claims against the
state in Congress. Arts. Confederation. art. 8, § 1 (1781) (superseded 1789).
196.
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the
Confederation 1781-1789, 371-73 (1965) (describing work of board, and noting that the
board was honest and efficient, many claimants were opportunists, and while the board did
not hear testimony it received documentary evidence and actively investigated claims of
petitioners).
197.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 635.
198.
COWEN, supra note 13, at 3; Jensen, supra note 196.
199.
The exact function of the Board of Auditors is subject to some debate. James
Madison saw it as principally a judicial function (which should be appealable to the
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tion.2°° Congress was free to set aside the legal or factual conclusions of
the Board or consider the claim de novo before making payment.2 0°
In the courts, however, there was some initial breach in sovereign
immunity, at least with regard to state governments, as the Supreme Court
held in Chisholm v. Georgia that states could be directly sued. 20 2 However,
Chisholm was quickly abrogated by the Eleventh Amendment. In the end,
the Court held that while Article UI's reference to suits in which the United
States was a party provided the federal government with the power to sue
individuals in federal courts, it did not provide individuals with a constitutional right to sue the federal government in such courts.0 3
In 1792, Congress attempted to assign the responsibility of adjudicating support claims by revolutionary war orphans and widows to the courts,
which would then pass their recommendations to the Secretary of War.2°4

Supreme Court). However, Congress was not willing to do that, in part because of U.S.
Const. art. I. § 9, which held that no money should be drawn from the treasury unless there
was a specific appropriation. COWEN, supra note 13, at 5.
200.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 637; William Wiecek, The Origin of the United
States Court of Claims, 20 AD. L. REv. 387, 389 (1968).
201.
See, e.g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch 26, 6 Stat. 1 (1789) (paying claims to
foreign officer and appointing Commissioner to settle claims with states).
202.
2 U.S. (DalI.) 419, 478 (1793) ("[I]n case of actions against the United States,
there is no power which the courts can call to their aid."). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411 (1821).
203.
COWEN, supra note 13, at 6 n. 13.
204.
Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 243 (1792); Power, supra note 10,
at 699 ("Although the Supreme Court did not formally invalidate the Act in Hayburn's
Case, the report of that decision appended letters and opinions in which the lower federal
courts expressed substantial doubts about its constitutionality.") (footnote omitted); see, e.g.,
Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 (1792), in which the court quoted a decision of
the Circuit Court of New York which read:
[tihat the duties assigned to the Circuit courts, by this act, are not of
that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate
them as [s]uch; inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of the[s]e courts,
made pursuant to tho[s]e duties, fir[s]t to the consideration and
[s]u[s]pen[s]ion of the Secretary at War, and then to the revi[s]ion of
the legislature; whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at
War, nor any other executive officer, nor even the Legislature, are authorized to [slit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of
this court.
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46-52 (1851) (stating that the treaty with
Spain did not create a court to determine damages, and unless Congress gave finality to
judgments, the courts could not determine facts for Congress to base appropriations upon).
The more recent case of Mistretta v. United States described Ferreiraand noted that:
We did not conclude in Ferreira, however, that Congress could not
confer on a federal judge the function of resolving administrative
claims. On the contrary, we expressed general agreement with the view
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This failed when the courts balked at executive review of their judicial
decisions, holding that they were not cases or controversies that were
within the cognizance of the judiciary. °5 Congress later amended the
statute to vest the courts without fact-finding authority, which apparently
satisfied some lower courts, 2° 6 at least temporarily. 20 7 Congress responded
by completely foreclosing judicial review of these20early
veterans bene9
fits, 20 8 and it remained this way for almost 200 years.
In 1794, faced with judicial reluctance to act in an advisory capacity
and without self-executing judgments that could be executed absent
congressional acquiescence, Congress set up a standing Committee on
Claims.2 '0 Hearings were ex parte.
No formal rules of procedure or
evidence were observed (other than the Committee's rules), and there was
no prohibition against lobbying the Congressmen independently.212 Indeed,

of some of the judges in Hayburn'sCase that while such administrative
duties could not be assigned to a court, or to judges acting as part of a
court, such duties could be assigned to judges acting individually as
commissioners.
488 U.S. 361, 402-03 (1989). A final decision by the Supreme Court was avoided when
Congress enacted a statute that provided that the courts could find facts. Act of Feb. 28,
1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324 (1793); Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 10 ("That the judges of this
court regard them[s]elves as being the commi[s][s]ioners de[s]ignated by the act, and
therefore, as being at liberty to accept or decline that office.").
205.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 639.
206.
The history behind these proceedings is somewhat murky. The best account is
found in Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in
Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 301, 305-09 n.13 (1986). There the findings of the
New York Circuit Court (in letters addressed to the president) are described:
The judges of the New York circuit court, John Jay, William Cushing,
and James Duane, then declared that, in view of the benevolent purposes of the Act, they would agree to conduct the invalid pensions
business as commissioners: As, therefore, the business assigned to this
court by the act is not judicial, nor directed to be performed judicially,
the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners for the
purposes mentioned in it by official instead of personal descriptions.
A copy of this letter is available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ll/llsp/037/0000/00590051.tif (last visited Oct. 19, 2005).
207.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 402-03 (1989) (collecting cases);
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 639 (collecting cases where some lower courts held that they
can act as fact-finding commissioners); Binney, supra note 51, at 3381.
208.
See Charles Mills, Is the Veterans' Benefits Jurisprudenceof the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Faithful to the Mandate of Congress?, 17 ToURo L. REv.
695 (2001) [hereinafter Mills, Mandate].
209.
See infra notes 453-473 and accompanying text.
210.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 644.
211.
Richardson, supra note 39, at 782.
212.
George M. Davie described Washington and state capitals as being deluged
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if a claimant failed in one session of Congress, he could seek relief in the
next.21 3
In 1797, Congress statutorily authorized courts to setoff claims that
the government had against individuals by claims that the individuals had
against the government, even if such claims were denied by the Treasury.2 14

with "claim brokers" and parliamentary agents, as well as lobbyists who sought to influence
various legislators. Since claims were resolved on a political basis it was considered clever
to introduce them into various legislation while one's opponents were absent, so that they
would not be on notice of a potential payout. Davie, supra note 55, at 14. At one point, as
Mr. Davie relates, Congress was known as the "National Claims Mill."
Davie, supra note 55, at 816; Shimomura, supra note 62, at 644.
213.
Act of Mar. 3, 1797, § 3, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 514 (1797); see also United States v.
214.
Macdaniel, 32 U.S. 1, 17 (1833) (where military officer had been paid in excess of his
congressionally authorized salary, but he had done work to earn that amount, the
government was not entitled to those excess funds back simply because they could deny that
he had an equitable claim to the funds); States v. Ringgold, 33 U.S. 150, 163 (1834) ("If the
right of the party is fixed by the existing law, there can be no necessity for an application to
congress, except for the purpose of remedy. And no such necessity can exist, when this right
can properly be set up by way of defense, to a suit by the United States"); Nat'l Bank of
N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359-360 (1955) ("This chilly feeling against
sovereign immunity began to reflect itself in federal legislation in 1797 .... Congress
decided that when the United States sues an individual, the individual can set off all debts
properly due him from the sovereign.").
Setoff and counterclaim did not exist at common law. A defendant who
asserted a setoff could only assert that the plaintiff owed him some liquidated damages.
Under British law, setoffs could not be in the nature of penalties. Until 1875, in England, if
a Defendant ended up owing more than the Plaintiff had originally sued for, he was required
to bring a cross-action for the balance. W. BLAKE ODGERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING
AND PRACTICE IN CIviL ACTIONS IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 236-37 (7th ed. 1912).
Courts of law and equity were very careful to ensure that setoffs were only between the
parties acting in the same capacity. Therefore, the debts of an estate could not be set off
against the credits of an executor of the estate. Id. at 238-39. Counterclaims, unlike setoffs,
are more similar to a separate action by a defendant. The ability to bring them did not exist
at common law either. Id. at 241. For this reason, if the U.S. government, as a defendant,
asserts a counterclaim at the Court of Claims, or any court that sits without a jury, a Plaintiff
might have a right to a jury trial. In short, the right to setoff requires that:
[A] party... show[s] that he holds a mutual obligation against the party
asserting a claim against him which is unrelated to the transaction upon
which the other party bases his claim. As for the requirement of a "mutual obligation," the defendant seeking to assert a right of setoff must
possess a legal right against the same party making demand of him. It
is well established that a right to setoff only exists when the party asserting the right has a claim which arises out of a transaction unrelated
to the matter upon which plaintiff is asserting his claim.
Gary E. Sullivan, In Defense of Recoupment: Why "Setof"' of Prepetition Utility Deposits
Against Prepetition Debt is Not Subject to the Automatic Stay, 15 BANKR. DEV. J.63, 66
(1998-99) (footnote omitted). Because setoff by its nature involves substantive rights, when
the existence of individual rights are at stake, it is treated separately. For example, in the
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Over the next seventy years, Congress preserved its "committee on
claims ' 21 5 while creating others. 21 6 While it paid some claims,217 it also
delegated some initial decision-making to various executive agencies.
219 At
21 8
all times Congress feared fraud and overextending the public fisc.
Before Reeside,22 ° the courts appeared to allow judgments against the
government when it turned out that, after the government had sued a

bankruptcy context, a party must seek a lifting of the automatic stay of the setoff of one debt
against another and historically specific statutes have authorized setoffs. II U.S.C. §
362(a)(7) (2000); in re Holyhoke Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Health Care Fin. Admin., 372
F.3d 1, 3 (2004) (lifting of automatic stay not requirement to recoup debts, whereas lifting
of stay is required for setoff). Unlike setoff, recoupment does not appear in statutes, and
requires that the parties' obligations to each other arise in the same transaction. However,
historically, it has been used to mitigate damages. Recoupment, 7 AM. L. REv. 389, 390
(1872-73) (recoupment is available to reduce liability based on a breach of warranty theory
based on a set of facts existing at the date of contract "although perhaps not ascertainable till
subsequently.") (footnote omitted).
215.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 644 (the committee would "take into consideration all such petitions ... claims or demands on the United States, as shall be presented, or.
. referred to them by the House, and to report their opinion thereupon, together with...
propositions for relief ...as ...shall seem expedient.") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 25-730, at
2-3 (1838)).
216.
Binney, supra note 51, at 381 (listing committees on claims).
217.
See, e.g., 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 844 (1817), available at
http://case.tm/pubs/sourceslVilliers.pdf (referring to the case of Jumonville de Villiers,
whose fence was used by American soldiers for fuel and whose sugar cane was allegedly
eaten by the soldiers. The committee concluded that Mr. De Villiers was entitled to
payment for the fence, but not the cane because "the Government cannot be considered
liable for the destruction of the cane or the use of the sugar, it being neither necessary for
the service nor for the sustenance of the army.").
218.
The statute required the granting of a new trial to the government if it could
"satisfy the court that a fraud, wrong, or injustice had been done to the Government.
Claimants, however, could get a new trial only if they met the usual requirements of the
common law or [C]hancery and made their motion during the court term when the judgment
was entered." COWEN, supra note 13, at 34; see also Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, §2, 15
Stat. 75, 75 (1868).
219.
After the war of 1812, in 1816 Congress appointed a commission with final
authority to decide claims for property lost by citizens who were either volunteering in the
war, or for property destroyed by the American army. Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 11, 3
Stat. 261, 263 (1816) (amended 1817); COWEN, supra note 13, at 7. After the MexicanAmerican War, pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Congress established a
commission to pay claims. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 107, 9 Stat. 393; COWEN, supra note 13,
at 11. While the codified statute did not accord finality to the judgments of the threemember commission, the treaty itself did. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and
Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Mex., art. XV, 9 Stat. 922, 923.
Since there was a cap on the amount payable, the treaty did not violate Article I. § 9 of the
U.S. Constitution, but the commission certified the amounts due to each petitioner to the
treasury department, who, in turn, paid each petitioner their ratable share.
220.
See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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defendant, it was the government that owed the defendant money.22'
However, several years after Congress allowed for setoffs, the Court took
what amounted to a step away from attempting to adjudicate the entirety of
the controversy and a step towards protecting the public fisc, and held that
if after the resolution of claim and setoff, the government ended up owing,
it was impossible to enforce a judgment against the government. 222
2. As an Agent of Congress
From 1855 to 1860,223 Congress experimented with a three-judge
"Court of Claims." 224 This three-judge tribunal did not have the power to
order the Treasury to pay, but could hear petitions and adjudicate claims
based on statutory, regulatory, or contractual theories 225 argued by

221.
United States v. Fillebrown, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 28 (1833). Recently the Tax Court
has dealt with a similar issue; however, jurisdictional issues have complicated the subject
somewhat. When a Taxpayer petitions for a "redetermination" of proposed Tax Liability,
the Tax Court generally has jurisdiction to redetermine the tax liability for the entire year;
therefore, one recognized item may be offset against another. Fisher v. United States, 80
F.3d 1576 (Fed Cir. 1996); Americold Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 747, 752 (1993)
("There is no room... to deny the government its right of setoff because the taxpayers'
claim is relatively small .. .or because the underlying facts are old and complex, or the
Internal Revenue Service had a previous opportunity to assess the underpaid tax.") (quoting
Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624, 628 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (under § 6402(d) (2000) the
government offset refunds against debts to other agencies)). See Sorenson v. Sec'y of
Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986) (noting excess earned income credits were overpayments
subject to intercept).
222.
Reeside, 52 U..S at 272; Tillou v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 220, 1865 WL 1995
(1865), rev'd sub nom, United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484, 489-90 (1867)
(Since right of setoff did not exist at common law, there must be a specific statute that
allows plaintiffs to setoff. However, equitable claims for credit may be used to change the
amount liability, but they may not result in ajudgment against the United States.).
223.
The Court of Claims was created by the Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat.
612 (1855).
224.
Richardson, supra note 39, at 784.
225.
Id. at 796; COWEN, supra note 13, at 15 ("The original Act provided that the
court could receive and file without reference by Congress claims founded: (1) on any law
of Congress, (2) upon any regulation of an executive department, and (3) upon any contracts
with the United States Government, express or implied .... The court could also hear
claims referred to it by either House of Congress."). Although a discussion of the procedure
in government Contracts is beyond the scope of this article, Congress has the ability of
plaintiff contractors to obtain review in court. At one point, it was held that contractors
could agree that the decisions of the agency as to the facts and to the law were final, absent
fraud. Wunderlich v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (1950), rev'd, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
However, Congress abrogated this doctrine to allow for review of the final decisions of an
agency based on a clearly erroneous standard, and prohibited clauses in government
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petitioners and a solicitor for the government.2 26 The judges had life
tenure. The statute provided them with the power to appoint and use
commissioners to take evidence. 7 However, in practice, the reports were
given to Congress, which essentially reviewed (via its Committee on
Claims) the court's determinations de novo. 228 Despite the widely-held
229
view that the court should act as a "standard for government morality,,
Congress only paid on about half of the court's "judgments. 23 °
By the time of the Civil War, after pleas from President Lincoln, a
majority in Congress conceded that something should be done about the
solely legislative determination of claims. The final version of a bill,
passed in 1863, provided that while this court (expanded to five judges23 I)
could adjudicate claims, these claims would only be paid based on
allocations that Congress made after the judgment. In other words, the
judgments were still not self-executing.232 Congress also imposed a sixyear statute of limitations on claims brought before the court which
persists, in large part, to this day.233 Congress further provided, in partial

contracts which included a waiver of all rights to seek judicial review. Act of May 11, 1954,
Pub. L. No. 356, 356, 68 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 321).
226.
See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, §§ 1-2, 10 Stat. 612.
227.
§ 3, 10 Stat. at 613. Like other judges, they were nominated by the President
and confirmed by Congress. Various "commissioners" were appointed who traveled to far
away cities, took oaths, served subpoenas, and transcribed depositions of the parties.
Although the parties paid the commissioners, the transcripts became part of the record.
COWEN, supra note 13, at 14-16. In large part, the judges did not hear evidence themselves
but acted on the record generated by the commissioners, and oral arguments from counsel.
Id. at 86. Eventually, the trial judges became bona fide appellate judges, and the
commissioners became trial judges similar to the pattern followed in New York State of
having a trial-level "Supreme Court" consisting of trial judges and an appellate division. Id.
at 92; Act of Feb. 24, 1925, ch. 301, 43 Stat. 964 (1925). See Court of Claims, General
Order Number 2.
228.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 653; COWEN, supra note 13, at 18.
229.
Edmund W. Pavenstedt, The United States Court of Claims as a Forumfor Tax
Cases (FirstInstallment), 15 TAx L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1959-60).
230.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, 984 (1860).
231.
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 112 Stat. 765, 765. Richardson explains how
most of the judges had prior judicial experience, usually in state Supreme Courts, and were
highly regarded. Richardson, supra note 39, at 794. Interestingly, at the same time,
Congress made payment of judgments by the government against Tax Collectors explicit.
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 76, § 12, 12 Stat. 737, 741.
232.
See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 147, § 1, 13 Stat. 145 (1864) ("Court of
Claims ....

For payments of judgments to be rendered by the court of claims, previous to

the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and sixty five, three hundred thousand dollars.").
233.
Richardson, supra note 39, at 796. However, some aggrieved parties continued
to petition Congress for waivers of the statute of limitations. Id.
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abrogation of Reeside, that the Court of Claims could adjudicate counterclaims and setoffs that the government asserted against the petitioners.2
Although the Court of Claims began to look more like a court, with a
statutory right of appeal on behalf of the government or individuals with
more than $3,000 in controversy,235 in Gordon v. United States,236 the
Supreme Court decided that the Court of Claims was neither really a court
nor within the judicial power of the United States. In Gordon, the Court
held that since a plaintiff could not be awarded damages "till after an
appropriation therefore shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the
Treasury, ' 237 the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear appeals.
Because the Court of Claims decided only whether Congress should pay
(pending Treasury approval) and not what Congress must pay, the court
was not adjudicating cases or controversies, and therefore, not exercising
the judicial power.238
3. Into the JudicialPower
Responding to the harsh effect of the controversy clause, in 1866
Congress eliminated the requirement of treasury approval. 239 By authorizing the payment of judgments without prior estimates by the secretary of
the treasury, Congress placed Court of Claims judges firmly within the
ambit of Article Il, even though they did not need to be reappointed as
Article Ed judges. 24° Likewise, Congress gave up its claim to de novo

234.
Id. at 796. However, in the 1863 provisions, Congress does not appear to have
addressed whether the court could adjudicate all claims against the government, even if they
were only asserted as a defense to an offset. See United States v. Fillebrown, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 28 (1833); COWEN, supra note 13, at 23. However, judgments against claimants had to
be enforced by an action in the U.S. District Court. See § 3, 12 Stat. at 765. This does not
necessarily extend jurisdiction over a new class of people, as the claims must be transitionally related. Therefore, if the Plaintiff's claim is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, so
would the counterclaim. Volk v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 87 (1920); STULL, supra note 39,
at 49-50.
235.
See Richardson, supra note 39, at 788. However, this limitation on the ability
to appeal was construed in United States v. Alire, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 573 (1867) to deny
jurisdiction to the court in equitable prayers seeking a decree of specific performance. See
also infra note 262 (describing limitations upon equitable decrees).
236.
69 U.S. (2 Wall) 561, 1864 WL 6626 (1864).
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Richardson, supra note 39, at 789.
240.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 660-61. In a few cases, executive departments
attempted to revise judgments of the courts of claims. See United States v. Anderson, 76
U.S. 56, 71-72 (1869) (holding that the Court of Claims was empowered to render judgment

20051

ARTICLE I COURTS

review of the records Court of Claims cases. 24 1 The Supreme Court then
administratively determined that it could hear appeals from the Court of
Claims 242 since it was no longer subject to executive control, even though
Congress continued to appropriate amounts in advance that would be
payable by the court.243 During the next few years, Congress experimented

with prospective and retrospective allocations of funds, 244 mindful of the
Supreme Court's distaste for reviewing the decisions of a tribunal that
relied on Congress's discretion and grace for payment of its judgments.24 5
The controversy clause had forced Congress to endow the Court of Claims
with greater power.
In a final attempt to cast the Court of Claims as both fact-finder for
Congress and forum for citizen-claimants, Congress passed the Bowman
Act.246 The Act provided for specific references to the Court of Claims
from heads of executive departments, provided that: 1) the claims were
within the agency's subject-matter jurisdiction; 247 2) the matter was not

for a specific sum, and that sum could not later be revised by an executive officer); Brown
v. United States, 6. Ct. Cl. 181 (1870).
241.
Richardson, supra note 39, at 788.
242.
Shimomura, supra note 62, at 660 (citing 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) vii-viii (1865)).
Interestingly, the statute did not provide for appellate review of judgments of under $3,000
if requested by the petitioner. Binney, supra note 51, at 385.
243.
The first case heard under the new regime by the Supreme Court was De Groot
v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419, 427 (1866).
244.
See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128, 144-45 (1871) (collecting
cases and concluding that finally, "[t]his court being of opinion that the provision for an
estimate was inconsistent with the finality essential to judicial decisions, Congress repealed
that provision. Since then the Court of Claims has exercised all the functions of a court, and
this court has taken full jurisdiction on appeal.") (footnotes omitted).
245.
Although the Supreme Court was never faced with the issue, some Congressmen took the position that mere retrospective allocation was not dispositive of its status of a
court: Congress was simply free to prevent the fund that the court drew upon from being
depleted by a various large claims. 6 CONG. REc. 581, 587 (statement of Congressmen
Clymer). Congress also passed specific legislation that asked the court to consider various
claims, such as the "Hot Springs Act," which required the Court of Claims to determine
proper title to a piece of lucrative property that a number of parties (including the
government) laid claim to. Congress directed the court to provide its final opinion to a
number of government entities, so that they might be guided in future disputes of a similar
nature. Richardson, supra note 39, at 791.
246.
Bowman Act, ch. 116, 22 Stat. 485 (1883).
247.
See Pitman v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 253, 257 (1885) (declining to find facts
in ship collision where the Navy would not have had the legal obligation to compensate the
injured ship because "provisions of the act of Congress to afford assistance and relief to the
executive departments in the investigation of claims and demands against the government
must be construed to apply only to such as are founded on legal rights, and not to extraofficial investigations").
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completely within the agency's discretion; 248 and 3) the reference was
made less than six years after the claim arose.2 4 9 Likewise, the Act
prohibited the court from hearing cases if the claimant had settled with the
agency-even if Congress referred the matter to the court.25 0 However,
back to the Court of Claims for
Congress could remand 2references
5
additional findings of fact. '
4. Constructionand Sovereign Immunity
In 1887 Congress passed the Tucker Act, 252 which remains largely
unchanged today. Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Claims had the
power to render judgment on claims founded on "the Constitution . .. any
Act of Congress, . . . any regulation of an executive department," and,
essentially, on any claim against the government not grounded in tort.253
Furthermore, the court had the "power" to render advisory opinions (not
judgments) on congressional and executive 254 references 255 to Congress

248.
See In re Billings, 23 Ct. Cl. 166, 176 (1888) (holding that Court of Claims
could not accept reference where matter was wholly within the scope of executive
discretion).
249.
See McClure v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 18, 28-29 (1883) (holding that if
claims were presented to the department after the department's statute of limitations
expired, the court could not act upon such a reference from that department); Alexandria, L.
& H.R.R. v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 327 (1891) (a claim which was within the agency's
statute of limitations but over six years old could not be referred to the court under the
Bowman Act).
See Belt v. United States, 23 Ct. Cl. 317, 319 (1888) (once claimant had
250.
submitted his claim to the Treasury Department's Board of Commissioners and they reached
a conclusion, his claim was barred under the Bowman Act).
See Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels v. United States, 69 Cl. Ct. 91 (1930).
251.
Tucker Act, ch. 359 § 1, 24 Stat 505, 505 (1887) (giving the Court of Claims
252.
jurisdiction of all claims founded on the Constitution, any law of Congress, executive
regulation, or contract with the government, or for damages in cases not sounding in tort,
where such claims would be redressible "in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United
States were suable").
At one point it was argued that the clause of the Tucker Act that read "actions
253.
for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort," limited jurisdiction
exclusively to cases that were not grounded in Tort. However, in Dooley v. United States.,
182 U.S. 222, 223 (1901), the court held that the Tucker Act conferred jurisdiction to
recover duties illegally extracted. See also Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, 205
F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000); cf. Daily v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 144, 148 (1881) (clause
granting jurisdiction to court to act on claims under "Laws of Congress" did not provide an
alternative means to either seek review of claims allocated by Congress to the Commissioner of Pensions or to another forum to adjudicate them).
254.
Under the Tucker Act, references from executive agencies had to have the
consent of both the claimant and the head of the department.
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concerning legal, equitable, and moral claims without an appeal to the
Supreme Court.256 The Act also provided the court with jurisdiction over
"takings" claims in excess of a threshold amount, now $10,000.
Soon after the passage of the Tucker Act, the question of the scope of
the waiver of sovereign immunity began to rear its head: the Supreme
Court was faced with determining the scope of the waiver without treading
upon the appropriations clause. 257 In United States v. Realty Co., 258 the
Supreme Court relied on the proposition that Congress alone had the power
to "pay the debts" of the United States,259 prompting the Court to conclude
that any waivers by Congress of its immunity must be narrowly construed.
For example, suits grounded in tort would not fall within the scope of the
consent already given by the Tucker Act. 260 The Court held that while
Congress could determine the morality behind imposing obligations on the
public fisc, the courts could only analyze the legal claims within the

255.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2000).
256.
Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275-76 (1868) (reversing the
judgment of the Court of Claims, and announcing the principle that waivers of sovereign
immunity would be construed narrowly).
257.
United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 19 (1889) ("[W]e should have been
somewhat surprised to find that the administration of vast public interests, like that of the
public lands, which belong so appropriately to the political department, had been cast upon
the courts."). The Court in Jones held that the court lacked jurisdiction to render decisions
based on equitable doctrines or to order specific performance (requiring the supervision of
the court). However, the Court carved out an exception for specifically conferred equitable
matters. Id. at 2 ("If such is the legislative will, of course the courts must conform to it,
although the management and disposal of the public domain, in which the newly-claimed
jurisdiction would probably be most frequently called into exercise, has always been
regarded as more appropriately belonging to the political department of the government than
to the courts, and more a matter of administration than judicature.").
258.
163 U.S. 427, 438 (1896) (denying bounties to sugar manufacturers and
concluding that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent, that consent must be
strictly construed, and that it can decide all the terms and conditions and name the court to
entertain the suit).
259.
U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 1. Binney speculated that while Congress has the
power to pay the debts of the United States, it may not have the power to determine their
validity. Binney, supra note 51, at 379.
Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1868) ("The language of
260.
the statutes which confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims, excludes by the strongest
implication demands against the government founded on torts."). Initially, the Tucker Act
did not cover suits against the "Post Exchanges" of the armed forces. These bodies were
essentially government run stores which apparently were financially independent from the
government, and therefore none of the reasons for immunizing them from suit in a District
Court existed. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942). By the Act of July 23,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-350(a), 84 Stat. 449, 449 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)), these
bodies were specifically added to the scope of the Tucker Act. The District Courts retained
jurisdiction over cases with an amount in controversy of less than $10,000.
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framework provided by Congress. But, Congress was not completely
hostile to the development of the concept of equity being delegated to the
courts. Indeed, Congress began marking out ad hoc jurisdictions for the
court, which, in some cases specifically included the jurisdiction to
determine "equitable rights."26 ' Ironically, this largely failed as the
Supreme Court held that to construe a treaty to render a "more just result"
was beyond the scope of the court's jurisdiction, as it intruded into the
"domain of the political departments." 262 Therefore, despite an explicit
grant of jurisdiction to the court, the Supreme Court held that the
appropriations clause prevented the Court of Claims from intruding "upon
by the Constitution to the political departments of
the domain committed
263
the government.,

5. The Case and Controversy Clause and Recoupment
Arguably the biggest obstacle to obtaining relief from the Court of
Claims has been the Tucker Act's requirement that a plaintiff whose claims
are not grounded in contract must seek damages based on another so-called
"money-mandating" statute in which Congress specifically provided for
payment. The Tucker Act has a built-in statute of limitations, 264 but often
the limitations to the money-mandating statutes are even shorter.265

The Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 188, 28 Stat. 876, 898 read in part:
That as the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations claim to have some right,
title, and interest in and to the lands ceded by the foregoing agreement,
which claim is controverted by the United States, jurisdiction be, and is
hereby, conferred upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine the
said claim of the Choctaws and Chickasaws and to render judgment
thereon, it being the intention of this Act to allow said Court of Claims
jurisdiction, so that the rights, legal, and equitable of the United States
and the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.
Id. (emphasis added).
262.
In United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532-33 (1900), the Supreme
Court held that "Congress did not intend, when passing the act under which this litigation
was inaugurated, to invest the Court of Claims or this court with authority to determine
whether the United States had, in its treaty with the Indians, violated the principles of fair
dealing."
Id. at 532.
263.
264.
28 U.S.C. §2501 ("Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years
after such claim first accrues.").
E.g. 28 U.S.C. § I 346(a) ("Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any
265.
tax ... shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2
years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later.").
261.
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Typically, many of the transactions that come within the cognizance of the
court cover quite a bit of time, and to fully resolve them, the court must
look to events that took place outside the statute of limitations, or to
activities that are not solely within the "money-mandating" statute upon
which a petitioner relies. However, since the Court of Federal Claims is
within the judicial power, it has found that in order to adjudicate the
entirety of a controversy that extends beyond the scope of the moneymandating statute, it must look outside the time-frame that the statute
covers. In short, the controversy clause pushes the jurisdiction of the court
outward.
To appreciate the magnitude of the equitable recoupment controversy,
it is necessary to understand that at the time of the drafting of the Tucker
Act (which provided for money damages if the claimant could show that
the government had breached a contract, executive order, or statute
providing for money damages 266), fewer people were subject to federal
income tax than today, and the ability to effectively contest tax liability was
not settled.267 Many claims were brought without much thought as to
whether the Tucker Act alone could afford the petitioner relief, and the
court denied relief to petitioners who could not demonstrate both a moneymandating statute, and jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. This left open the
question of whether the Tucker Act was the jurisdictional grant, or the
specific money-mandating statute that the plaintiff relied upon in his
complaint. If both the money-mandating clause and the Tucker Act were
treated as jurisdictional, the court could not even inquire into facts alleged
that would not, by themselves, satisfy the substantive requirements.
Eventually, in Edison ElectricIlluminating v. United States, 268 the Court of
Claims concluded that the Tucker Act was the jurisdictional (and remedial)
grant and
the money-mandating statute provided the substantive right to
269
relief.
However, Edison Electricdid not fully answer the question of whether
the controversy clause provided a substantive right to relief because a party
might fall within the Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations, but that
full adjudication of the controversy required reference to taxes paid outside

266.
See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
267.
See infra notes 297-304.
268.
38 Ct. Cl. 208 (1903).
269.
Id. (The Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 152 "provides for [in]
internalrevenue cases like this[,] a judicial remedy .... This grant of a judicial remedy to
such claimants constitutes what the Supreme Court calls in Nichols [v. U.S., 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 122 (1868)] 'a system,' containing an exclusive jurisdiction.") (distinguishing U.S. v.
Kaufman, 96 U.S. 567 (1877)).
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the statute of limitations. In Bull v. United States,27 ° the Court of Claims
grappled with the question of whether, as a court whose jurisdiction might
be somewhat limited by the Tucker Act, it possessed jurisdiction to offset a
taxpayer's tax liability by money that would normally be due a taxpayer,
but as27 1a refund action was barred by the statute of limitations or viceversa.

The story of Bull is part of tax lore. Archibald H. Bull was a shipbroker who had interests in a number of partnerships. The partnership
agreements provided two alternatives to the estate upon Mr. Bull's death:
1) within 30 days after his death the estate could withdraw from the
partnership; or 2) the partnership would continue paying his estate for
another year.272 When Mr. Bull died, the estate did not withdraw from the
partnership, and so the estate received monies from the partnership as if
Mr. Bull had survived. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue included
the value of his partnership interest as income. The Board of Tax Appeals
(the "BTA"), which, at the time, was not preclusive upon any court,273
rejected the argument that profits paid his estate (and not part of his estate
at the time of his death), and therefore, according to his heirs, were
unlawfully subject to both income and estate taxes.274 His estate paid the
tax and sued in the Court of Claims for a refund, arguing that the profits
were either: 1) not income; or alternatively, 2) not part of the estate, and
therefore his estate was entitled to a setoff of amounts against other
payments whose recovery was barred by the Tucker Act's statute of
limitations. These theories required the court to look to matters that, if
plead alone, would have been outside the Tucker Act's jurisdiction. The

270.
Bull v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 133 (1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
271.
Equitable recoupment, in essence, allows the court to look beyond the statute of
limitations to the whole transaction and thereby to offset one payment of tax on the
transaction against another payment to prevent a taxpayer from being taxed twice under two
different theories which are mutually exclusive or interrelated. James E. Tierney, Equitable
Recoupment Revisited: The Scope Of The Doctrine In Federal Tax Cases After United

States v. Dalm, 80 KY. L.J. 95, n.16 (2001) (providing examples). Recoupment generally
operates as a partial defense and does not provide an independent right, nor a theory of
jurisdiction for a specific court. Dalm v. United States, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). In the words
of the Tax Court: To "recoup" is to "get back the equivalent of something lost." Equitable
recoupment, in turn, is a judicially created doctrine under which a claim for a refund of, or
deficiency in, taxes barred by a statute of limitations may nonetheless be recouped, or offset,
against a tax claim of the Government (in the case of a time-barred refund) or of the
taxpayer (in the case of a time-barred deficiency assessment). Estate of Orenstein v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2000-150, at *7 (2000).
272.
Bull, 295 U.S. at 254-5.
273.
See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
274.
ld. at 258.
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Court of Claims rejected these theories because it held that it could not look
beyond facts relating to taxes paid within the statute of limitations. 7 5
The Supreme Court reversed. It emphasized instead that the same
stream of income (not identical amounts of income) had been taxed
twice. 276 The Court concluded that the "mechanism" of taxation, assessment, and controversy over amounts due, created an exception to "sovereign immunity" and therefore taxpayers were free to assert counterclaims
that fell within that carve-out to sovereign immunity. 77 According to the
Court, Congress (in keeping with due process concerns) provided the
taxpayer the opportunity to seek a refund, and that claim for refund was
grounded in a theory of restitution for amounts wrongly paid.2 78 Lord Coke
would have been proud.27 9 The Court pointed out that if such a claim were
not based on assessment of tax, but rather a contractual claim between two
parties, the party that admitted to wrongly holding the money would not
have prevailed.2 80 Though the Court used the inflammatory words "fraud"

275.

Id.

Bull, 79 Ct. Cl. at 143 (1934), held that the Court of Claims could not:
consider whether the Commissioner correctly included the total amount
received from the business in the net estate of the decedent subject to estate tax for the reason that the suit was not timely instituted. The only
question for decision is whether the Commissioner correctly included
the item of $200,117.09 in income for the purpose of income tax payable by the estate.

276.
Bull, 295 U.S. at 256 (1935) ("They were inconsistent. The identical moneynot a right to receive the amount, on the one hand, and actual receipt resulting from that
right on the other-was the basis of two assessments.").
277.
Later cases have held that other grants of jurisdiction to the Tax Court are a
separate exception to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Wagner v. United States, 2002 WL
31476652 (D. Nev. 2002) ("26 U.S.C. § 6331(d) provides a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity to taxpayers who disagree with the outcome of a CDP [Collection Due Process]
hearing.").
278.
Bull, 295 U.S. at 260.
279.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
280.
Bull also refers to United States v. Ringgold, which holds:
[W]hen an action is brought by the United States, to recover money in
the hands of a party, who has a legal claim against them for costs; it
would be a very rigid principle, to deny to him the right of setting up
such claim in a court of justice, and turn him round to an application to
Congress.
33 U.S. 150 (1834) (emphasis added). Finally, the Bull court analogized to United States v.
Macdaniel,32 U.S. 1, 17 (1833), in which a military officer had been paid in excess of his
congressionally authorized salary, but had done work to earn that amount. The government
was not entitled to those excess funds simply by denying that he had an equitable claim to
the funds.
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and "immoral, 28 ' it refrained from imposing a constructive trust (the
282
traditional remedy for monies fraudulently taken) on the government.
The Court concluded that equitable recoupment is a valid defense,2 3 'and is
"never barred by the statute of limitations so long as the main action itself
is timely" and that "[a]n action will lie whenever the defendant has
received money which is the property of the plaintiff, and which the
defendant is obliged by natural justice and equity to refund., 28 4 Bull
demonstrates the power of the "case and controversy" clause to extend the
reach of a court beyond its mere statutory jurisdiction to cover all relevant
facts.
On the other hand, in the case of taxes that were unconstitutional
based on a "self-executing" portion of the Constitution (such as the
prohibition against taxes on exports,28 5 the takings clause,286 the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment, 287 or a theory of federalism
that prevented the federal government from exacting money from the
states 288), the Court of Claims rightfully possessed jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act, 289 as no specific money-mandating statute was necessary.
However, the Court has consistently held that the jurisdictional grant did

281.
Bull, 295 U.S. at 261 ("While here the money was taken through mistake
without any element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud
on the taxpayer's rights.").
282.
Camilla E. Watson, Equitable Recoupment: Revisiting an Old and Inconsistent
Remedy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 719-20 (1996). Professor Watson points out that in the
non-tax cases that the court cited, a constructive trust was imposed on the government so as
to preserve any monies it may have taken.
283.
See supra note 214, for a description of the difference between recoupment and
setoff.
284.
Bull, 295 U.S. at 261 (quoting United States v. State Bank, 96 U.S. 30 (1878)).
285.
See, e.g., Cyprus Amax Coal Co., 205 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000), citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.").
286.
Although the Court has jurisdiction to review claims under the takings clause, it
has been held that the a claimant may not invoke the court's jurisdiction under this clause to
obtain additional review over rate-setting matters, as administrative procedures and other
judicial appeals provide claimants with relief. Capital Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 116 Ct.
CI. 850, 858-59 (1950), cert. denied., 340 U.S. 875 (1950).
287.
COWEN, supra note 13, at 137.
288.
South Carolina v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 257 (1904), aff'd, 199 U.S. 437
(1905) (finding that the federal government did have the power to levy taxes on state liquor
stores).
289.
A similar situation outside the tax context appeared when an army lawyer was
convicted in a sham trial of disrupting a court martial. The Court of Claims found that
because the court marital of the lawyer was jurisdictionally infirm, it has jurisdiction to
award back pay. Eventually, the President pardoned Lt. Shapiro. Shapiro v. United States,
69 F.Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
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not, in and of itself, allow for the award of interest unless a specific statute
so provided.2 9 °
6. Modern History
While its ancestors were either a part of Congress or within the executive branch, the status afforded the Court of Federal Claims vacillated. In
1925, the court was divided into judges, 29 1 and the role of "commissioners"
292
expanded from merely transcribing depositions to that of trial judges.
Soon thereafter, in 1929293 and 1933,294 the Supreme Court determined that
since Article III does not specifically provide for suits against the government, such a court was created under Article I, and therefore the pay of the
judges could be diminished. However, twenty years later, Congress
declared the court to be an "Article 1m1" court.295 This declaration was
apparently acceptable to the Supreme Court: in Glidden v. Zdanok,296 the
Supreme Court agreed and found that a Court of Claims judge, endowed
with life tenure, could sit by designation on the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
Indeed, until the enactment of Public Law 92-415 in 1972, allowing
for reinstatement of civil servants, the Court of Claims was not able to
entertain complaints for purely equitable 297 relief-namely, specific
performance-that would order the executive to do anything besides pay
money, even though King Edward had allowed the Chancery to hear cases
298
against the Crown.
Finally, in 1982, the Commissioners were renamed trial court judges
in a reformulated Article I court named the "United States Claims
Court, '' 299 and the now-judges of the court became the Article III judges of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 300 Despite the different
constitutional status, the judges of the court issued "General Order Number

290.
COWEN, supra note 13, at 99; 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a); Tektronix v. United States,
213 Ct. CI. 257 (1977).
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
(amending
296.
297.

298.
299.
300.

Act of Feb. 24, 1925, 68 Pub L. No. 451, ch. 301, § 1, 43 Stat. 964 (1925).
Id.
Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452.
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
Act of July 28, 1953, 83 Pub. L. No. 158, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226 (1953)
28 U.S.C. § 171).
370 U.S. 530 (1962).
United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889).

See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
Act of Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 42, 97 Pub. L. No. 64 (1982).
See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 80 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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One" which adopted the precedents of the Court of Claims and its
reviewing courts. Ten years later, the name of the trial court was changed
to the "Court of Federal Claims."
One last case bears mentioning in the court's history: In MA. Mortenson Co. v. United States, the government argued that it could not be
sanctioned in a discovery dispute that transpired before the Claims Court,
under R. U.S. Cl. Ct. 37(b)(2), as sovereign immunity precluded summary
judgment.3 ° ' Indeed, the waiver of sovereign immunity for payment of
judgments in 31 U.S.C. § 1304 prohibits disbursement of money unless the
court issues a "final judgment. 3 °2 Interestingly, rather than simply order
the government to pay sanctions, Judge Bruggink entered partial summary
judgment under R. U.S. Cl. Ct. 56.303 On Appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit not only affirmed, but treated the partial summary
judgment as an order. that was not immediately appealable. 304 The claims
were settled, and the government appealed again.305
Although the
government argued that the only sanction available to the Claims Court was
dismissal or default, the Federal Circuit held that:
We cannot accept the government's position that it can
consent to suit in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act
and the Contract Disputes Act, and yet simultaneously may
abuse the litigative process to the impairment of fair adjudication. We reject the notion that the government can
frustrate and undermine the goals in creating such a tribunal, leaving the Claims Court itself helpless to preclude
such conduct on the government's part, and thereby
3°6 eliminating the possibility of achieving a "fair" result.
At least for the time being, the needs of the court to adjudicate a case
or controversy, combined with the congressionally-created avenue to lodge

301.
M.A. Mortenson Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 362, 363 (1988).
302.
See Christian v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 720, 727 (2001); see also Trout v.
Garrett, 891 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (denying writ of mandamus from District Court that
ordered government to pay interim attorney fees, and holding that the "judgment fund
legislation, in contrast, authorizes no claims for relief. It is auxiliary legislation; its sole
office is to furnish 'a mechanism for facilitating payment of judgments' rendered on claims
authorized by another statute").
303.
Mortenson, 15 CI.Ct. 362.
304.
M.A. Mortenson Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 50, 51-2 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
305.
M.A. Mortenson Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
306.
Id. at 1184.
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petitions, has triumphed over the appropriations clause and sovereign
immunity.
B. THE TAX COURT

The Tax Court emerged in its current form after a struggle with inefficiency, 30 7 sovereign immunity, and the country's love-hate relationship
with taxes. The Tax Court and its predecessors have journeyed out of the
executive and into the judiciary, but the stigma of not being a "real court"
persists to this day.
Despite having a much more narrow jurisdiction than the United
States Court of Federal Claims (and its previous appellations), the Tax
Court has had a more colorful adventure with decisions based on equitable
principles. 30 8 The Tax Court's jurisdiction is limited by statute to inquiries
regarding refund requests properly included in the taxpayer's petition and
based only on the tax paid for a specific "tax year. ' '309 It has been argued,
often successfully,31 ° that to look at any other year would be reaching a
decision on equitable grounds, which according to this argument, are
beyond the Tax Court's jurisdiction. However, to reach such a conclusion,
one must first conclude that the Tax Court serves no institutional disciplinary function, or, in the words of the Sixth Circuit, the Tax Court has
jurisdiction to do "nothing more than [undertake] the judicial review of an
assessment made by an administrative agency. ,,311I

307.
Professor Ferguson characterized a taxpayer's current menu of remedies as
resulting "more from the accidents of history than any unified, full-grown plan." M. Carr
Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Taxation Controversies, 48 IOWA L. REV.

312, 315 (1963).
308.
Lederman, supra note 14, at 379 (providing an in-depth discussion of equitable
recoupment).
309.
26 U.S.C. § 6214(b) ("The Tax Court in redetermining a deficiency of income
tax for any taxable year or of gift tax for any calendar year or calendar quarter shall consider
such facts with relation to the taxes for other years or calendar quarters as may be necessary
correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in so doing shall have no
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the tax for any other year or calendar quarter has
been overpaid or underpaid.").
310.
See, e.g., Estate of Mueller v. Comm'r, 153 F.3d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1998)
(equitable recoupment not possible); c.f. First Chicago Corp. v. Comm'r, 842 F.2d 180, 181
(7th Cir. 1988) ("[there is some chance that the taxpayer might obtain relief under ... the
doctrine of equitable recoupment.").
311.

Id.
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1. Prehistory
Long before there was a Tax Court and even before our modern income tax, tax liability was litigated through the ever-present legal fiction of
an evil minister who acted on behalf of the government.3 12 In this case, the
tax collector, after having the Commissioner of Internal Revenue "certify"
an assessment, 313 collected the money, and briefly held it in his personal
capacity before turning it over to the government. The tax collector was
viewed as an agent of the sovereign. As an agent, he could be sued at
common law.3 14 If the tax collector knowingly collected money illegally or
erroneously, 3 15 he would be personally liable under a theory of assumpsit;
but, upon such a determination by the court, the tax collector could simply
return the money. 316 If he collected money without knowing that the
government was not entitled to it (such as when the taxpayer failed to pay
"under protest") and passed the money on to the government, 31 7 the
contrived legal theory no longer applied and the taxpayer had no remedy.3 18

312.
Pfander, supra note 17, at 926.
313.
William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue,
60 HARv. L REv. 685, 687 (1946-47); BOLTON B. TURNER, THE TAX COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ITS ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS IN THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 31
(1955) ("The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, either on the basis of returns filed or upon
such audits as were made, entered the amount of tax upon assessment lists and certified
them to the various collectors for collection.") [hereinafter ORIGINS]. Though the distinction
may be somewhat obtuse, a determination of a deficiency is different from the assessment of
money. CHARLES D. HAMEL, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE U.S. BOARD OF TAX
APPEALS 25-26 (1940).
Assessments involve the actual taking of money, whereas a
determination of a deficiency is a decision made that the taxpayer owes more money for a
given year. See Terminal Wine Co. v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 697 (1925) ("Therein this Board
declined to hold that an assessment constitutes per se a determination.").
314.
See Howard Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical AnalysisPart I-The Origins of the Tax Court, 40 ALB. L. REv. 7, 36 (1976-76). [hereinafter
Dubroff, PartI].
315.
William Plumb speculated that there might be a difference between monies
"illegally" and "erroneously" collected. Plumb, supra note 313, at n.2. However, he also
notes that the Bureau (or Internal Revenue Service) never availed itself of any substantive
distinctions between the two. See United States v. Lederer Terminal Warehouse Co., 139
F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1943) (differentiating between a statute of limitations for illegal
collections, and one for an erroneous overpayment).
316.
The Tax Collector was initially indemnified by statute, so that he would not
have to pay the money himself. See, e.g., Rev. Stat. 989 (1875); 28 U.S.C. § 842 (1940);
The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 125 (1897).
Plumb, supra note 313, at 687 ("The Tax Collector who collects an erroneous
317.
tax neither commits a wrong nor personally profits from it.").
318.
In Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 137 (1836), the Supreme Court, in an action
against the collector of the Port of New York, held that if a payment was made under protest
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Since no actions were initially possible against the United States, once the
money found its way to the government's coffers, there was no remedy. In
1839, Congress recognized that requiring collectors to retain money paid
under protest was inefficient, and directed the collectors to pay the money
directly into the treasury. 31 9 Therefore, for a short period, it was questionable whether taxpayers had any remedy as the collectors now acted without
discretion. 320 Five weeks later, Congress adopted corrective legislation that
allowed actions nominally against the collectors, with claims paid by the
United States. 32 1 After the creation of the Court of Claims, and the passage
of the Tucker Act, these actions against tax collectors duplicated actions
under the Tucker Act in the District Courts, 322 suits in the Court of Claims,
or direct appeals to Congress. 323
After the inception of the modern corporate excise tax in 1909324 and
325 and administratively 326
the income tax in 1913, there were statutorily

to the collector, one could sue the collector for a refund of the monies. The court reasoned
that upon payment under protest, "there can be no hardship in requiring the party to give
notice to the collector that he considers the duty claimed illegal, and put him on his guard,
by requiring him not to pay over the money. The collector would then be placed in a
situation to claim an indemnity from the government." A failure to make such a protest
would be considered a payment to the government under a mistake of law, and the
government, at the time, was protected by sovereign immunity. See also Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. 236 (1845) (holding that no action lies against the collectors after the collectors were
compelled to pay their funds over to the government); Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. 263 (1839)
(where no notice was contemporaneously given to tax collector, importer could not recover
duty that he claimed was erroneously collected); Jenks v. Lima Tp., 17 Ind. 326 (1861)
(collecting common law applications of this rule).
319.
Act of March 3, 1839, § 2, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 348 (1839).
320.
Carey v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236 (1845) ("This section of the act of Congress,
considered independently and as apart from the facts and circumstances which are known to
have preceded it, and may fairly be supposed to have induced its enactment, must be
understood as leaving with the collector no lien upon, or discretion over, the sums received
by him on account of the duties described therein; but as converting him into the mere
bearer of those sums to the Treasury of the United States, through the presiding officer of
which department they were to be disposed of in conformity with the law."). Justice Storey,
in dissent, argued that the common law bound even the government. Storey's argument
may have carried the day, as the Supreme Court later found that "[ilf the Congress did not
have the authority to deal by a curative statute with the taxpayers' asserted substantive right,
in the circumstances described, it could not be concluded that the Congress could
accomplish the same result by denying to the taxpayers all remedy both as against the
United States and also as against the one who committed the wrong." Graham & Foster v.
Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 431 (1931); see also Plumb, supra note 313, at 689.
321.
Act of Feb. 26, 2845, ch 22. 5 Stat. 727 (1845); 12 Stat. 741 (1863); Plumb,
supra note 313, at 690.
322.
Lederman, supra note 14, at 402-03.
323.
See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 128.
324.
Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, ch 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112, § 38
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created procedures for "abatement" of tax,327 wherein the party seeking an
adjustment would post a bond before paying the tax, 328 unless the commissioner decided that the amount required immediate collection, and
instituted what was termed a "jeopardy assessment. 329 Just as now, a
statute prohibited taxpayers from seeking an injunction against the Bureau
from collecting taxes, even if it refused to abate them.33 ° Creative legal
counsel determined that a suit by shareholders in a corporation to prevent
the stockholders from paying what they perceived to be unconstitutional
taxes would allow the courts to rule on the validity or construction of the
tax before payment.33 '
In 1919,332 Congress established a "Committee of Review and Appeal" within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, with Treasury Department
(1909) cited in Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918).
325.
For a description of these early statutory abatement procedures, see Dubroff,
Part I, supra note 319, at 27. It appears that these initial statutory procedures were somewhat short lived. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch 18 §§ 214(a)(12), 234(a)(14), 40 Stat. 1068,
1079 repealed by the Revenue Act of 1924, ch 234 § 279, 43 Stat 300.
326.
See Dubroff, PartI, supra note 314, at 108.
327.
If the abatement was granted, the taxpayer could avoid collection of the tax.
The taxpayer would be charged a statutory interest rate of 6% on the portion of the claim
that was ultimately denied, or 12% if the Commissioner found that the claim for abatement
was not filed in good faith. 26 U.S.C. § 250(e) (1918). Abatement was not given as of
right. The taxpayer had to submit his legal reasons before even an abatement would be
granted. See ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 201-02 (1921).
328.
Dubroff, Part1,supra note 314, at 27-8 ("The claim in abatement ...permitted
the taxpayer to administratively appeal an assessed tax prior to paying the assessment. The
claim in abatement ... permitted a taxpayer to defer payment if he provided a bond for the
payment of the tax and any interest or penalties thereon.") (citations omitted).
329.
Dana Latham, Jurisdictionof the United States Board of Tax Appeals under the
Revenue Act of 1926, 15 CAL. L. REv. 199, 204 (1926-1927) (showing how jeopardy
assessments were not originally found in statutes, but were originally a Bureau procedure).
330.
26 U.S.C. § 3224 (1918).
331.
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine, 284 U.S. 498 (1932) (collecting cases).
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust, 157 U.S. 429, 553-54 (1895) ("The jurisdiction of a court
of equity to prevent any threatened breach of trust in the misapplication or diversion of the
funds of a corporation by illegal payments out of its capital or profits has been frequently
sustained."), reh'd, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
332.
A failed attempt at providing a taxpayer with pre-payment review came in the
form of the "Advisory Tax Board." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1301(d), 40 Stat. 1057
(1918) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1301 (1918)). This Board had the power to issue subpoenas
and make findings on the request of the Commissioner and the taxpayer questions regarding
the interpretation of income, war-profits, or excess profits taxes. The first members of the
Board were appointed in March of 1919. By October of the same year, it was abolished,
because not enough qualified people could be found to serve on it. MONTGOMERY, supra
note 332, at 162. The Supreme Court, in dicta, described the work of the Board as such:
The Commissioner might submit to the Board, and on the request of a
taxpayer must submit, any question relating to the interpretation or ad-
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personnel as its members. 333 This board heard pre-payment protests of
actions taken by the "income tax unit. ' 334 At the time, the Bureau had a
considerable backlog of uncompleted audits. However, it was decided that
the board would make an assessment based on returns where there was any
doubt as to the validity of deductions, and any questions would be cleared
up in the process of a claim for refund or abatement. 335 The Commissioner,
via the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, could and did overrule the committee.336 Despite this check, the Board's enabling legislation allowed the
Commissioner to dissolve it, which he did six month's after its creation.3 37
In 1921, Congress required that the Board of Internal Revenue give
the taxpayer thirty days to administratively appeal a proposed assessment
without payment. 338 However, after such review began, no claims in
abatement could be made.339 Under this procedure, the taxpayer could
appeal a decision of the "income tax unit" to the "Committee on Appeals
and Review" who heard appeals on behalf of the Commissioner. 340 There
were no other limitations on the ability of the Commissioner to collect the
underlying tax as well as penalties. Any further review would have to wait
until payment. Until 1924, "certain case assessments were made which
neither represented the final determination of the Commissioner, [nor] were
jeopardy assessments.,, 341 At that point, an aggrieved taxpayer's remedies
were: 1) a suit against the United States in the Court of Claims under the

ministration of the income, war profits or excess profits tax. The functions of the Board were, in some degree, similar to those of the excess
profits tax advisers and reviewers who had aided the Commissioner in
applying the 1917 act.
Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, at 277 U.S. 551, n.7 (1928) (citations
omitted).
333.
William J. Gallagher, Board of Tax Appeals, 7 Loy. L.J. 145 (1926).
334.
Id.; see also Dubroff, PartI, supra note 314, at 22 & n.77.
335.
Dubroff, PartI, supra note 314, at 27.
336.
HR Doc. 103, 68th Cong, 1. Sess 2: Report of Tax Simplification Board.
337.
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. 65-254, ch 18, § 1301(d), 40 Stat. 1141 (1918);
Dubroff, PartI, supra note 3149, at 44.
338.
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. 67-98, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265 (1921).
339.
Id.; Dubroff, PartI, supra note 314, at 28.
340.
Clarence A. Miller, The United States Board of Tax Appeals: Its Jurisdiction
and Practice, 11 A.B.A. J. 169 (1925); Dubroff, Part I, supra note 3149, at 28, 46-48
(explaining how the committee functioned similarly to the tax court: its primary purpose
was to resolve tax controversies, its membership was distinguished and collegial, and it held
hearings in different parts of the country).
341.
Latham, supra note 329, at 199 & n.2 ("The amount of tax assessed became a
lien on the taxpayer's property. Both real and personal property could be seized and sold
for unpaid taxes."). Collection of tax could not be enjoined. Id. (citing Dodge v. Osborn,
240 U.S. 118 (1915)).
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Tucker Act; 2) a suit against the Tax Collector in a District Court,34 2 as
Congress had since eliminated the "protest" requirement; 343 or 3) a suit
under the Tucker Act in District Court against the United States, provided
that the amount in controversy was under $10,000. 344 Whatever the case,

342.
Because of the earlier congressional decision to allow suits against the collector
in customs cases, the Supreme Court held, in Philadelphia v. The Collector, 72 U.S. (5
Wall) 720 (1867), since the earlier statutes had merely indemnified the tax collectorsprovided that they acted according to specific directions or probable cause, suits against tax
collectors were still possible, and Congress had thereby recognized the actions grounded in
assumpsit). See also Dubroff, Part 1, supra note 314, at 36. The Court also held that since
this was a suit against a private litigant, the government had no interest in it, and therefore
could not aid the collector by using its subpoena power in discovery. Pacific Mills v.
Kenefick, 99 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1938) ("We do not think the Commissioner may use his
powers of examination to aid the government representative as a litigant in civil proceedings."). Naturally, the tax collector could use the generally available discovery methods.
343.
Plumb argues that the elimination of this protest requirement converted the
action from a suit at common law to a purely statutory action. Plumb, supra note 313, at
691. In 1921, the $10,000 limit was eliminated, only in cases where the collectorhad died.
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub L. No. 67-98, ch 136, § 1310 (1921). The "death" requirement
for unrestricted suits against tax collectors in District Courts was later replaced with an "out
of office" requirement. Act of February 24, 1925, ch 309, 43 Stat 972 (1925).
344.
Plumb, supra note 313, at 687. Moreover, since multiple tax collectors might
have been involved with the same taxpayer, issue preclusion was often unavailable to a
taxpayer who needed to sue two tax collectors over the same tax. Id. at 693. In actions
directly against the government, claim preclusion was available. Id. at 693; Dubroff, PartI,
supra note 314, at 37. Congress, in 1942, attempted to remedy this lack of preclusive effect.
53 Stat. 965. In 1942, Congress required the courts to accord preclusive effect to actions
against different tax collectors, so long as the issues were identical. Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. 77-753, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
This legal fiction created another problem: if two tax collectors were involved
in the collection of tax on a given transaction, a taxpayer could not sue them in District
Court (nor could he sue the Treasury for an amount over $10,000), offsetting one payment
against the amount due. Instead, his only remedy was the Court of Claims. Plumb, supra
note 318 at 695; Lowe Brothers v. United States, 304 U.S. 302 (1938). Therefore, even
though the tax was collected by a Tax Collector, who was, either in theory or by
Congressional fiat, not subject to sovereign immunity, and the suit was brought in a Court
that possessed equitable jurisdiction, the fact that different Tax Collectors were involved
precluded any remedy that might have resembled equitable recoupment.
Since the Tucker Act did not require that claims against the government be tried
by a jury, it was speculated that claims against the United States, and against a collector may
be joined-with one claim tried by the court and one before a jury. Plumb, supra note 318 at
700. In some cases, the United States could intervene in a suit against a collector, asserting
that additional tax was owed, and, in theory, the tax collector should really be paying the
United States the money anyway (though the money was long ago deposited in the
Treasury). Id. Jury trials in suits against the United States were not authorized in the
District Court until 1954. Act of July 30, 1954, ch. 648, §§ 1-2, 68 Stat. 589 (1954); 28
U.S.C § 2402; Wickwire v. Reinecks, 275 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1926). Finally, it has been
held that when the government attempts to enforce a tax lien, defenses on the merits may be
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none of these remedies provided for pre-payment
judicial review, and none
34 5
of them provided for any injunctive relief.
2.

The Board of Tax Appeals

The story of the Tax Court begins with the creation of the Board of
Tax Appeals. Although it was called "quasi judicial" in nature,34 6 the
history of the court is marked by a constant tension between whether it
was, in fact, truly judicial, or something else. And, if the court's nature
was judicial, the extent to which Congress could engineer a result different
from that reached in another forum, was a question raised.
The Board of Tax Appeals was created by the Revenue Act of 1924347
as an "independent agency in the executive branch of government" 348 to

made by the taxpayer absent any earlier issue preclusion. United States v. O'Conner, 291
F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1961); but cf. I.R.S. v. Pransky, 261 B.R. 380, 387 (D.N.J. 2001)
("debtor may not avoid the strict statute of limitations prescribed in the Internal Revenue
Code by waiting for the government to institute a legal action after the debtor's claim
against the IRS has become time barred").
345.
26 U.S.C. 7421(a). Dubroff notes that this prohibition on injunctive relief was
of "common law" origin. See Dubroff, Part I, supra note 314, at 35 & n.145 (citing
StandardNut Margarine,284 U.S. at 509). The Miller Court had traced this prohibition to
the common law by saying:
The principal reason is that, as courts are without authority to apportion
or equalize taxes or to make assessments, such suits would enable those
liable for taxes in some amount to delay payment or possibly to escape
their lawful burden, and so to interfere with and thwart the collection of
revenues for the support of the government .... Section 3224 is de-

claratory of the principle first mentioned and is to be construed as near
as may be in harmony with it and the reasons upon which it rests.
However, Miller acknowledged that in some cases, injunctive relief could be sought against
the collectors. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine, 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932).
346.
See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 212 (1926) ("the
character of the work to be done by the board, the quasi judicial nature of its duties..
347.
Pub. L. 68-176, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336 (1924).
348.
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 2900, 44 Stat. 105 (1926). The Treasury
Department was not happy with the elimination of such review functions from under its
umbrella, and apparently furiously protested. Walter Hammon, The United States Board of
Tax Appeals, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 2 (1926-1927). Despite the fact that the Revenue Act of
1924 did not call the Board a court, create it within the judicial branch, or specifically
provide for the creation of standards of admission, the Board initially saw its role as more of
a court than an executive agency, holding that:
Section 900 of the Revenue Act of 1924 designates this Board as "an
independent agency in the executive branch of the government." Notwithstanding this description, the requirements of the section vest this
Board with the main attributes of a court and make it a tribunal, entitled
to respect and charged with great responsibilities.
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review "final determinations '' 349 of income, estate and gift taxes, as well as
excess profit taxes 350 on a de novo 3 5 1 basis by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue without generally requiring that the taxpayer pay first.3 52 Its sole
purpose was to review deficiencies issued after the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1916, 353 based on a petition filed within sixty days of a
notice from the Commissioner.

Old Colony Trust Co. v Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 722 (1929) ("The case is analogous to the
suits which are lodged in the Circuit Courts of Appeals upon petition or finding of an
executive or administrative tribunal."); Appeal of Edward L. Scheidenhelm Co., I B.T.A.
864 (1925); Comm'r v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir. 1932) ("While
it is not a court but is an executive or administrative board, it nevertheless exercises
'appellate powers which are judicial in character."' (citing Helvering v. Gooch Milling &
Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943))); Erwin Griswald, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals,
57 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1943-1944) ("Congress has, of course, declared that the Tax Court
is an 'independent agency in the Executive Branch of Governments'. This is a polite fiction
that once served a purpose. But the Tax Court is in organization, tradition, and function, a
judicial body and should be treated as such in any survey of judicial review in tax cases.");
Robert C. Brown, The Nature of the Tax Court of the United States, 10 U. Prrr. L. REV. 298
(1948-49) ("The Board of Tax Appeals was, or at least was intended to be, an administrative
body; and the Tax Court is the same body under a different name, and is likewise explicitly
administrative and not judicial." However, Brown concedes that in renegotiation act
proceedings, it did act as a court as in 50 U.S.C. § 1191.).
349.
HAMEL describes the jurisdiction as not based on existence of notice, but rather
on the more metaphysical question of whether the Commissioner has come to a final
determination. HAMEL, supra note 313, at 26.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336 (1924). This system
350.
was initially patterned on the British system of tax review where a board of "special
commissioners," designated by the Exchequer heard appeals from the decisions of various
assessors. George 0. May, Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of Income
Taxation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 384, (1947). Its fifteen members-just as the Article I
judges of today-were appointed by the President with the advice and consent of Congress.
J. Gilmer Korner, The United States Boardof Tax Appeals, 11 A.B.A. J. 642, 642 (1925).
351.
But see Hammon, supra note 229, at 3 ('The Board is not a substitute for the
Internal Revenue Unit but an appeal body to review determinations made by it and
presupposes a comprehensive consideration of the case there, so that only substantial
questions will reach the Board.").
352.
Pavenstedt, supra note 234, at 26.
353.
Appeal of Mills, 1 B.T.A. 199 (1924); but cf Appeal of Hickory Spinning Co.,
1 B.T.A. 409, 410-11 (1925) (holding that the Board could consider factual matters before
1916 because "[tihe computation of the profits tax does not and can not stand alone for any
one year. Such tax for each year is necessarily dependent upon the income and tax of the
preceding year by which the profits-tax credits are determined.").
354.
At the time, taxpayers had sixty days from the mailing of such a notice to
appeal to the Board. Under today's statutory regime, they have ninety. The 1926 Act (and
its later incarnations) provided that under normal circumstances, the Commissioner could
not begin to collect until that period of time had passed, providing for injunctive relief if the
Commissioner failed to do this. Latham, supra note 329, at 210; 26 U.S.C. § 3224 (1926).
This period was considered jurisdictional, and the Board strictly construed it. Appeal of
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It could not order refunds,35 5 even though the Commissioner was in
the practice of administratively considering and paying refunds.356 In fact,
while the filing of an appeal stayed collection, 357 payment of the tax
deprived the Board of jurisdiction. 358 Its decisions were not binding on the
Bureau, and so the Bureau, after losing before the Board could sue the
taxpayer in a District Court to collect such taxes from the taxpayer. 359 The
Board had no power to change the behavior of the Bureau. For example, it
could not order the Bureau to accept amended returns or change the way it
proposed to assess taxes. 3 °
While it was not bound by the Bureau of Internal Revenue's determination of fact or law, 361 the Board's actual power to act as a court was
362 By
obviously
in question.
statute,inita could
administer
and obtain
evidence via
subpoenas enforceable
District
Court.363 oaths
However,
there

Satovsky, 1 B.T.A. 22, 1924 WL 17 (1924).
It was argued that, "taxpayers are not prevented from asserting in their appeal to
the Board that the proposed assessment of additional tax is in violation of the Constitution,
in violation of the provisions of any of the Revenue Acts or illegal for any other reasons."
Miller, supra note 340, at 171.
355.
In Appeal of Everett Knitting Works, 1 B.T.A. 5 (1924), the Board wrote:
The harsh rule of payment first and litigation afterwards was sought to
be mitigated. But the consideration of refund claims has no place in this
scheme. Payment has already been made and there is nothing upon
which the determination of the Board can effectively operate. The taxpayer has now, as he has heretofore had, a right of action in court to recover any amount erroneously collected.
Id.
356.
MONTGOMERY, supra note 327, at 204.
357.
Korner, supra note 350, at 642.
358.
Appeal of Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925) (noting that
taxpayer could have filed a claim for abatement, "and if, after consideration, the Commissioner denied the claim, to appeal to the Board from such denial."). If payment was
obtained via a jeopardy assessment under § 274, the Board also lost its jurisdiction.
359.
TURNER, ORIGINS, supra note 313, at 36.
360.
Appeal of Kunkel & Co., 3 B.T.A. 133 (1925).
361.
The Board would not accept ex parte affidavits relating to disputed questions of
fact. Miller, supra note 340, at 173.
362.
At the time, the board did not consider whether it had the contempt power, or
even the scope of its power to enforce judgments. See Latham, supra note 334, at 203 ("The
Board is a tribunal possessed of the attributes of a court and will take jurisdiction only of
actually litigated tax problems. It has neither the time nor power under either the 1924 or
1926 acts to consider moot questions."); Korner, supra note 355, at 642 ("The purpose of
[the BTA's] creation was to provide a tribunal within the executive branch of the
government which should be independent of the Treasury Department for the hearing and
determination of controversies between taxpayers and the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
relative to the assessment and collection of additional taxes.").
363.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(i), 43 Stat. 253, 338; Blair v. Oesterlein
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was never a chance to test whether it had such powers independent of the
congressional grant. 364 On the other hand, the court was convinced that, as
a matter of procedure, it could consider evidence that was presented to
Treasury Department personnel, without formal admission, crossexamination or whatever other devices courts use to ensure credibility.365
However, a judicial recognition by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. Blair366 that the Board of Tax
Appeals should rely on information collected by an agency, without
subjecting it to cross-examination, could either mean that: 1) following the
institutional discipline model, the Board of Tax Appeals should determine
whether the actions of the agency are reasonable; or 2) it could represent a
narrower redeterminist view that the records of revenue agents were
sufficiently reliable that they did not require cross-examination, and were
an adequate basis for the Commissioner's determinations.
In the Revenue Act of 1926, however, Congress acted to abrogate
Chicago Ry. Equipment Co., and held that the Board must follow the rules
of evidence as applicable in courts of equity in the District of Columbia,367
thereby reining in the use of hearsay evidence. By scrutinizing the record
of evidence presented by the Board and not the Bureau of Internal
Revenue's files, it appears that Congress felt that the role of the Board was
to redetermine tax liability, and not to regulate the conduct of the agency,368
in the way that a court reviewing administrative decisions would.

Mach. Co., 275 U.S. 220 (1927) (subpoenas against government); Norman 0. Tietjens,
Some Problems Facingthe Tax Court, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV., 453, 455 (1961-1962); See,
also, United States v. Union Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1936) (records from third
parties). However, similar to current procedure, depositions and documents could only be
issued upon the permission of a member of the board. Miller, supra note 340, at 173.
364.
Gallagher, supra note 333, at 147 (showing how the Treasury Department
envisioned an independent board for settling income tax cases, but Congress empowered the
BTA to administer oaths, subpoena documents or testimony, and hold hearings anywhere in
the country). Also, in Goldsmith, the Supreme Court held that the statute implied the power
of the Board to promulgate rules of admission and practice before it. Goldsmith v. BTA, 260
U.S. 117, 120 (1926).
365.
See Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. Blair, 20 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir. 1927) ("The
schedules made by revenue agents and filed with the Commissioner's answer here, show
that those agents made exhaustive investigations into plaintiff's business.") abrogated by
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 907, 45 Stat. 791, 875, 610 (1928) ("The proceedings of
the Board and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and
procedure (other than the rules of evidence) as the Board may prescribe and in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in courts of equity of the District of Columbia.").
366.
Id.
367.
Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, ch. 27, §§ 897(a), 900(h) 44 Stat. 9
(1926).
368.
For the initial dispute as to whether the Board could analyze constitutional
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In the period between 1924 and 1926, the decisions of the Board were
not subject to direct appeal,36 9 as it was considered experimental.37 °
However, taxpayers, upon payment, could collaterally attack the decision
of the Board in the District Court or Court of Claims, and appeal those
decisions to either a Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The decisions
of the Board were primafacie evidence of the facts. 3 7 1 By the same token,
the Commissioner could sue the taxpayer in a District Court within five
years.37 2 At this early time, should the Board have considered a year that it
did not have jurisdiction to review, those findings of fact were binding on
neither the Commissioner nor the taxpayer, 373 because in a roundabout way
the Board held that if it were to give any effect to its consideration of
earlier years, it would, in reality, be ordering a refund which at the time it
had no jurisdiction to do,374 thereby showing that the board rejected any
theories which are usually associated with the controversy clause as would
later be raised in Bull. 375 Though review on the merits could only be
through such collateral attack, in one case, where the BTA found that it
lacked jurisdiction, petitioners sought, and were granted, a writ of
mandamus, effectively reversing the BTA's decision.3 76

questions, see HAMEL, supra note 313, at 79 & 75 (collecting cases in which some BTA
members thought that there was no jurisdiction to pass on constitutionality of statutes or
regulations, and later consensus that they were required to do so if asked).
Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal
369.
Income and Estate Gift Taxes - A Criticism and a Proposal,38 COLUM. L. REv. 1393, 1406
(1938).
370.
Bolton B. Turner, The Tax Court of the United States, 41 LAw LR. J. 371, 372
(1948) [hereinafter Court].
371.
26 U.S.C. § 284 (1924). Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court,Article III, and the
ProposalAdvanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 985, 1002 (1991); Latham, supra note 334, at 201. The
question of what evidence the BTA would consider was initially left to the Board, with little
guidance from Congress. Gallagher, supra note 338, at 147 (noting that initial drafts of the
Board's enabling legislation used the word "informal" to describe its processes, but later
drafts left it up to the BTA to decide what procedure to use). The chairman of the BTA
described its rules of evidence in these terms: "Because there is no jury, the strict rules of
evidence obtaining in law courts are relaxed, and the rules of evidence observed are more
nearly those obtaining in courts of equity." Korner, supra note 350, at 643.
It is worth noting that in an analogous situation, with the now-defunct Interstate
Commerce Commission, prima facie evidence of facts that were found by the ICC, was not
conclusively binding upon courts. See Young, supra note 148 at 784 & n.99 (citing I.
SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 387 & n.64 (1931)).
Oscar Bland, FederalTax Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 1013, 1015 (1925).
372.
373.
Latham, supra note 329, at 216; Miller, supra note 340, at 171.
374.
Appeal of Estate of Jackman, 2 B.T.A. 515 (1925).
375.
See supra notes 275 to 289 and accompanying text.
376.
United States ex rel. Dascomb v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 16 F.2d 337 (App. D.C.
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To correct these problems, the Revenue Act of 1926 specially authorized the Board to consider other years, but the Act expressly stated that the
Board had no jurisdiction for tax years other than the ones before the
Board.377 Congress preserved the rights of taxpayers who paid in advance
to sue in the Court of Claims or at the District Court. However, once a
taxpayer elected to proceed at the BTA, review was by a Court of Appeals
where the taxpayer resided and was based on the record before the
Board.378
In 1926, the Board finally was granted overpayment jurisdiction: the
authority to determine when a taxpayer had paid excess taxes.3 9 When an
overpayment was found, the Board commissioner would issue a "Certificate of Over-assessment" which could be used as a credit toward future
taxes or submitted for a refund. 380 Technically, the decisions of the board,
however, were not self-executing. A taxpayer might still have to file a
claim in the District Court for an actual refund of an overpayment. 381
Though unable to enforce judgments, in 1926, the Board was granted
the power by Congress to impose penalties for frivolous appeals,382 which
383
were enforced by allowing the Commissioner to increase his assessment.
However, there does not seem to have been a statutorily-mandated means
for the Board to punish bad behavior by representatives of the Commissioner, or other government agents.

1926).
377.
See supra note 367.
378.
Turner, Court, supra note 370, at 372.
379.
The Revenue Act of 1926 also forbade taxpayers from commencing an action
with regards to a tax year and then abandoning it to seek a refund. Pub. L 69-20, Ch. 27, §
284(d), § 319(a), 44 Stat. 9 (1926). As always, payment of the asserted deficiency would
remove jurisdiction from the board, but filing a petition with the Board removed jurisdiction
from any other court where refund litigation might be pending. See 26 USC § 7422(e).
However, under the 1926 Act, the taxpayer could waive restrictions on collection of the
assessment during the pendency of the petition to the Board. This, it was speculated, would
not deprive the Board of jurisdiction.
The Commissioner was required to begin assessment immediately if a taxpayer
began bankruptcy or receivership proceedings. Latham, supra note 334, at 218. However, if
the Commissioner failed to file a claim in the court where the action was pending,
apparently the Board still would retain jurisdiction. Id.
380. JOHN G. HERNDON, JR., INCOME TAX PROCEDURE, 74 (1927).
381.
Latham, supra note 329, at 217.
382.
Revenue Act of 1926 §§ 911, 1000.
383.
Revenue Act of 1926 § 911. While the Board, at the time, lacked jurisdiction to
set aside or modify closing agreements, it could effectively rule on them by analyzing
whether additional tax was actually due in view of the agreement and the party's behavior.
Of course, in effect, only the taxpayer's behavior would be at issue. Holmes & James v.
Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 74 (1934).
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Despite Congressional concern for the ability of individuals to contest
their income tax liability, the jurisdiction of the Board remained subject to
some dispute. In 1928, in Peerless Woolen Mills v. Commissioner, the
Board held that it had jurisdiction to consider not only taxes that were
before the Board, but also whether deficiencies for prior years-before the
creation of the Board-were barred.384 Even so, while the appeal was
pending, collection of the tax was still pursued. The taxpayer attempted to
enjoin collection of the tax at the District Court, arguing that since the taxes
related to each other, the collector was prevented from collecting until the
Board had reviewed the matter.38 5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that, since the Board was considering the statute of
limitations issues, "the jurisdiction of the Board extends to the whole
controversy, to the end that it may determine or redetermine the correct
amount of the tax." 386 The court recognized, even in the BTA's infancy,
that resolution of the entire controversy must be had somewhere, and the
controversy clause demands that either the courts assert jurisdiction over all
of the controversy, or declare that another body is doing so.
3. The Tax Court of the United States
In 1942 the Board's name was changed to "Tax Court of the United
States," and the members received the honorific of "judge. 3 87 In this form,
individual judges or commissioners 388 could rule on petitions, subject only
to rehearing by the full "court." Although it was named the "Tax Court of
the United States," by statute it was an "independent agency within the
executive branch., 389 Accordingly, courts initially treated the decisions of
the Tax Court with some deference, recognizing its special expertise in the
field of taxation. 390 Because of its position within an administrative

384.
13 B.T.A. 1119 (1928).
385.
Peerless Wollen Milles v. Rose, 24 F. 2d 576 (N. D. Ga. 1928).
386.
Peerless Wollen Milles v. Rose, 28 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1928); HAMEL, supra
note 313, at 64.
387.
Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798
(1942). David Laro, Panel Discussion: The Evolution Of The Tax Court As An Independent
Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 17, 22 (1995); Turner, Court,supra note 370, at 373.
388.
Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, ch. 63, § 503, 58 Stat. 21 (1943)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1114 (b)). These commissioners are the ancestors of today's
"Special Trial Judges." Like the modern STJs, they were appointed by the judges.
389.
It seems to be the general consensus that with its new name, nothing changed.
TURNER, ORIGINS, supra note 313, at 38.
390.
Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). In Dobson, the court opined that
many questions of law appear to be really questions of accounting which the board has
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agency, the Supreme Court held, in Dobson v. Commissioner,3 9' that a
reviewing court must defer to the Tax Court as it would to an administrative agency and should regard accounting disputes not as pure questions of
law, but rather factual disputes that the Tax Court has special expertise in
reviewing. 392 Of course, one could simply avoid Tax Court precedent and
"expertise" and seek a refund, if a taxpayer had the money to pay first.
However, in 1948, Congress acted to abrogate Dobson by enacting §
1141(a) (now 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1)) specifying that "[t]he United States
Courts of Appeals . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the

decisions of the Tax Court ... in the same manner and to the same extent
as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury."
(emphasis added).393

Faced with an agency that might lack general equitable powers, the
Supreme Court held in Hormel v. Helvering394 that Courts of Appeals could
take it upon themselves to "modify or reverse a decision of the Tax Court
with or without remanding the cause to the Tax Court 'as justice may
require.' 395 In these cases, it seems the Court of Appeals could use a rule
of decision out of reach of the Tax Court: equitable grounds.39 6 The Tax

Court of the United States was treated by reviewing courts as if it were not
capable of exercising all of the judicial power once a controversy was

special expertise in. Therefore, the Tax Court should only be reversed when it is clearly
wrong. See generally May, supra note 350, at 392-94.
320 U.S. 489 (1943).
391.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of America v. Comm'r, 321 U.S. 560 (1944)
392.
(stipulated facts require the Tax Court's analysis, the Supreme Court cannot analyze it
itself); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 379, 380 (6th Cir. 1947) ("[R]eview of Tax
Court decisions is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act."); but see TURNER,
ORIGINS, supra note 313, at 444 (indicating that in MacDonald v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 213
(6th Cir. 1947) (affirmation of Tax Court without opinion) the Sixth Circuit's assignment of
error based on the failure by the Tax Court to follow the Administrative Procedures Act was
without merit).
Rules of Decision Act, Pub L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 991 (1948) (to
393.
be codified at 28 U.S.C.); see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-02-014 (Sept. 30, 1982) (Dobson
"was legislatively repealed in 1948 by the addition of section 1141(a) (now section 7482) to
the 1939 Code"); An Introduction to the New Federal Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 201, 207
(1949).
394.
312 U.S. 552 (1941).
395.
Charles W. Heidenreich, Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of the United
States Tax Court, 29 MINN. L. REV. 186, 191-92 (1944-1945).
Id. at 557 ("Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of
396.
fundamental justice."); Note, Reformulation of the Rule Against Introducing New Matter in
Appellate Courts-The Hormel Case, 50 YALE L.J. 1460, 1466 (1940) ("By taking such
factors into account in exercising their discretion in specific cases, courts may be expected
to utilize the Hormel rule to reach equitable results.").
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properly before it, as it could consider petitions (or defenses) that were
grounded in "law" but not "equity."
Even though it was reviewed as if it were a court, the Tax Court was
still rigidly prevented from doing many things that a court could do. It was
precluded from considering whether the Commissioner had taken an
inconsistent position (assessing a transaction in one year under one theory,
and in another year under a different theory), and remedying that inconsistency with equitable recoupment, as even the Court of Claims had in Bull,
but in Hormel its reviewing courts could consider these grounds. However,
in Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 397 the Supreme Court
appeared to retreat from Hormel, by stating that "[t]he Internal Revenue
Code, not general equitable principles, is the mainspring of the Board's
jurisdiction., 398 There was never any answer to the question of whether
this "independent agency within the executive branch" must apply the
doctrines that the Supreme Court ordered its reviewing courts to apply.
4. As an Article I Court
In 1969, the Tax Court was transformed into its present incarnation as
an "Article I" court, 399 a change brought about with few public hearings or
studies. 400 Nevertheless, the Tax Court moved out of the IRS's headquarters and into its own building in Washington, D.C.,4°1 and its name was
changed to the "United States Tax Court." To remove all doubt that it was,
in fact, a court, Congress statutorily empowered the Tax Court with a
specific contempt statute, 4 0 2 as well as a self-enforcing subpoena power
statute. 4°3 Of course, as an Article I court, like the Court of Claims, its
judges were subject to potential diminution in salary and non-renewal.

397.
398.
399.

320 U.S. 418,422 (1943).
Id. at 422.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (1969).

400.
Howard Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis-Part
IV-The Board Becomes a Court, 44 ALB. L. REv. 1, 50 (1976-77).

401.
402.
403.

Laro, supra note 387, at 22.
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 956, 83 Stat. 732 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7456(d)).
Christopher R. Kelley, Recent Federal Farm Program Developments, 4 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 93, 127 n.242 (1999) ("Since the Supreme Court's decision in Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), the rule has been that, as a matter of
due process, federal agencies cannot be given the power to enforce their subpoenas. See
Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285, 286 (10th Cir. 1964)."); but cf. SEC v.
O'Brien, 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984) ("Subpoenas issued by ... [an agency] are not selfenforcing, and the recipients thereof are not subject to penalty for refusal to obey.").
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The Tax Court's judges are appointed for a term of years by the President and confirmed by Congress. Most of its decisions review the
preliminary determinations of the IRS de novo, but the IRS is accorded
some deference on questions of interpretation of its own interpretive
regulations. The one exception is that when the Tax Court reviews a
"collection due process hearing" it sits as an appellate court with exclusive
jurisdiction. 4 4
As an Article I court, the Tax Court has been hesitant to apply equitable doctrines (including the celebrated "equitable recoupment") in order to
right wrongs, or even to vacate decisions procured by fraud.4°5 Unfortunately, as of yet, the Supreme Court has not resolved the extent to which
the Tax Court's powers include equity. The closest it has come is in a per
curium opinion in Commissioner v. McCoy. 4°6 In McCoy, the Supreme
Court held that where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit "forgave"
interest and penalties "in order to achieve a fair and just result,', 4 0 7 the court
had overstepped its jurisdiction to review the Tax Court pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 7482(a). It concluded that the Sixth Circuit "was not empowered
to proceed further to decide other questions relating to interest and
penalty--questions that were not presented, and could not possibly have
been presented, to the Tax Court--or to grant relief that the Tax Court
itself had no jurisdiction to provide." Ironically, the Supreme Court also
cited Gooch, which had originated when the Tax Court's ancestor, the
BTA, was firmly planted in the executive branch, for the proposition that
"[t]he Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general
equitable powers." However, lower courts' applications of McCoy to
foreclose equitable recoupment have been criticized by other courts which
4 8
point out that: 1) all federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, anyway; 0

404.
26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1)(A); Holliday v. Comm'r, 57 Fed.Appx. 774 (9th Cir.
2003) (Because Holliday's CDP hearing was based on her liability for unpaid income tax,
the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over her appeal.); Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 176,
183 (2000) (issues not raised administratively waived on appeal to the Tax Court); c.f.
Cortes v. United States, No. CV-S-01-0940-RLH LRL, 2002 WL 1987469 (D. Nev. Jul. 10,
2002) ("Plaintiffs failure to petition the proper court for review of the IRS's administrative
determination is not fatal to his claim, since Section 6330(d) permits refiling in the correct
court 30 days after this Court's determination."). There are various reasons, however, why
the government may wish to sue the taxpayer in district court to collect taxes, such as the
appointment of a receiver, or enforcement of a lien on property in which the taxpayer has an
interest. Ferguson, supranote 307, at 316.
Drobny v. Comm'r, 113 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997); Gara, supra note 36.
405.
406.
484 U.S. 3 (1987) (per curiam).
407.
Id. at 5.
408.
FAAUO v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) ("The
argument that the Tax Court cannot apply the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable
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and 2) unlike the U.S. Tax Court, the BTA and the Tax Court of the United
States were not even courts, but rather agencies within the executive
branch. 4°9
Unfortunately, much has been made of McCoy, and the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have taken the ball, concluding that
the Supreme Court had rejected the institutional discipline view, and
embraced a view of Article I § 8 supremacy. Particularly, since the
Supreme Court used the words "[t]he Tax Court is a court of limited
jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers. .. ,,41 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Tax Court could "do no more than
determine the amount of the deficiency before it."' 411 However, this may be
misinterpreting the scant guidance given by the per curium opinion in
McCoy, as the Supreme Court was, as stated supra,412 condemning the
court's granting of forgiveness of interest and penalties, "in order to
achieve a fair and just result" despite the fact that Congress has presumably
already considered the fairness of the tax code.
Finally, as stated supra,41 3 the court's power has been analyzed not
just in terms of its power to remedy the harsh effects of the tax year, but
also in the form of its power to remedy abuses of its forum by I.R.S.
attorneys. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Tax
Court must use its discretion and fashion an equitable remedy that would
put taxpayers victimized by a corrupt agreement between I.R.S. counsel
and taxpayer counsel involved in the same tax shelter "in the same position
as provided for in the . ..settlement. ' 4 14 This equitable remedy, for a
breach of' 415
a "statutory, official, or customary duty," is known as "quasicontract. ,
estoppel because it is a court of limited jurisdiction is fatuous. All federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction.") (emphasis in original).
409.
Branson v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 6, 10-11 (1999), af'd, 264 F.3d 904, 914 (9th
Cir. 2001) (affirming and distinguishing Gooch Milling), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002).
410.
Comm'r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam).
411.
Estate of Mueller v. Comm'r, 153 F.3d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting
McCoy, 484 U.S. at 7).
412.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
413.
Id.
414.
Dixon v. Comm'r, 316 F.3d 1041, 1047 n.lI (9th Cir. 2003).
415.
Obviously, in the common law courts, only tort and contractual obligations
existed. See, e.g., William Keener, Quasi-ContractIts Nature and Scope, 7 HARV. L. REv.
57, 66 (1893-1894) ("The only forms of action known to the common law were actions of
tort and contract. If the wrong complained of would not sustain an action, either in contract
or tort, then the plaintiff was without redress, unless the facts would support a bill in
equity." (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court held that such obligations based not on
common law torts or contracts willingly entered into are not contracts per se, since they lack
the assent of all of the involved parties. In Louisianaex rel. Folsom v. City of New Orleans,
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However, because of the split between the Ninth Circuit in Dixon, the
Sixth Circuit in McCoy, and the Seventh Circuit in Drobny, a circuit split
exists regarding the Tax Court's power to alter the substantive tax liability
of taxpayers based on equitable principles, when a strict application of the
Internal Revenue Code would result in essentially rewarding the government for the corrupt behavior of its agents.
C.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has a much shorter and less
spectacular history than the other Article I courts. Initially, an attempt was
made to involve the judiciary in determining who was eligible for veterans'
benefits; this failed when the courts insisted on having the final say, and
balked at adjudicating only part of the case or controversy.41 6 Today, while
the Court does exercise judicial review over the entirety of the claim,
Congress has precluded Article I review (by, ironically, the Article III
descendent of the Court of Claims-the Federal Circuit) of the Article I
court's factual determinations or challenges to law or regulation as applied
to the facts of a particular case,41 7 "[e]xcept to the extent that an appeal...
presents a constitutional issue. 4 18 These limitations have, for the moment,

109 U.S. 285, 288 (1883), Justice Field wrote:

A judgment for damages ... is sometimes called ... [a] contract of re-

Id.

cord, because it establishes a legal obligation to pay.. . and, by a fiction
of law, a promise to pay is implied where such legal obligation exists..
.But this fiction cannot convert a transaction wanting the assent of parties into one which necessarily implies it. Judgments for torts are usually
the result of violent contests, and, as observed by the court below, are
imposed upon the losing party by a higher authority against his will and
protest.

The remedy of Quasi-Contract is founded "(1) upon a record, (2) upon a
statutory, official or customary duty, or (3) upon the fundamental principle of justice that no
one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." JAMES BARR AMES,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 160 (1912), quoted in
Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguishedfrom Quasi Contract, 2 CAL. L. REv. 171,
180 (1913-1914).
416.
See supra note 209-213 and accompanying text.
417.
Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[W]e may not review a
challenge to a factual determination or a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the
facts of a particular case.").
418.
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) ("Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter
presents a constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a
factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a
particular case.").
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satisfied the courts that they are adjudicating enough of the "controversy"
so as not to be acting in a commissarial or advisory capacity. Like the
Court of Federal Claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
acknowledges that, although it is not bound by the controversy requirement, it will not, as a matter of policy, decide moot cases.419
1. Background of Veterans Benefits
The Veterans Administration (VA)-now the Department of Veterans
Affairs-was created by Congress in 1933,420 replacing a hodge-podge of
other programs.4 2' While creating an administrative mechanism for
providing veterans with pensions and the like,4 22 the Act contained a
provision excluding veterans' claims from judicial review, 423 and limited
the fees that attorneys could receive to ten dollars. 424 Final administrative
appeal, under the Act, was to the 65-member "Board of Veterans Appeals,"

419.

Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 12, 15 (1990):
Under these circumstances, it is sufficient to observe that we are granted
power judicial in nature and being statutorily characterized as a 'Court'
we are free, in the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary,
to adopt as a matter of policy the jurisdictional restrictions of the Article
HI case or controversy rubric.
Id. The court also noted that "[plost-Northem Pipeline majority opinions have not discussed
the type of power exercised by non-Article III adjudicatory bodies. We recognize the
unsettled nature of the law in this area and do not attempt to resolve the controversy for
purposes of this case." Id. at 15.
420.
Economy Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 3, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (1933).
421.
See Christopher D. Knopf, Note, One Last Battle: Reform Of The Veterans'
Administration Claims Procedure,74 VA. L. REv. 937, 938 (1988) ("These programs were
administered in the 1920s by the Veterans' Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions of the Interior
Department, and the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers."); Norman G. Cooper
& David W. Engel, November 18, 1988: A JurisdictionalBright Line in Veterans Law?, 5
FED. CIR. B.J. 91, 92 & n. I (1995) (bibliography of history of veterans benefits in the U.S.).
422.
In general, most decisions are made in an ex parte hearing before a three-person
rating board, which can be appealed within the agency. Laurence R. Helfer, The Politicsof
JudicialStructure: Creatingthe United States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REv.
155, 157-58 (1992-1993).
423.
Economy Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 43 Stat. 8, 9 (1933). See Kim Lacy
Morris, JudicialReview of Non-reviewable Administrative Action: Veterans Administration
Benefits Claims, 29 ADMIN. L. REv. 65 & n.3 (1977) for a description of future incarnations
of this non-review clause. Veterans' pensions were initially subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, but were later excluded. Stephen Van Dolsen, Note,
Judical Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of The Veterans' Administration: Does 38
U.S.C. § 211(a) PrecludeReview?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 579, 593-96 (1986-1987).
424.
See infra note 438.
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which sits in panels of three, 425 and was bound by decisions of the VA
General Counsel and VA regulations.4 26 However, the final determinations
of the Administration did not have preclusive effect, allowing veterans to
resubmit their claims.4 27 Likewise, with no court to review the administrative determinations of the VA, there was no guarantee even of complete
fact-finding, as "without a court to look over the VA's shoulder, it could
issue [a] determination in whatever form it chose without any external
accountability. 42 8
Throughout it all, there was sick irony in the history of veterans' benefits. While the country has consistently lauded the service of veterans, until
fairly recently, many have taken a smug pride 429 in insulating veterans'
benefits from judicial scrutiny by deeming them to be a gratuity and not a
public right.4 3 °
Somehow, from professors 431 to veterans' groups to Congress, many
were convinced, for quite some time, that there was no need to resort to

425.
38 U.S.C. § 4004(a) (1991).
426.
Knopf, supra note 42 1, at 943.
Heifer, supra note 422, at 158; WILLIAM L. Fox, THE LAW OF VETERANS
427.
BENEFrrs, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 14 (2002).
428.
Fox, supra note 427, at 107.
429.
For example, lawyers were prohibited from charging more than ten dollars to
represent veterans before the agency. Most likely this preserved the power of organizations
that represented veterans. See infra notes 438 and accompanying text. However, the notion
persisted that when a lawyer gets involved in a dispute, somehow less justice is available.
Walters v. Nat. Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) ("The appearance of
counsel for the citizen is likely to lead the government to provide one-or at least to cause
the government's representative to act like one. The result may be to turn what might have
been a short conference leading to an amicable result into a protracted controversy.")
(Rehnquist, J.) quoting Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1287-90 (1975); Fox, supra note 427, at 15 (describing Congressional testimony). Of
course, when the Veterans Administration sought to collect funds that were wrongfully
disbursed to veterans, they didn't rely on lay advocates or informal procedures, nor did
Congress require them to. 38 U.S.C. § 3116(a)(1) (1982) (current version at 38 U.S.C. §
5316 (2002)); Knopf, supra note 421, at 954 & n.114 (showing lower court split about
degree of deference to be accorded the findings of fact by the administration related to the
overpayment). Knopf, supra note 421, at 955 (indicating that the BVA had 189 lawyers).
430.
Before Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), government largess was not
considered a right protected by the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, for most of the history of
the Veterans Administration, lack of judicial review was not considered completely
aberrant to the constitution. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)
("The Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.").
431.
Fox, supra note 427, at 15 (quoting H.R. No. 963 at 25) (statement of Paul
Verkuil that "[the VA procedural system] is informal, efficient, and fair ....Indeed, when
one considers the declared pro-claimant bias of the agency it is surely one of the most
generous benefactor agencies in the world.").
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judicial review as, surely, the government that veterans had loyally served
would take care of them. Indeed, even administrative procedures were
limited.4 32 Even so, many veterans' groups, providing lay representation to
veterans in administrative procedures before the VA, objected to judicial
review. They feared either that it would detract from their ability to lobby
Congress or the agency informally, 433 or that lawyers, once admitted, would
descend like vultures upon hapless injured veterans, eager to devour their
fees in proceedings before courts.434

2. The Minimum Amount of Review
Whether Congress can isolate some agencies from all judicial scrutiny
is a question that has not yet been answered. In 1974, the Supreme Court
held in Johnson v. Robinson435 that courts probably could review the
constitutionality of the provision that precluded judicial review, where the
plaintiff, a conscientious objector seeking veterans' benefits, had raised a
constitutional claim. The Court ultimately decided that the government
was correct in its determination. However, the Supreme Court did not
reach the question of whether individual decisions could be subject to
attack via injunctions or writs of mandamus issued by the courts, or
whether regulations promulgated by the agency could be subject to
attack.436 Likewise, the Supreme Court later held that it had jurisdiction to
decide whether the agency acted outside its jurisdictional grant. 437 Most
notably, the court concluded that the ten dollar attorney fee limitation was
constitutional, despite a challenge on First and Fifth Amendment grounds.
The Court concluded that pro se or non-lawyer advocacy was sufficient to
secure the petitioner's meaningful access to the courts, and therefore,
"[g]overnment interests [in reducing the administrative burden] favored the

432.

See Sandra Murphy, A Critiqueof the Veterans Administration Claims Process,

52 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 544 (1986-87) (explaining ex parte hearings and limitation on
attorney fees).
433.
Heifer, supra note 422, at 160 (1992-1993) (citing Joseph C. Zengerle &
Charles E. Joeckel, Vets are Helped, NAT'LL. J., Aug. 17 1987, at 12).
434.
HOUSE COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS. PROCEEDINGS

OF THE 41ST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOcIATION OF STATE DIRECTORS OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VA ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS 10

(Comm. Print 1988) (statement of Lt. Col. David Passamaneck, AMVETS) cited in Heifer,
supra note 422, at 160.

435.
436.
Review...
437.

415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974).
Jonathan Goldstein, Note, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial
Slowly!, 67 WASH.U.L.Q. 889, 893 & n.29-30 (1989).
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 541-45 (1988); Van Dolsen, supra note 429.
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limitation on 'speech' that appellees attack.', 438 While this limitation
obviously did not apply to the courts, it raises the question of whether the
Petition Clause can be invoked independently to remedy deliberate (or
inadvertent) government interference with an individual's ability to seek
substantive relief, as was the case in Zimmerman Brush.439 To illustrate, in
an extreme case, if the government's interest in reducing its burdens can
outweigh an individual's interest in at least some form of petition for
redress, one wonders if there are situations where the government would be
able to assert that it is simply too burdensome to argue the issue in any
forum and that it, as a matter of law, is entitled to a court's agreement with
whatever legal argument the government uses to justify its behavior.
Requiring such acquiescence would surely not find too much sympathy in
Professor Pfander's view of the Petition Clause, in which individuals could
seek redress via the courts, without regard to the burden it imposed on the
government. 440
Indeed, only after a politically unpopular war, in which veterans exposed to Agent Orange were denied treatment 441 did Congress take action
to provide veterans with some judicial review. Compounding the irony, the
American victims of Agent Orange were arguably better situated than
individual victims of "generic" service-related injuries or those whose
claims were based on constitutional arguments such as conscientious
objection. There were many victims of Agent Orange, 4 2 and although they
did not initially have the benefit of epidemiologic studies to support their
claims, they were able to sue (and eventually settle with) the makers of the
defoliant under common law theories." 3 Vietnam veterans began to feel
not only that the Veterans Administration (which included many veterans

438.
Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985).
439.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens, in dissent, appears
to have noticed this problem, and expressed his skepticism with the view that the VA's
limitations were there to protect veterans from lawyers by quoting Justice Jackson in
American CommunicationsAssn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950):
The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional
right of each member to think as he will. Thought control is a copyright
of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it. It is not the function of
our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error.
Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
440. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
441.
Murphy, supra note 432, at 536.
442.
After the Vietnam War, the claims for compensation appear to have increased.
Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 309.
443.
See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(approving settlement).
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of previous wars) was biased against them, but that other veterans' groups
did not have their best interests at heart.4 "
In 1989 Congress, fully aware of the constitutional positions of the
Claims Court and the Tax Court, enacted the "Veterans Judicial Review
Act '"44 5 which created the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as an
explicitly Article I court. By statute, this court could overturn "clearly
erroneous" findings of fact," 6 and "arbitrary and capricious" conclusions of
law." 7 The Act provided specifically for review of individual adjudications, as well as direct challenges to the agency's regulations before the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 4 8 The Act went on to provide a
level of review at the Federal Circuit (and by a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court). However, the statute appears to preclude review of asapplied non-constitutional challenges 449 and the application of facts to
law. 450 The judges of the court were appointed by the President, confirmed
by Congress, and paid according to the salaries of district court judges.
Interestingly, while they can be removed by the President for enumerated

444.
Heifer, supra note 422, at 162.
445.
Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
446.
38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (1994); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(B)-(C) (1996)
(standard of review under Administrative Procedure Act).
447.
38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)-(4).
448.
38 U.S.C. § 223.
449.
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) ("Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter
presents a constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a
factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a
particular case."); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1996):
To the extent that Mrs. Barnett's appeal is based on the assertion that
the Statement of the Case and the Supplemental Statement of the Case,
issued on remand from the Board, were inadequate, her appeal involves
a question of the application of a statute or regulation to 'the facts of a
particular case' and is thus beyond our jurisdiction.
Goldstein, supra note 444, at 907 (describing such a challenge as akin to one in which the
petitioner concedes that there may be a valid application of the statute, "but when the statute
or regulation is applied to him it violates some outside authority").
450.
E.g. Rossi v. Principi, 91 Fed.Appx. 141 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (dismissing appeal to
Federal Circuit where initial appeal to United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
was filed late, yet petition raised a "garden variant excusable neglect" argument but
conceded the interpretation of the statute of limitations and the date of filing); Caravella v.
Principi, 86 Fed.Appx. 423 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appeal dismissed because petitioner did not
raise a colorable constitutional claim "thus, any review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims would be a review of a challenge to the court's factual
determinations or application of law to the facts of Caravella's case, which 38 U.S.C. §
7292(d)(2) does not permit.); Jim v. Principi, 87 Fed.Appx. 737 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("challenge
pertaining to the weighing of evidence falls outside of this court's jurisdiction under 38
U.S.C. § 7292.").
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reasons, it is unclear whether such an action is subject to review by the
courts.

The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (or its prior appellation, the
United States Court of Veterans Appeals) 45' was born into an era when
Article I courts were accepted. Congress (or at least a powerful group of
lobbyists) understood the need to accomplish the specific task of providing
judicial discipline to an agency, both in its rulemaking and in its adjudication. 452 From its inception, the court was specifically empowered to issue
writs of mandamus, 45 3 and it453has used this power.454
Unlike other Article I courts, the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims was constituted as an appellate court, perhaps to satisfy concerns
that the sheer number of veterans' claims would unduly burden the court
system. The scope and nature of its review resembles Article In court
review of administrative decisions. This court does not hold fact-finding
trials, but remands matters back to the agency when factual findings are
required. These remands take the form of a mandate. On occasion, the
court has reprimanded the Department of Veterans Affairs for failing to
heed its mandate, and suggested that the Department could be held in
contempt.455 However, there is, in general, much less need to specifically
discipline parties for their manipulation of evidence because the question of
what is in the record before the court is generally not in dispute.
In 1995, the court's role as an appellate court, and not an Article I trial
court, became most apparent when it was faced with a claim that the
Department had not attempted to issue a subpoena against the warden of a
prison, that would presumably have required transportation of a prisonerveteran claimant to a hospital for examination. While the Department has
the power to issue such subpoenas, 456 they are not self-executing.
Subpoenas must be enforced by a U.S. District Court.457 The court held

that it would not use its powers under the All Writs Act to enforce a

451.
Formally, the name of the court was changed to the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in 1998, but substantively its role did not change. Veteran Programs
Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511, 112 Stat. 3341 (1999).
452.
Congress, on the other hand, provides the Federal Circuit with the ability to
review rulemakings of the Department of Veterans Affairs directly. 38 U.S.C. §§ 502,
7292(c) (2002); Disabled American Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
38 U.S.C. § 4061; 26 U.S.C. § 1651.
453.
454.
26 U.S.C. § 1651.
455.
Harris v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 547, 548 (1995).
456.
38 U.S.C. § 5711 (2002).
457.
38 C.F.R. § 20.711(i) ("In case of disobedience to a subpoena issued by the
Board, the Board will take such steps as may be necessary to invoke the aid of the
appropriate district court of the United States in requiring the attendance of the witness
and/or the production of the tangible evidence subpoenaed.").
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subpoena against the warden, because enforcement of such a writ would
not actually be necessary to fulfill its mandate to simply review the
Board.458 Therefore, in the case of incarcerated veterans, the court is in the
strange position of not only affirming a decision made by the agency that
might otherwise have required the use of a subpoena, even though if an
Article Ell court had original jurisdiction, it would have been empowered to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to perpetrate the appearance of a witness.45 9
Of course, if the Board were a court, this situation would be different.
While equitable doctrines are not generally used to toll the statute of
limitations in claims against the government, 460 the Court of Veterans
Appeals has ordered equitable relief in the case of interference with an
individual's ability to petition, even if a statute of limitations has elapsed.
If the Department breaches its statutory duty to provide claimants with
necessary records, causing a petitioner to miss a deadline, the court can
provide a petitioner with a remedy by equitably tolling the statute of
limitations. 46 Such a remedy may allow the court to provide meaningful
relief in a controversy that comes before it, but it may threaten Congress's
ability to preserve the public fisc.
Despite acknowledging this equitable power, and allowing veterans to
avail themselves of a statutorily-created power to effectively petition the
government, the next year the court held that it could not order the agency
to exercise its statutory power to relieve a claimant from administrative
errors; the Court determined that this matter was within the "sole discretion" of the agency, and therefore "the Court may not review the merits of
the appellant's contention of entitlement to equitable relief., 462 Consis-

458.
Bolton v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 185 (1995). Almost indisputably, the power to
issue writs of habeas corpus lies within Article III Courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). While
the Court of Veterans Appeals certainly has the power to issue subpoenas, its power to
enforce them is likely limited to subpoenas "in aid of [its] jurisdiction" under the All Writs
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
459.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
460.
See Brice v. HHS, 240 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that in order
to determine whether equitable tolling is possible under a given statutory regime courts
should ascertain congressional intent by analyzing five factors: 1) the statute's detail; 2) its
technical language; 3) its multiple iterations of the limitations period in procedural and
substantive form; 4) its explicit inclusion of exceptions; and 5) and its underlying subject
matter.") (citing U.S. v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 347, 350-52 (1997)).
Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 429 (1992).
461.
462.
Suttmann v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 127, 138 (1993). Congress has empowered the
agency to grant equitable relief from its own administrative errors, but the Court of Veterans
Appeals has held that it lacks the power to order the secretary to conclude that there was an
error that demands equitable relief. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 227 (2000) ("The
Secretary's authority to grant equitable relief under section 503 is wholly within the
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tently, the court held that the nature of veterans' claims (generally not
subject to statutes of limitations) were such that the doctrine of laches
would not apply.463 The Federal Circuit, however, refused to decide
whether the Court of Veterans Appeals has equity powers absent a specific
statutory grant, 464 but it has held that specific statutes were intended by
Congress to be equitably tolled.465
The Court of Veterans Appeals has embraced the concept that, as a
court, it carries with it the power to sanction parties for bad conduct.
Indeed, in Jones v. Derwinski,46 rather than simply rely on a statement that
its power to sanction parties derives from statute, 4 7 the court cited Ex Parte
Robinson468 in support of its conclusion that it possessed inherent powers
regardless of the wording of the statute. While the court issued an
injunction against the VA and ordered payment of the petitioner's
attorneys' fees, two concurring judges argued that the petitioner was
entitled to "a large monetary sanction" for the Department's conduct (direct
communication with a represented party). However, to this day, the court
has not had to decide whether it could order that a veteran be paid more
money because of the agency's behavior. Therefore, the court has not had
occasion to alter substantive determinations of the amounts owed to
veterans.
It is unlikely that this court will ever be forced to deal with issues
faced by courts that are required to supervise discovery. However, for the
moment, it has interpreted the congressional determination that the right to

Secretary's discretion, and the Court lacks jurisdiction even to review the exercise of the
Secretary's equity discretion"); Taylor v. West, 11 Vet.App. 436, 440 (1998) ("The
Secretary of Veterans Affairs has discretionary equitable power to provide relief where he
determines that veterans benefits 'have not been provided by reason of administrative error
on the part of the Federal Government or any of its employees."'); Harvey v. Brown, 6
Vet.App. 416, 425 (1994) ("[T]his Court may not review the merits of appellant's
contention of entitlement to equitable relief and any such claim must be presented directly to
the Secretary.").
463.
Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 140, 144 (1991); Elsevier v. Derwinski, 1 Vet
App. 150 (1991) ("We therefore conclude that here, as in Irwin, there is no basis for tolling
the 120-day time limit of 38 U.S.C. § 4066(a).").
464.
McCay v. Brown, 106 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("We need not decide
if the Court of Veterans Appeals is devoid of equity powers in all cases, because even if the
court may exercise such powers, there would be no need to reverse or to vacate and remand
for a determination of the merits of McCay's claims because neither of McCay's theories
possibly presents a valid ground for relief.").
465.
Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
466.
1 Vet.App. 596, 606 (1991).
467.
The statutory power of the Court of Veterans Appeals is found in 38 U.S.C. §
7265.
468.
86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873); see supra notes 41 and text accompanying note 165.
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petition the government is important enough to create a specific court to
handle grievances against the executive as a grant of authority to extend
statutes of limitations for equitable reasons, perhaps indicating a triumph of
the Petition Clause over the appropriations clause.
VI. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

Faced with seemly ad hoc determinations of what constitutional vector prevails, we are left with the following question: what coherent legal
theories are available in an Article I court to a litigant injured by the
government's conduct? What remedies can an Article I court can provide
without exceeding its jurisdiction? To answer these questions we must
look to the very nature of rights and remedies.
It is generally assumed that an erroneous legal position taken by the
government can be remedied by the judiciary once a court has jurisdiction.
Even though judicial review of agency positions was not explicitly written
into the Constitution (some have even suggested that it was stumbled
upon 469) courts are generally capable of imposing their own statutory or
constitutional interpretation upon the government. This imposition may
result in a remand to an agency, or money refunded when the agency is
required by statute to give or receive money.
Unfortunately, a general reluctance to rely on the "supervisory authority" of the federal courts limits the ability of courts to decide such issues.
For example, in United States v. Horn,47 ° the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit found that to order the payment of attorney fees, absent a specific
statute, was an incursion into the public fisc. 471 However, this position has
not prevented Article 1H courts from using their supervisory powers to do
what is concededly within their power, such as dismissing criminal
charges. 472 While sovereign immunity may prevent courts from fashioning
monetary remedies against the federal government, the supervisory power

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
469.
29 F.3d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
470.
332, 341 (1943)).
See also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983) (holding that,
471.
waiver aside, sovereign immunity bars the shifting of attorney fees against the federal
government). The court, in Horn concluded, however, that "[d]espite the fact that, in recent
years, the domain of sovereign immunity has tended to contract and the domain of
supervisory power has tended to expand, we believe that sovereign immunity ordinarily will
trump supervisory power in a head-to-head confrontation." Horn, 29 F. 3d at 764.
See, e.g., United States v. Leung, 351 F.Supp.2d 992, 997 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
472.
("Even if the conduct does not amount to a due process violation, a court may nonetheless
dismiss charges 'under its supervisory powers."').
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will allow a court to act contrary to government wishes, in whole or in part,
once the subject matter is within the court's jurisdiction.
When a petitioner avails himself of judicial review of a specific
agency action, for example, after petitioning the Tax Court, that petitioner
is forever barred from seeking relief via a separate lawsuit against those
involved in defending the agency, and even though the proceedings are
supposed to be fair, there may no remedy for government interference with
the proceedings in collateral litigation.473 Recall the government's apparent
argument (initially accepted by the Tax Court) in Dixon that though a right
to honest advocacy exists, there is no specific remedy (apart from, perhaps,
a default judgment against the government-a drastic measure rejected by
the Ninth Circuit).474
Faced with arguments that the Tax Court had not punished the government for letting its attorneys lie and enter into something resembling an
undisclosed "Mary Carter" agreement,475 the Ninth Circuit, in Dixon, relied
on its inherent power to vacate a judgment that the government had
procured by fraud and impose an equitable remedy. The Ninth Circuit had
vindicated the right to petition the government and judicial power over
controversies, finding that said money should be repaid, perhaps at the
expense of the public fisc. The Ninth Circuit left the determination of the
exact amount of the refund to the Tax Court, although at the time of this
writing no refunds have been made to the aggrieved taxpayers.
Therefore only two questions remain. First, does every right--even
those not found in statutes that courts are asked to apply-have a correlative remedy? Second, if the only possible remedy for such a right requires
a court to look to equitable principles, must a body within the judicial
power of the United States have equitable power to provide such a remedy,
i.e., vacation of a judgment or final decision that was procured by fraud?
A.

CLASSICAL VIEWS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

Throughout history it has been common for lawyers to assert that
every right had an accompanying remedy. 476 However, the maxim ubijus,

473.
Attempts to sue IRS agents under Bivens have been thwarted as the courts have
found that Congress created a separate remedial regime. Hudson Valley Black Press v. IRS,
307 F. Supp. 2d 543, 549-50 (2004). However, this case was not dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, but rather for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
474.
Appellee's Brief, Dixon, supra note 27 at 68-70.
475.
For a description of "Mary Carter" Agreements, see infra note 547 and
accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Loughrey, 172 U.S. 206, 232 (1898) ("The maxim,
476.
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imi remedium does not necessarily translate into a substantive rule of
decision or jurisdictional grant. 4 7
Indeed, maxims have never been
considered substantive rights, but rather observed relationships between
various "customs" in the law.478
The view that ubi jus, imi remedium is a maxim of equity was probably first articulated by Richard Francis. 47 9 However, others, such as
William Blackstone, 480 and Roscoe Pound 48' argued that this is a general
principle of law that could be subject to various constructions. Unless482
it
was a "custom" to follow a pattern of behavior, a right is of little effect.
Instead, Blackstone saw maxims not as creating "positive law" but rather as
a relationship between the law as declared by the "legislator" (which
included the king, parliament, various customs, and even the Magna Carta)
and the method by which a wrong would be redressed.4 83 In today's terms,

'Ubi jus, ibi remedium,' lies at the very foundation of all systems of law") (White, J.
dissenting); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("'In all other cases,'
he says, 'it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."' (quoting
BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 23)); Ashby v. White, 87 Eng.Rep. 808, 816 (1702) ("If a
statute gives a right, the common law will give a remedy to maintain that right.").
477.
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies Of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1142 (1992).
478.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 68.
479.
Richard Francis, Maxims of Equity (1728). In sum, his maxims, expressed as
chapter titles, were as follows: 1) He that will have equity done to him, must do it to the
same person; 2) he that hath committed inequity, shall not have equity; 3) equality is equity;
4) it is equity that should make satisfaction, he who receives the benefit; 5) it is equity that
should have satisfaction, he who sustained the loss; 6) equity suffers not a right without a
remedy; 7) equity relieves against accidents; 8) equity prevents mischief; 9) equity prevents
multiplicity of suits; 10) equity regards length of time; 11) equity will not suffer a double
satisfaction to be taken; 12) equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or
forfeiture, where compensations can be made; 13) equity regards not the circumstance, but
the substance of the act; and 14) where the equity is equal, the law must prevail.
480.
BLACKSTONE,supra note 8, at 109.
481.
ROSCOE POUND, On CertainMaxims of Equity, CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 809
(1921).
482.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §3.
483.
OLP, supra note 8, at 55 (quoting BLACKSTONE, at 53-54). Blackstone's
treatise reads:
For this purpose every law may be said to consist of several parts: one,
declaratory; whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be
eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down: another, directory:
whereby the subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights,
and to abstain from the commission of those wrongs: a third, remedial:
whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's private rights, or
redress his private wrongs; to which may be added a fourth, usually
termed the sanction, or vindicatory branch of the law; whereby it is sig-
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according to Blackstone, maxims organize whatever substantive rights
were provided by the legislature.
Herbert Broom described the maxim "where there is a right there is a
remedy" as an observation that if a person has legal authority to demand
something he may enforce that remedy via a "cause of action." 4 8 To
Broom, a right was cognizable, but new in "instance" if there was a new set
of facts, but a similar underlying principal injury, enabling common law
courts to step outside precedent and provide a remedy once the matter is
entrusted to them.485 Hence, in this case, the maxim stands for the
proposition that courts do grant remedies where there is a right to such a
remedy.48 6
Complicating the issue is the tendency of all branches of government
to speak of rights without providing a specific remedy for them. In
executive orders, the President will usually simultaneously declare that
agents of government should do one thing, but add that this order provides
no substantive rights.
B. THE HART AND SACKS VIEW OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

While some see rights without remedies as either nullities, or mere
aspirations about the way society should be,487 Hart and Sacks' conception
provides a working model of the relationship between rights and remedies.
In short, while rights may not have free-standing remedies, a right without

Id.

nified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as commit any
public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.

484.
HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND
ILLUSTRATED 153-54 (1854).
485.
Id.
486.
See Roscoe Pound, Maxims of Equity, 34 HARv. L. REv. 809, 832 (1920-192 1).
487.
See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 724 (1987). Zeigler
argues that limited enforcement of a right does not diminish its importance, and suggests
that the government be made to show a reason why individual rights should not be enforced
against it. However, in exploring the exact relationship between rights and remedies,
Hohfield saw that each right came with a correlative duty to act or refrain from acting for
the befit of another person. Hohfield, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 38 (1919).
Therefore, a right without a remedy is nothing more than a "wish" or a "general statement of
policy." Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement
of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 (1987). Likewise, a similar
view holds that while such a view may be a good description of the behavior of courts, as if
a court is fashioning a remedy it must be basing it on a right, there is no historical support
for the notion that rights exist and therefore call into existence a series of remedies. Id. at
677.
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a remedy may serve as a defense to another cause of action by another.
Unfortunately, this dichotomy is turned on its head in Article I courts
where it is the petitioner that fires the first shot, suing the government for
an incorrect determination. Rather than asserting a defense to the opposing
party's cause of action, a petitioner must claim that these rights entitle them
to, what amounts to a counter-defense to what is presumably a valid
argument by the government-i.e., that they went through the required
formalities involved in taking some money.48 8 In Article I courts, rather
than assert a right without a specific statutory remedy as a defense to a
cause of action interposed by the government, a petitioner must assert it in
response to the government's claim that it is entitled to receive (or keep)
certain funds, and that it has gone through the necessary formalities to keep
them. 89
The question of "what is a remedy" exists outside of a constitutional
context and finds its roots in jurisprudential theories predating the
Constitution.49 ° While many theorists conflated the concepts of legal rights
and remedies by arguing that one does not have a right if the courts cannot
apply a remedy, Professors Hart and Sacks bifurcated these concepts,
arguing that it was possible for primary rights to exist without correlative
remedies. Instead, these rights may manifest themselves as a defense. For
example, while there is no independent right to be insane, insanity may be
raised as a defense to criminal charge because our system of laws finds no
utility in criminally punishing the insane.
Hart and Sacks' model of bifurcated rights and remedies is useful in
analyzing the powers of a court of limited jurisdiction. It is possible to see
that even though a petitioner's first choice of remedies may not be within
the jurisdiction of the court to provide, the court may still be able to
adjudicate the issue without fear of simply passing on intellectual questions
when it has no power to render an enforceable judgment.

See, e.g., Weimerskirch v. Comm'r, 596 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[the]
488.
Commissioner... cannot rely on the presumption in the absence of a minimal evidentiary
foundation.").
For example, at the Tax Court, the IRS must show that it issued a valid and
489.
timely statutory notice of deficiency as required by 26 U.S.C. 6212(a), and that it has some
basis beyond being "rested on the presumption of correctness and the petitioner challenged
the notice of deficiency on the grounds that it was arbitrary." Jackson v. CIR,73 T.C. 394,
401 1979 WL 3735 (1980).
See supra notes 476 to 486 and accompanying text.
490.
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1. GeneralDirectives
Hart and Sacks conceived of a "law" as a series of "directive arrangements.",491 These arrangements are promulgations that are projected into the
future and are "entitled to observance and acceptance Oy all members of the
society. 4 92 Some arrangements speak only to a small group of people or to
the government itself. 493 These arrangements are only authoritative
because they were made in compliance with an underlying arrangement.494
Accordingly, underlying directives give governmental bodies the power to
create other directives. However, it is not necessary for them to be
imposed by constitution, and a legislative body, by paying private claims,
would provide such an arrangement for the rest of the government.49 5
General directives, according to Hart and Sacks, are initially formulated by some sort of governing body. Most such directives are "selfapplying" and individuals will comply with them voluntarily, even if the
arrangement is ultimately "regulatory" or would, at some point, invoke the
court's coercive powers. Most norms of behavior that are codified into
statutes fit this mold. Others, such as divorce and bankruptcy, are
4 96
"individually administered" and require the approval of a court.
So, in practice, for example, the Internal Revenue Code generally
directs all members of society, in the future, to pay part of their income to
the government, via a system of self-reporting and verification.497
However, as a part of that directive, it allows some groups to reduce that
income by other expenses.498 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court
rules, or the portions of Titles 26 and 28 create and regulate the Tax Court
and the Court of Federal Claims. Although these powers generally speak to

491.

HENRY

M.

HART,

AND ALBERT M.

SACKS.

THE LEGAL PROCESS:

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 113 (2001).

BASIC

492.
Id. at 114.
493.
These specific directives, interestingly enough, according to Hart and Sacks,
speak to private persons, in so far as they can consider disregarding an unconstitutional Act
of Congress. Id. at 118. They also note that the Constitution speaks indirectly to the courts
to determine whether Congress has done what it was supposed to do (or done something that
it was not supposed to).
494.
Id.
495.
See supra note 36-37 and accompanying text.
496.
HART and SACKS, supra note 491 at 120-21 ("You cannot, as a married man,
say to yourself, 'such and such has happened, and that women is no longer my wife."').
497.
26 U.S.C. § 6213(b)(4) ("Any amount paid as a tax or in respect of a tax may be
assessed upon the receipt of such payment.").
498.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §270(a)(2)(B) (allowing deductions by artists for "expenses
paid or incurred by a... performing artist in connection with the performances by him of
services in the performing arts as an employee").
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a relatively small group of people who appear before courts, they exist only
because another set of laws mandates that certain people may seek either
relief from the government's dictates, or may enlist the government's help
in resolving private disputes provided that they comply with certain
procedures.
In practice, the Internal Revenue Code is individually
administered only when the government disputes the amount the taxpayer
thinks he is owed or a taxpayer seeks a refund. Most other disputes that
come before Article I courts are similar to refund actions, as it is not
possible for an individual to unilaterally decide that the government must
pay a veterans' benefit or fulfill its obligations under a contract without
executive agreement or judicial decision-making.
In Hart and Sacks' world, courts (though some might not want to admit it for political reasons) perform a function similar to that of a legislature by articulating directives. In general, courts make decisions, rather
than enacting laws that are less specific about what constitutes a duty.
Courts have more flexibility in articulating their decisions, 499 though
protocols of review usually require detailed explanations. However, unlike
modern American legislatures, they also apply and enforce those directives.
Various actors apply enactments and rely on decisional law. Police
officers may give tickets, or individuals may enlist a court's help in using
the power of the state to achieve a result. The IRS may send a taxpayer a
"Notice of Proposed Deficiency." After the tentative application, a final
decision is made which usually includes a punishment or payment of taxes,
a penalty, or a fine. 5°° This final decision may include "elaboration" in
which the body that makes the final determination attempts to discern any
unstated or ambiguous meaning in the terms of the directive. 50 1
2. PrimaryRights
Hart and Sacks saw that individuals occupied various "characteristic
positions" with regard to others in directive arrangements.5 2 These

499.
HART and SACKS, supra note 491 at 126.
500.
Id. at 119-20.
501.
Id.
502.
For the purposes of my argument, other views of the "rights-remedies"
dichotomy are of only tangential interest. However, some take the "sanctionist" viewpoint
and posit that there is no right if something does not have a remedy. Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 n.230

(1997).

According to Professor Katz, if courts are only going to apply so much of the "remedial
law" as would effectuate one purpose, but not another, such a choice must be "rationally

justified." Al Katz, The JurisprudenceOf Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality And The Law
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"characteristic positions" include the various legal duties, individual
liberties, government largess, or reductions (and potential refunds of
overpayments of) taxes. 503
Hart and Sacks first articulated that primary law is that which is expected or hoped for when a private arrangement or other legal guarantee
works. 5° It exists independent of litigation, 0 5 and may be articulated in
terms of a general policy. 5°6 Directive arrangements that are addressed to
individuals include primary private powers, 0 7 primary private duties, 0 8
and primary private liberties.l5

Of Torts In Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1968). Professor Katz's view may
suggest that some primary rights only spring into existence when the taxpayer gives up
some rights. By giving up a right to a jury trial, the taxpayer gains access to the Tax Court
which serves several purposes - both for the government and, allegedly for the taxpayer
(though most are procedural in nature): 1) provided for appointment of "specialist judges"
who has much more expertise in deciding complex Tax Cases on a de novo basis; 2)
allowed litigants not to prepay their tax liability; 3) provided for nationwide jurisdiction;
and 4) provides all parties with quick review of cases, based not only on the court's
efficiency, but a 90-day window with which to file suit. Hart and Sacks saw themselves as
at odds with others, such as Professors Corbin and Hohfield who, they claimed, blurred the
issue by essentially arguing that it is obvious that if there is no remedy, there is no right, but
concede that in some circumstances the secondary right may be in addition to an obligation
to perform a court-ordered performance of a primary duty.[0] Arthur L. Corbin, Legal
Analysis and Terminology, Night And Day: Coeur D'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of
the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction In Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 29 YALE L.J.
163 (1919); Wesley N. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, and Other Legal Essays, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), and 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
Professor Corbin defines a primary right as "a right resulting from some operative fact that
was not itself a violation of some precedent right," and a secondary or remedial right as "a
right resulting from some operative fact that was a violation of some precedent right,"
However, in a strange interaction between constitutional jurisprudence[0] and more
rudimentary discussion of the nature of law it is necessary to distinguish between U.S.
district courts that are bound by the Constitution's "case or controversy" requirement, and
courts that are created under Article I. Therefore, it is possible (and, in fact, likely) that
such a court may decide that there, in fact, is a right, but that it is powerless to grant the
chosen remedy.
503.
HART AND SACKS, supra note 491, at 130.
504.
Id. at 122.
505.
Henry Paul Monaghan, FederalStatutory Review Under Section 1983 and the
APA, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 233, 249 (1991).
506.
See infra note 534 and accompanying text.
507.
HART AND SACKS, supra note 491, at 133-34 (describing a primary private
power as "a capacity ... to effect a deliberate act [that will be] enforced by the official
representative of the group.").
508.
Id. at 130-31 (describing a primary private duty as a "recognized obligation of a
private person not to do something, or to do it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed
way.").
Id. at 132-33 (describing a primary private liberty as a the absence of a duty).
509.
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A primary private duty is a "recognized obligation" to do something
or refrain from doing something. 510 A breach of such duty might give rise
to a remedial private duty-but such instances are rare. Until recently
modem criminal statutes did little more than mandate a punishment, and
victims were at the mercy of a prosecutor to seek a restitution judgment.
Offenders cannot opt, for example,
to fix the damage they did, thereby
51
absolving themselves of guilt. '

To Hart and Sacks, "a primary private power" is the right of an individual to enlist the help of the state in securing the following: contractual
damages, orders of specific performance, actions for ejectment, or tort
damages.5 12
Finally, a primary liberty is the absence of one of those duties.51 3 Hart
and Sacks point out that these liberties refer only to freedom from state
interference (such as the ability to resist state indoctrination into a religion),
but do not guarantee that an individual actually has the ability to realize
their powers insofar as they conflict with another's liberties.51 4 However,
these rights, by themselves, do not necessarily solve the injured parties'
problems.
3. Remedial Rights
On the other hand, a remedial provision "directs that a certain consequence, or sanction, may or shall follow upon an acknowledgement or
formal official determination of noncompliance with the relevant primary
provision. 51 5 Remedial provisions 1) must provide enough of a punishment for violation of primary rights that are not violated so commonly as to
cause a breakdown in the system; 51 6 2) "deal justly with the particular
situation that the deviation presents"; and 3) guide parties in working out
settlements that would normally be decided by courts.51 7 Yet not every
primary right is directly associated with a remedial right.

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 137.

supra note 491, at 133.
Hohfield referred to this as a privilege. See supra note 487.
HART AND SACKS, supra note 49 1, at 133.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
HART AND SACKS,
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4. Rights of Action
The "capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative
application upon a disputed question about the application of preexisting
arrangements and to secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an
appropriate official remedy," is termed, by Hart and Sacks to be a "right of
action." 5t 8 This places the holder into a "positive" position rather than
merely describing the holder's relation to others. 5 19 When courts do
adjudicate all of the rights and duties (an authoritative application) they
have adjudicated a remedial duty.52°
The Supreme Court has, to some extent, conflated remedial rights and
primary rights. However, its analysis is not in conflict with the analysis
Instead, it analyzed whether specific
proposed by Hart and Sacks.
Congressional directives can allow an individual to invoke a court's power.
In order to determine what Congressional policies may give birth to private
rights of action, the Supreme Court announced a four-part test in Cort v.
Ash5 2 ' and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.522 The test looked to: 1)
whether there is any legislative intent to create or deny a private judicial
remedy; 2) whether the plaintiff is in the class the statute sought to benefit;
3) whether a private judicial remedy would be consistent with the
legislative scheme; and 4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally
relegated to state law. The Comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts §
874A 523 applies a similar methodology in determining whether, in fact, a
cause of action exists, looking not just to statutes, but also to administrative
regulations. 524 Even after the courts restricted the ability of Congress to

518.
519.
520.

Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138.

HART AND SACKS, supra note 491, at 138.
521.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
522. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Later opinions reduced this analysis to just two prongs.
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
523.
The text of the provision is relatively simple:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing
or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the
violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate
in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the
effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class
a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of
action analogous to an existing tort action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).
524.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §874A, cmt. a (1979) ("As used in this

Section, the term "legislative provision" includes statutes, ordinances and legislative
regulations of administrative agencies at various levels of government.").
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imply a cause of action, commentators still argued that Congress might not
ever be able to limit the powers of the courts to imply private rights of
action and to fashion remedies thereupon.525
When faced with a breach of statutory duty, federal courts traditionally adopted the criteria in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 285-288 to
determine whether there was a remedy, and therefore a cause of action,5 26
of negligence per se in
and then simply applied the common law doctrine
527
claim.
a
stated
plaintiff
a
whether
determining
While the Tax Court has never addressed this issue, the Court of Federal Claims applied the Supreme Court's test in Ash, and found that private
rights of action were not implied in a statute,528 showing that, at a minimum, Article I courts are capable of this analysis even when the government is the defendant. Likewise, Zeigler also points out that a court can act
to ensure the effectiveness of a statute.529
According to Professor Vazquez, one need not establish that there is a
cause of action in order to assert a defense, merely that there is a primary
right. 530 However, one may still have to convince a federal court that there
53
is standing to assert such a defense. However, if a party has standing, '
Vazquez concludes, there is a cause of action. 532 So, in the Tax Court, a
violation of right to be free from governmental mischief can be used to
offset a proposed deficiency.
Numerous private rights of action find their roots in the Constitution.
Specifically, the First Amendment's Petition Clause may, as discussed
supra, provide a private right of action even in the face of sovereign

525.
See Zeigler, supra note 487, at 724 (also citing Congressional intent for courts
to create causes of action).
526.
Id. at 708.
527.
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
528.
Reidell v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 770, 772 (1999). C.f. Passaro v. United
States, 4 Cl. Ct. 395, 399 (1984), rev'd. 774 F.2d 456 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Tucker Act
jurisdiction lacking because no "presently due" money damages were present).
529.
Zeigler, supra note 487, at 717.
530.
Vazquez, supra note 477, at 1143 n.251 (1992) ("[A] defendant being
prosecuted or sued under a state or prior federal law that is inconsistent with a treaty is
entitled to invoke the treaty in court to nullify the state or federal law without having to
show that the treaty confers a private right of action."); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,
197 (1961) ("Our National Government's assent to these international agreements . . .
precludes any State from deciding that Yugoslavian laws meeting the standards of those
agreements can be the basis for defeating rights conferred by the 1881 Treaty.").
531.
Id. at 1142 n.245 (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-89 (1980);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1980); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-76 (1969)).
532.
Id.
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immunity arguments. Article II may provide for review of agency
decisions to ensure that they comport with federal law, even if there is not a
statutory mechanism for direct review, though Vazquez and other theorists
posit that such review could even be in a state court.533

Likewise, the

Administrative Procedures Act tidied up the process somewhat, by
allowing suits to be filed directly against various agencies, rather than
against an individual party, such as a tax collector.534
As discussed above, when determining what remedies are available,
Article I courts are limited to who they have jurisdiction over, but they still
possess jurisdiction to issue judgments and decisions. This is not to say
that these courts do not attempt to analyze areas of law that they do not
have jurisdiction to enforce. They simply do so, not to alter the party's
rights vis-A-vis his or her former spouse or business partner, but to
determine rights vis- -vis the government determined by property,
contractual, or tort remedies imposed under state or federal law. 535 In most
cases, these courts feel confident in adjudicating these questions, but they
can and
will stay proceedings while another court arrives at the correct
53 6
result.

Whatever the case, an apparent jurisdictional limitation by Congress
does not prevent courts from deciding questions that are inseparable from
the controversies before them, or from acting in accordance with the scope
of their inherent power. Therefore, a Congressional limitation on the
court's jurisdiction only applies to the rights that a party may assert have
been violated in his complaint. However, since jurisdiction implies that a
court has some power, the court may fashion a remedy based on the
application of equitable doctrines that become relevant in the course of its
proceedings.53 7

533.
Id. at 1151 ("[S]ome measure of review by an Article III court-or perhaps a
state court-is thought to be required either by Article III or by the Due Process Clause
itself.").
534.
Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in
Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 554 n.110 (1982). For a brief period, smaller
suits could be maintained under the Tucker act against the U.S. directly, whereas suits
greater than $1,000 had to be against the Tax Collector. Robert B. Nadler, Math Error
Notices: In Search of TaxpayerRights, 2003 TNT 131-6 (2003).
535.
See, e.g., Utilicorp United v. Comm'r., 104 T.C. 670, 675 (1995) (Court has
inherent power to determine whether it may receive offered testimony even if such a
conclusion would require inquiry determining whether offered witness was in violation of
state law).
536.
See also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719-21 (1996) (a
federal court may stay action pending resolution of the state-law issue).
537.
In most, if not all cases, the government can indisputably argue that the remedy
of "specific performance" is not available to its opponents in civil cases, since the

2005]
C.

ARTICLE I COURTS

SOURCES OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS TO FAIR TREATMENT

While it is easy to condemn misbehavior by government lawyers,
courts have been reluctant to fashion remedies for their misconduct in the
same manner that they would for other parties. Perhaps this hesitation is
tied to the role of government attorneys. An executive understanding of
what government attorneys should do, and a view that so-called "Mary
Carter" agreements may violate certain canons of ethics and give rise to
substantive rights, provide a source of law on the subject.
1. The "Better Than Private Litigants" View
One source of the substantive law governing government lawyers,
besides the Petition Clause and Zimmerman Brush, may lie in executive
procedures. President George H. W. Bush signed an executive order
directing government lawyers not only to engage in fair-play, but also to
Unfortunately, the order was
utilize alternative dispute resolution.
"intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch
in resolving disputes, conducting litigation in a reasonable and just manner,
and reviewing legislation and regulations. 53 8 However, even so, the
President's view of proper government attorney conduct is some normative
indication of which customs will be followed in society, at least, by agents
of the government. Therefore, even if the government argues that the
constitutional position of a court requires that it only review (or revisit de
novo) a factual determination of the government, any court must still
resolve what effect (if any) such a custom has on its final determination.
According to Lord Coke, neither the executive nor the legislature can

government always has the option of providing "just compensation" to a party for taken
property. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
538.
Exec. Order No. 12,778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640 (Oct. 23, 1991). President Clinton
signed a similar order, which, although revoking President Bush's order, retained most of
the language. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4727 (Feb. 7, 1996). Most, if not all,
recent presidents have issued similar orders with similar caveats, and I do not mean to imply
that this President did anything out of the normal practice. Standing alone this order has not
provided a basis for a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 2001 WL
1203288 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (after suit was brought against taxpayer, court concluded that this
executive order did not require pre-service notice because "[i]t is only when a violation of
the [Internal Revenue] Manual [incorporating the executive order] reaches the level of a
constitutional violation will any action by the IRS be set aside."). Some speculate that the
Taxpayer Advocate Service can act to restrain the IRS from using certain illegally or
unethically obtained evidence; however, it is unlikely that this happened.
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simply declare that the jurisdiction of the court has evaporated once
government conduct outside the accepted norms has been discovered.5 39
In matters before Article I courts, the legislature is not constitutionally
obligated to accept judicial fact-finding. 540 However, where Congress has
chosen to place these matters in the hands of the judiciary, the right to fair
treatment is a substantive right that may be implied in whatever rights are
found within the courts' jurisdiction. Even the redeterminists see that
government counsel is obligated not just to defend the interests of the
government but to assist the court in coming to the correct legal and factual
conclusions regardless of the outcome. 54 1 When Congress created the
Article I courts, it did not see such litigation as a nuisance, but rather as a
political necessity 542 and specifically declared that the government would
be represented by counsel-it even created specific offices to handle these
cases. 543 Therefore, since the government has gladly ventured into these
forums, should not government attorneys be held to their own norms of
behavior? Moreover, once a litigant proceeds in one of these forums, it is
unlikely that he can collaterally litigate the behavior of counsel under
Bivens.544 Therefore, at least in the case of tax collection, once a litigant
petitions an Article I court, there is little chance that collateral litigation or

539.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
540.
Courts have split on whether prosecutorial misconduct (by state actors) in the
form of coercing witnesses does not give rise to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because
only the witness's rights (and not the defendant's) are violated. Michaels v. New Jersey, 50
F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1999), aff'd, 222 F.3d 118 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1118
(2001); cf. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (action available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for denials of liberty for manufacture of evidence). Also, as the history detailed
above indicates, legislative fact-finding was the norm until the Civil War. See supra notes
215-28 and accompanying text.
541.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
542. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
543.
At first a special solicitor was appointed to represent the government before the
Court of Claims, but later the Department of Justice was assigned the task. 28 U.S.C. §
518(a); Shimomura, supra note 62, at 652. At the Tax Court, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has always been represented by attorneys from the Internal Revenue Service. 26
U.S.C. § 7452 (2004) ("The Secretary shall be represented by the Chief Counsel for the
Internal Revenue Service or his delegate in the same manner before the Tax Court as he has
heretofore been represented in proceedings before such Court."); William Rands, Section
356(a)(2): A Study of Uncertainty in Corporate Taxation, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 75 n.203
(1983).
544.
In general, in denying a Bivens remedy courts seem to look to whether or not
there is some remedy for denials of rights. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 (1983)
("Federal civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that
encompasses substantive provisions forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and
procedures-administrative and judicial-by which improper action may be redressed.").

20051

ARTICLE I COURTS

administrative procedures will be successful, so substantive rights to fair
treatment from government adversaries must be recognized in these fora.
2. Mary Carterand the Judiciary
Besides the executive's stated desire to have its agents behave ethically, the judiciary has addressed, based on common law principles, the
need for complete disclosure of the parties' litigative interests in order to
avoid improper fact-finding. Punishment of offenses against the court are
within the discretion of the trial judge. Once the judge decides that an
offense has occurred, he can simply choose to embarrass the litigant with a
published decision, or he can impose a fine or require that the guilty party
compensate the victim for any losses incurred. During the discovery
process, however, the time and effort of parties is at stake, and failure to
conform to specific orders or discovery procedure creates a right that the
court must vindicate.54 5
However, in various fora, defendants in multi-party liti ation have
chanced upon the idea of making a deal with the plaintiff.In these
agreements, the plaintiff and one defendant enter an agreement that
obligates the settling defendant to remain in the trial but fixes his liability
based on a set amount or formula based on the final judgment against the
non-settling defendant.- 7 Typically, the "cooperating" defendant does not

545.
For example, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 376 (1990),
the Court noted that Rule 11 sanctions are collateral. Therefore, they may be adjudicated
after the underlying litigation has terminated. See also Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv.,
No. 98-35361, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 402 at *7 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that under the
revised version of Rule 11, it no longer applies to discovery violations under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26-37) (Ferguson, J., dissenting); Topalian v. Ehrman, 3 F.3d 931, 936 n.5 (5th cir. 1993)
("Rule 11 involves mandatory sanctions once a violation is found, while 28 U.S.C. § 1927
leaves the decision whether or not to impose a sanction to the court's discretion; Rule 11
and § 1927 deal with claims and pleadings in general, while Rules 26(g) and 37 deal only
with discovery abuses."); Bell v. Bell, No. 86-4321, 1986 US. App. LEXIS 36886 (5th Cir.
1996) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) as requiring that "[i]f a party has failed to make a
requested admission as to a matter later proven to be true, then the rule permits the
requesting party to apply to the court for an order requiring the first party to pay him the
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof."); Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1135
(5th Cir. 1980) ("[I]f certain requirements are not met the court shall impose sanctions upon
application or motion.").
546.
See, e.g., Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
547.
John E. Benedict, Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary CarterAgreement,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 368, 368 n.1 (1987). The note further describes these agreements as:
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have nearly the assets that the other one does. After such a deal, their
interests are aligned. Such is the case when a driver of an automobile finds
himself a co-defendant with the automobile manufacturer after being sued
by the victim of a crash. This is decidedly unethical. 548 To be sure, this
situation resembles Dixon, except that in "test case" litigation before the
Tax Court, the petitioners agree to be bound by the results of one or a few
tried test cases, and while similar situations and similar facts are at issue,
the parties are not actually "co-parties."
For our purposes, however, the question is whether a defendant who
lacks knowledge of the agreement had his rights violated. After all, even
though such an agreement is distasteful on its face, the defendant is still
able to present his case in its entirety, and, of course, could argue, on
appeal, that there was a structural defect in the proceedings. He is only
deprived of a potential teammate in the fight against a common enemy, and
arguably a procedural right, which, in most cases can be remedied by a new
trial.

First, the settling defendant guarantees the plaintiff a minimum payment, regardless of the court's judgment. Second, the plaintiff agrees
not to enforce the court's judgment against the settling defendant. Third,
the settling defendant remains a party in the trial, but his exposure is reduced in proportion to any increase in the liability of his codefendants
over an agreed amount. Some Mary Carter agreements include a fourth
element: that the agreement be kept secret between the settling parties.
Id. at 369-70.
548.
Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("There is,
indeed, much to suggest that government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because their
client is not only the agency they represent but also the public at large."); Cobell v. Babbitt,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20918, at *197 (D.D.C. 1999) (collecting cases); Zimmerman v.
Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Any ethical and procedural
obligation of a private attorney to be fair to opponents and candid with the court is
enforceable when the litigant is represented by an attorney for the government."); City of
Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1977) (government attorney in eminent
domain has affirmative duty to develop full and fair record); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-14 (1981) ("A government lawyer in a civil action . . . has the
responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his
position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust
settlements or results."); Lory A. Barsdate, The Republican Civic Tradition:Attorney-Client
Privilegefor the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1738 (1988) ("The government has
an obligation to advance the public interest in litigation, a feature distinguishing government
attorneys from attorneys for private parties."); see also Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co.
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("We find it
astonishing that an attorney for a federal administrative agency could so unblushingly deny
that a government lawyer has obligations that might sometimes trump the desire to pound an
opponent into submission.").
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Nevertheless, some courts have held that Mary Carter agreements do
substantive damage. 549 For example, plaintiffs may release any claims they
might have had against the defendant. 550 Therefore, it is within the power
of a court to provide a remedy for such substantive damage.5
3. Substantive Impact of Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility
Finally, some courts have begun to consider that attorney ethics, customs, and standards of gentlemanly litigation create substantive rights. As
it stands now, some discharged attorneys have successfully sued their
former employers claiming that they were fired in violation of state public
policy - i.e. the applicable attorney disciplinary rules - for doing exactly
what they were supposed to do.552 However, as of yet, it has not been
argued that the public policy for ethical attorneys in federal courts is so
strong that the court must recognize a substantive right on behalf of adverse
litigants to have their opponents follow each rule. Nevertheless, in view of
some initial willingness to consider disciplinary rules as creating substantive rights, enforceable by individuals, this may soon be the case.

549.
In Schick v. Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464, 466 (S.D. 1986) the court noted that
for choice of law purposes the validity of a Mary Carter type release is governed by the
substantive law of where the tort occurred, regardless of where the release was signed. In
this case, after undertaking the choice of law analysis, the court concluded that under the
law of the state where the tort occurred, the release was invalid, not merely inadmissible or
otherwise procedurally excluded from the trial. Put in other terms, an undisclosed
realignment of the interests of the parties, even before a judge alters their ability to protect
their interest. See also American Dredging Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 425, 429;
William John Dedrick, Mary Carter Agreements in Maritime PersonalInjury Suits, 22 S.
TEX. L. J. 545, 551 (1982) (describing settling party's adversity as "ostensibly adverse").
550.
See, e.g., Margetts et al. v. Timmer et al., [1996] A.R. 42, 53 26. (Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench Judicial District of Edmonton 1996).
551.
Typically, a remedy for Mary Carter agreement consists of admission of the
agreement to show bias. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Continental Imports, 610 A.2d 446 (Pa. 1992);
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1977). In other cases, courts
have reduced the number of preemptory juror challenges available to the colluding
codefendants. Greiner v. Zinker, 573 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). One court
has even directed that the colluding parties be struck from the lawsuit. Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes,
594 P.2d 354, 360 (Okla. 1978).
552.
See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992); Matzkin v. Delaney,
Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, P.C., No. 0440002885, 2005 WL 2009277 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2005).
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN DIXON

With these specified roles of counsel, that take on a substantive character and executive declaration of good faith,55 3 when litigating in an
Article I court, counsel for the government is charged with an implied duty
of good faith litigation. Therefore a petitioner or plaintiff has a right to an
opponent that acts in good faith. Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the
5 54
executive specifically provided for any remedy when good faith fails.
Nevertheless, simply because there is not an independent right to a remedy
does not mean that a court cannot recognize it, especially when the court is
specifically imbued with jurisdiction and Congress has specifically placed
its lawyers before these courts.
In most cases, courts have fashioned remedies based on their power to
conduct a trial, such as denying the government the benefit of their illegal
conduct by suppressing the illegally obtained evidence. 55 In the civil
context, Article 111 courts tried a number of remedies. While their inherent
power provides the court with the ability to sanction the counsel either
not necessarily provide
monetarily or by way of altering procedures, it does
556
a basis for altering the scope of substantive relief.
In Dixon, where a post-facto analysis was necessary, the Tax Court
attempted to ascertain the exact scope of the harm to its proceedings, and
initially concluded that there was none. 57 However, the Ninth Circuit held
that the taxpayers were entitled to a greater remedy and the Tax Court must
exercise its "inherent power" to discipline the government for its con-

553.
See supra note 547 and accompanying text.
554.
Exec. Order No. 12,778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640 (Oct. 23, 1991) ("This order is
intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch in resolving
disputes, conducting litigation in a reasonable and just manner, and reviewing legislation
and regulations.").
555.
United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissal of
indictment was not warranted unless delay rises to level of outrageous conduct that shocks
the conscience); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935) (reversal where
prosecutor had implied "personal knowledge" of additional evidence because the jury was
likely to have faith in the unsupported representations of the representative of the
sovereign).
556.
"[P]ublic interest requires that the court of its own motion, as is its power and
duty, protect suitors in their right to a verdict, uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to
passion or prejudice." N.Y. Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 (1929). The Sixth
Circuit noted that "[w]here such paramount considerations are involved, procedural niceties
will not preclude a court from correcting error." Pierce v. United States, 86 F.2d 949 (6th
Cir. 1936).
Dixon v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1999-101 (1999).
557.
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duct.558 In essence, the Tax Court found that suitors against the government in Article I courts not only have a right to an ethical adversary, but
the courts are required to determine whether a right has been breached, and
find a remedy. In this case, the Ninth Circuit ordered that the Tax Court
reveal the covert agreement to the non-cooperating taxpayers. 9 In short,
they ordered that the Tax Court apply the equitable remedy of QuasiContract, by finding that the non-cooperating taxpayers should have
benefited from the deal that the IRS was willing to make with those who
cooperated. 56
E. THE FALSE PROHIBITION AGAINST EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
561

It is argued that Article I courts lack the power to act in equity.
This argument, often advanced by courts, misses the mark. There is a
difference between the argument that the Tax Code (or other body of law
relating to government interactions) is substantively unfair, and the position
that equitable principles are needed to accurately apply the code. Congress
has already considered the substantive fairness of the Tax Code, and (with
the exception of Constitutional issues) courts will not revisit its substance.
Moreover, Congress has already provided for several substantive safety
valves to prevent overly oppressive applications of the Tax Code.562 On the
other hand, when the court determines that the government misbehaved in
court, it would be inequitable to give the government what it seeks-an
affirmation of its preliminary determination, for example. The petitioner,
in such a case, is not asking the court to apply equitable principles to a
statute itself, but rather to the government's conduct.
Joseph Story appears to have resolved the apparent inability of some
courts to provide equitable remedies by noting that equity jurisprudence is
divided into roughly three parts: 1) the parts of equity in which the

558.
Dixon, 316 F.3d. at 1047 ("[Wle remand to the trial court with directions to
enter judgment in favor of Appellants and all other taxpayers properly before this Court on
terms equivalent to those provided in the settlement agreement with Thompson and the
IRS.").
Id. at 1047 n. 1I ("We leave to the Tax Court's discretion the fashioning of such
559.
judgments which, to the extent possible and practicable, should put these taxpayers in the
same position as provided for in the [illegitimate] settlement.").
Id.
560.
561.
See Estate of Mueller v. Comm'r, 153 F.3d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1998); Lederman,
supra note 14.
562.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6521 ("Mitigation of effect of limitation in case of related
taxes under different chapters"); 26 U.S.C. § 6015 ("innocent spouse" provisions); 26
U.S.C. § 7122 (offers in compromise).
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Chancery had concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law; 2) equitable
remedies for what were, in effect, legal wrongs; and 3) the Chancery's
"auxiliary" jurisdiction in which it could order various types of specific
performance to support the role of the law courts.563 As stated earlier, the
federal "judicial power" includes law and equity, and the American
conception of equity has not diverged from English principles of equity.564
Therefore, those principles are applicable to American courts.56 5 Congress
has acknowledged this by explicitly providing at least some Article I courts
with jurisdiction to hear some equitable claims, 56 and explicitly declaring
that they had the power to issue writs that were only available in equity,
such as subpoenas. 567 Any resort to a court's equitable power to provide
remedies will only take place when a legal remedy is inadequate. It is
possible that a legal wrong can be righted with either a legal remedy or an
equitable one, though the preference is for a legal remedy.568
If the court resorts to equitable principles necessary to preserve a
right, it will be acting in areas where the law courts and Chancery had
jurisdiction. Article I courts exercise the judicial power of the United
States, which includes self-executing writs and subpoenas authorized by
statute,
if not by their inherent power.
The courts appear to be
exercising part, if not all, of the Chancery's "ancillary jurisdiction," which
aided the law courts by ordering people to do specific things, such as
testify, produce documents, or not leave the country. 57 1 Therefore, their
jurisdiction specifically includes Story's third category.572
Indeed, a reduction of tax liability, for any reason, would likely not be
outside of the Tax Court's jurisdiction, though, of course, it might be an
erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutes. Therefore, Congress has,

563.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 62 (1972).
564.
Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 & n.26 (1949)
("Notwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.").
565.
OLP, supra note 8, at 53.
566.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 302-03 (Public Law 92-415) and 572
(innocent spouse).
567.
See, e.g., supra note 2601 and accompanying text.
568.
See, e.g., Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., 67 U.S. (2
Black) 545, 551 (1862).
569.
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act applying to "all courts established by [an] Act
of Congress"); 26 U.S.C. § 7456(a) (subpoenas in Tax Court). For the history of subpoenas
in the Court of Federal Claims, see supra note 41. For subpoenas in the Court of Veterans
Appeals, see supra note 458 and accompanying text.
570.
See supra Section 1I(B).
571.
Fetter, supra note 39, at §§ 197-99 (1895).
572. Id.
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in fact, explicitly provided them with at least some equitable powers.
These equitable powers, in the absence of a specific statute allowing
citizens to setoff claims by the government were recognized in the early
Court of Claims. While the Supreme Court, in reversing the early Court of
Claims, held that while there was no common law right to setoff,
"[e]quitable claims for credit... may be admitted upon the trial [and] ...
are to be adjudicated as claims for credit, and not as demands for judgment
against the United States. 5 73
This division between remedies unique to equity and decrees which
would be similar to those issued in the law courts (but over areas in which
the law courts did not have common-law jurisdiction) shows why a
nuanced view of the "rights and remedies" dichotomy is necessary. A
petitioner may seek a remedy that is outside the jurisdiction of the court for
a right within the court's jurisdiction. In those circumstances, the court
need only construe the prayer as asserting a defense in the form of a
primary right, without a specific free-standing power to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court (that has not been channeled to other forms), and
rely on equitable principles to fix the value of its violation in terms of a
defense. Therefore, while an Article I court (as in Dixon) can only
redetermine tax574liability, it can calculate it using equitable doctrines such as
quasi-contract.
VII. CONCLUSION

Once Congress places the power to adjudicate matters into the hands
of an independent judiciary, any executive action that interferes with the
power of the judiciary to determine substantive rights risks exposing the
public fisc to additional burdens, as the executive now stands in the place
of a normal litigant regardless of whether its representatives appear before
an Article Ill or an Article I court.
While the government may be entitled to certain advantages, such as
not bearing the risk of liability under a promissory estoppel theory,57 5 when
a cause of action is properly within the jurisdiction of a court, the government may not claim an absolute immunity from sanctions or remedies for
its lawyer's mischief. Instead, Article I courts, when necessary, may use
their jurisdiction as a sword to protect victimized claimants by resolving

573.
574.
575.

United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 484, 490 (1867).
See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
See supra note 102.
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that less money is owed to the government, or the government
576 owes the
petitioner more money under the theory stated in the complaint.
Therefore, since the government, in its Statutory Notice of Deficiency,577 has asserted that the taxpayer owes additional monies, the Tax
Court is empowered and required to provide a remedy for the government's litigative mischief in the form of reduction of the amount the IRS
may assess as the Ninth Circuit did in Dixon. Absent specific congressional diversion of such claims to another forum, Zimmerman Bush
operates to allow Article I courts to refund taxes paid in the rare case that
the government's behavior is so dastardly that the only remedy is cash.

576.
At present, an Article I court may be acting ultra vires if it awards the petitioner
additional money than is arguably evident on the face of the complaint. However, for the
time being, it seems that at least the Federal Circuit has concluded that Article I courts may
award sanctions that go beyond the amount stated in the complaint. See supra note 15.
However, even in Mortenson, which was ultimately affirmed, the Article I court described
its remedy as a partial summary judgment and not a free-standing award of damages. M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. U.S., 15 CI.Ct. 362, 364 (1988).
Clapp v. Comm'r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989) (A statutory notice "is
577.
in many ways analogous to filing a civil complaint.").

